Gladio Free Europe, E10: To Live (with Cnut) https://www.gladiofreeeurope.com/episodes/to-live [0:00:14] And we're back with a new episode of Gladio Free Europe. I'm Liam, and we are here with Russian Sam. [0:00:20] Hello. [0:00:21] And a very special correspondent who some of you might know, Cnut. [0:00:26] What's up, guys? Hope everyone's doing well. [0:00:28] We are here today to talk about a really interesting movie that the three of us saw that actually Russian Sam picked out. It's the 1994 Chinese movie To Live, directed by the really beloved Chinese director, Zhang Yimou, which is sort of a generational story about one Chinese family from the pre-revolutionary period up until basically the end of Maoism. You know, in a way, you can think of it as like a Chinese Forrest Gump, and because it's a Chinese Forrest Gump, instead of ending with this guy inventing running and getting rich, it involves a lot more tragedy and hardship and is also a much more sophisticated work of art. [0:01:08] It's probably one of my favorite Chinese movies that have been produced, bar none. I feel like it's a very comprehensive look at Chinese history. And at the time, it was doing something that hadn't really been done before, as in synthesizing the entire historical experience of Maoism in one movie. [0:01:31] Yeah, and that's what's interesting about this movie is that it really does show the broad scope of the Maoist movement. This just incredibly turbulent time in China, where essentially every aspect of Chinese society was transformed. And it really seems like, both in the movie and through a historical look at Chinese society, that it's very difficult to tell to what extent these transformations were good and to what extent they weren't. You know, there's actually another more recent Chinese movie that I saw called Youth by Feng Xiaogang that does a sort of similar broad overview of Maoism. And although I think that I like that movie a little bit more purely in terms of storytelling, I think what's so interesting about this movie To Live is that it is, like you said, such a broad narrative, where it really tries to show every aspect of Maoist history through the eyes of this one family. [0:02:24] I do think that, however, that the sort of the downside of that, purely as this film as a work of art, is that it involves basically a parade of tragedies because this one family endures a lot of subsequent hardships. And I think that it does become a little bit exhausting seeing so many bad things happen to this family. But I guess that's kind of the point, you know? And I'm sure in real life, there were many families in this period that did experience unimaginable hardship again and again. [0:03:00] Yeah, I watched with my dad. When I told him that I wanted to watch this movie, he had told me that he, this is one of his favorite movies of all time, that he had seen it, I think, originally when it came out. [0:03:10] And your father is Chinese. [0:03:12] I was going to say, my father is Chinese and he was born in the middle of towards the beginning of the Cultural Revolution itself. So he lived through a lot of this and he had a lot of experiences like this. [0:03:22] So he's only a little bit younger than the kids in this movie. [0:03:24] Yeah, he's probably very similar age to some of the children in this movie. And he felt that this is a movie that, if you show it to any Chinese person, they'll cry because they'll feel that this is something that many people have gone through, that most people have gone through in China. That it is very, very sad. It is very, very tragic. But the history of late 20th century in China is in many ways very tragic and very sad. And part of that goes along with this is that it's also not sad to the level that I think a lot of Westerners think that it is at the same time. That's important to keep in mind. This movie has moments of levity and moments of brightness that accompany the tragedy. And depending on how you read the ending, you can think of it as ending on a somewhat happy note. [0:04:03] So it's not necessarily, I think, an unending pile of tragedies, but I think it's a very real feeling that many Chinese people have of going through something very, very difficult on a nationwide scale that I don't think anybody in America can really, in this day and age, can really conceive of in the same way. [0:04:18] No, no, yeah, no. [0:04:20] What you mentioned about how there are moments of levity, I think that really what makes this film so interesting from really a philosophical level is that it's really about not giving up and persevering through this kind of unimaginable hardship that, like you said, Americans can't really comprehend. Although I think ironically, in a weird way, that kind of optimism really is very culturally American. [0:04:43] I would say it's not optimism, though. I think that the more important aspect of it, you're right, the persistence is important, but I don't think it's optimism. I think it's more about, this is my reading, of course. I'm not saying that I'm the authoritative person on this, but I think that it's more about the importance of the persistence of the family, right? I feel like that's such a fundamental part of Chinese society, the way that I feel like a lot of Chinese people view the world and the way that they view their own lives in many ways. My father always says, and my grandmother always says, I do everything for my children, my grandchildren. I'll suffer a million times for them. I'll do whatever I can to preserve them. A sort of extreme duty to your children and a duty to go on no matter what. [0:05:22] I mean, you can see that's one of the unifying themes of this entire movie. It's no matter how much tragedy befalls the family, the family must persist and must continue on no matter what. And I think that's a very key part about this. Even though China itself is radically changing through all this, what remains constant throughout this entire movie, Eve, the relationship between the father and the mother. And so I don't think it's optimism because I don't think he's very optimistic. He's more, the characters are more practical about what it takes to survive and doing whatever it takes to survive. So I guess it's not like it's not looking forward to the possibility of a brighter tomorrow. It's not giving up, even if there is no brighter tomorrow. [0:05:57] Right. [0:05:57] You tell yourself there's a brighter tomorrow, even if there may not be one. [0:06:00] Just talking about the aesthetics of the movie, I think that's something that we should also talk about too, really quickly. [0:06:03] Sure, yeah. [0:06:04] So my mother is white, and so she never, she only went to China when it reopened during the 1990s for the very first time. [0:06:12] Which was when this movie came out, we should add. This is a movie that came out in the, I guess, the post-Deng era, you know, once the major changes had already happened, the major economic liberalization, although the political liberalization that a lot of Westerners and Chinese liberals were hoping for had not happened. [0:06:31] And would never happen. [0:06:33] Well, so far. [0:06:35] But she's someone who came into China with a completely untainted view of what China was. She had no conception of what China looked like and what China was before that. A white person going to China for the very first time. What a culture shock, especially the 1990s. And she laments all the time today how China looks so different than what it used to look like and worse than it used to look like. Even though we see throughout the movie that looks poor and run down to a certain extent, there's a certain charm to it. There's a certain history to it all of these old buildings and the way that they look. Like, it is very beautifully, the stone architecture, the wooden architecture, the gates that you see everywhere. It's beautiful. You can see what old China truly used to look like. Because today, when we think of China, we tend to think of Shanghai, right? [0:07:20] We think of the towering skyscrapers and the modernization of the subways. But it was not always like that. It had its own peculiar form of beauty in the past that, you know, I think has disappeared to a certain extent in the modern day that you don't see quite the same level, especially in the major, major cities. [0:07:37] And one thing we should add, which can segue into our next section, is that Zhang Yimou, the director, he's probably best known in America not for being a chronicler of Chinese history, although he certainly is, but really for being this aesthetic master. Because this movie, To Live, I had never heard of it really until Sam, you brought it up. His most famous movies in the West are much more abstract in story and much more striking in their visuals. Like, you know, his breakthrough in America was Raise the Red Lantern, which is a really interesting movie. But I think that what most casual American audiences are going to take away most of it is just how beautiful it looked with the colors and the architecture and all that. And then his later big hits in America, Hero, 2002, and then House of Flying Daggers, which I think was 2004, are incredibly stylish martial arts movies, which is such a far cry from this one. [0:08:37] Yeah, this is very understated in a lot of ways. I don't think there's any real depictions of violence on screen, and correct me if I'm wrong. [0:08:47] There's definitely. Very briefly, we see one character get shot, be executed. [0:08:52] No, you're right. There is that one scene where he is shot. That is true. But that's the only one, I think, in the entire movie for a movie that has a lot of death and violence in it, right? Not a lot, but has a good amount of death and a good amount of violence. There isn't, it's not, it's very understated for what it is. [0:09:06] And I think that a really important part about this movie in general is the fact that although it does involve, like we said, extreme hardship, a lot of the violence, like you said, is basically anonymous. There's a couple scenes where once the cultural revolution gets underway, characters are essentially taken away, but like you said, we don't see them be killed. And then although bad things happen to characters, it's usually sort of anonymized. The Red Guards are doing really awful things to a lot of people in the third act of the movie, but for the most part, we don't really see it. And the only specific Red Guard character we do see is he's not a very huge character, but he ends up being somewhat. [0:09:47] Yeah, he's immensely sympathetic. He's one of the very genuinely good characters in the movie, I think. [0:09:53] Well, so again, before we get into the plot itself, I was just wondering, Sam, do you want to talk a little bit about Zhang Yimou and his work? [0:10:00] All right, so Zhang Yimou, he was born in 1951 in Xi'an into a nationalist family. [0:10:06] Yeah, and I guess ironically, the boomers in China, they were the Red Guard generation. [0:10:11] That's true. Yeah, and so Zhang Yimou, he grew up with this shadow of a nationalist family past hanging over him. And then when the Cultural Revolution finally happened, he became one of the rusticated youth, the city kids who were sent into the countryside. And at first, he spent several years working in fields and farms in Shaanxi, as just like a regular laborer. And then he was finally able to get back into a city and work in a textile mill, which is where he started to really begin appreciating art. He became an amateur photographer, he started to paint, and he was so enamored by this craft that he actually sold his own blood to get the money. [0:10:52] Doesn't just happen in America, I guess. [0:10:54] Oh, yeah, talk about via blood, sweat, and tears in your art. That's incredible. [0:10:57] In 1978, Mao has been dead for a few years, and they're beginning the campaign to reverse a cultural revolution. So the universities are opening back up, and Zhang Yimou was able to get into the Beijing Film Academy, which was closed for the duration of the Cultural Revolution. [0:11:16] And this class that had enrolled in 1978, these people became what's called the fifth generation of Chinese cinema. China has a very long history of cinema, but during the Cultural Revolution, pretty much essentially all cinema was halted. And so you had in the early 60s, you had some pretty interesting, you can call them propaganda movies, they're political dramas and political adventure movies that were coming out. The most famous example is The Red Detachment of Women, but then suddenly, starting in the mid-60s, all production halted. [0:11:49] So, from what I understand, Zhang Yimou would have been the first generation of filmmakers after the Cultural Revolution to be allowed to make films at all. [0:11:57] Yeah, yeah. The fifth generation is the one that really hit it big. And, you know, especially because from my understanding, most films coming out in the 80s were actually not by young guys like Zhang Yimou, but they were from the guys from the 40s and 50s. They were from the guys who had been suppressed, who now, 20 years later, were able to make films again. So the fifth generation are very different from what came before them, especially in terms of aesthetics. [0:12:22] How so? [0:12:22] Well, basically, under the Mao era, films very much clung to the socialist-realist aesthetic. For the most part, these weren't very sophisticated films. Some of them were very colorful and were well choreographed, like the revolutionary operas from the 60s, for example. Those are very fun to look at. [0:12:42] Oh, definitely. [0:12:43] Yeah. [0:12:43] And I gotta say, like, honestly, aesthetically, like, say what you will about Mao Zedong, but the aesthetics of the Cultural Revolution are pretty cool, you know? Like, mass hardship aside, from a complete, from an entirely aesthetic perspective, the music and the ballets being produced were quite interesting. [0:13:02] Well, it wouldn't have been a successful movement if it wasn't appealing in some sort of way, genuinely. [0:13:07] That's true, yeah, yeah. [0:13:08] The revolution does have to be cool. In contrast to the older socialist-realist style of films, the fifth generation films had a very heavy allegorical nature. They had a lot of these very long shots. They often had very vibrant colors. [0:13:23] Yeah, oh, like I said, Raise the Red Lantern, the one I mentioned, it's the reddest movie you're ever going to see in the most beautiful way. The way he uses color is incredible. [0:13:32] Yeah, but most importantly, these were the people who started to breach politically sensitive topics in a way that hadn't been done before. And this both won them many accolades abroad, but also often brought the ire of the Chinese censors upon them. [0:13:49] Isn't the fifth generation of Chinese cinema basically considered like the golden age of Chinese movies? [0:13:54] Of mainland Chinese movies, right? [0:13:56] Yes, sorry, yeah, yeah. And yeah, and I guess what's interesting now is that now, so Zhang Yimou is still working. He's making films every year. But now he's kind of reaching the end of his career and he's running into some trouble again. So now that from what I understand, especially among Chinese filmmakers themselves, there is a bit of discomfort about what the future of Chinese filmmaking might be. [0:14:17] You know that movie that I mentioned, Youth, that came out in 2017? It was pretty well received in China. It was really seen as a very exemplary drama. And both film buffs in China and Western Chinese film fans or whatever, they assumed that it would be the natural nominee to be submitted to the Academy Awards in 2017. But it wasn't because in 2017, the Chinese government chose to submit a different movie to the Academy Awards instead that I guess they thought was a better example of the image of China they wanted to project. And can you guys guess what that movie was? [0:14:53] Wolf Warrior 3. [0:14:54] Wolf Warrior Harder? [0:14:56] Yes, it was. That was the movie that they chose. I think it was Wolf Warrior 2, but that was the one that they chose to represent China in the Academy Awards, which is crazy because a movie like that would never be nominated for anything. Like, not even Marvel movies get nominated, thankfully. [0:15:11] Liam, I think you should probably explain what Wolf Warrior is to the people out there who are uninformed. [0:15:16] It's just an action movie. It's a very kind of competent American-style action movie, which is to me kind of interesting: is that although the US and China are increasingly antagonistic in foreign policy goals, it does seem like Chinese pop culture is increasingly receptive to American pop culture. And now, the films that China wants to promote as exemplary Chinese artworks are not these beautiful dramas that could not have been made anywhere else, but instead are American-style action movies where the heroes happen to be Chinese. [0:15:49] It's the Chimerican synthesis. [0:15:51] I was going to say, hashtag Chimerica. [0:15:53] Yes. [0:15:53] Oh, yes. [0:15:54] Yeah, yeah. [0:15:54] You know what? We don't have to get into this too deeply in this episode, but all three of us are of the belief that Chimerica is imminent. It's happening. That in the classic, you know, Hegelian synthesis, the rivalry of China and the United States can only and must inevitably end with the synthesis of Chinese and American cultures into Chimerica or Chimerica, if that makes more sense. [0:16:17] I like it because it sounds like Chimera, so it's a good, it's a good one. [0:16:20] Yes, it's perfect. All right, well, you know, I think it is high time that we actually talk about this movie. So our story begins in late pre-revolutionary China, you know, the kind of classic image we have of early 20th century China, the opium dens, the gambling, the crowded streets, the poverty. You know, it's a pretty common setting for Chinese films. And here we are, we meet our protagonist, Fugui, who is this, I would just say, he's a playboy. [0:16:50] A shitty little rich kid. [0:16:52] Yeah, he's a playboy rich kid. And he's also a gamer. [0:16:55] The original gamer. [0:16:56] Yeah, yeah. So this is our protagonist, Fugui. He's a child of privilege who basically spends all his time drinking and gambling. [0:17:04] All of his father's money, too. [0:17:06] Yeah, on his father's money. He's married, and you know, because he spends all day gambling, his wife doesn't respect him. He's got a baby daughter, Fengxia, and his wife is pregnant. They're going to have another kid. But like I said, he just wants to gamble. And his only other apparent interest is that, kind of, as a lark, he loves performing and singing in puppet shows. So even though he's just at this bar, this gambling den as a customer, he at one point at the beginning, he goes up on stage and tries to, you know, perform. But then we find out that every day he's gambling against a guy named Long'er. But Long'er actually has some pretty nefarious designs. He's rigging the game. He's setting it up so that he can win. [0:17:47] Because Fugui is a landlord child. He's the child of a landlord who owns multiple houses, but according to his, according to him, his father had previously lost many of the properties, which was one of the funnier quotes of the movie, which is, a small bastard comes from a little bastard, is what he says to his father after Fugui is accused of being a degenerate gambler. [0:18:06] Well, let's talk about the father, because we only briefly see him, but he comes home really drunk, like usual. We know it's happened, we can tell it's happened a lot before. [0:18:14] Oh, Woodward II, a really interesting thing to mention here is: how does he go home? [0:18:18] Oh my god, yes! He gets on the back of this old lady, and she walks home with him on her back. [0:18:26] Right, so I think that's really interesting because that is something that does not happen ever again in the movie. You can see one of the things that happens in the movie is you can see the change in time, not just in terms of how things look, but also in social norms, right? Like, here's the son of the landlord, and he's being carried back by this basically peasant laborer, this peasant woman. And it's such a weird thing for a modern audience to see that. Like, when I was watching it, my mom exclaimed, like, what? Is she gonna carry him? Like, for us, it's a very weird thing. And you can see, even by the second act of the movie, that is gone. That no longer happens. [0:18:53] Yes. And I guess, and that's just an illustration of the gross inequality of pre-socialist China. [0:18:59] Exactly. It's important to keep that in mind. [0:19:01] It's that labor is so cheap, it's cheaper to get on someone's back than to go in a cart. [0:19:05] And he's so skinny. He's such a skinny guy. Fugui is so tiny, and the woman is so much larger than he is. And he's just like a pole, is what he looks like when he's being carried up on the back. And it's a very striking image. [0:19:17] Yeah, no, he's like a little prince, little Lord Fauntleroy. [0:19:20] Exactly. [0:19:21] Fancy boy. [0:19:22] And then, as we find out, though, his father, who is the income earner, is not happy. [0:19:27] Degenerate! Another night gambling! A dog's gotta eat shit, little bastard. [0:19:34] Very classic Chinese, you know, like that epic meme from 2005, disappointed Asian father. We gotta really, we gotta throw back in here. [0:19:41] That's for sure. [0:19:42] Well, this father has a good reason to be disappointed. [0:19:44] Is he correct, though? That's the question, though. Is he actually correct? Is his father actually right to be mad? We'll talk about why he might not actually have been correct in being mad about losing everything. [0:19:53] So, like you said, the very next day, Fugui goes back to the gambling den, and he plays against Long'er again. And this time, Long'er wins everything. Because Fugui has bet everything that he owns, including all of his father's properties. In an instant, Fugui, this pampered child of privilege, this princeling, is now homeless. [0:20:17] I actually found this scene very interesting because it gets to the heart of the philosophy of the movie in a way, and that it's a very karmic sequence, sort of. Like Jiazhen, she very much wants Fugui to quit gambling because he has a son coming into the world, and she wants to make sure that they actually have a future as a family, that he doesn't squander everything that they have on gambling. So he keeps telling her, Oh, yeah, yeah, and I'll quit, I'll quit. You know, you just can't quit this stuff right away because it's like smoking opium. Like, we just quit straight up, and I'll kill you. [0:20:50] Yeah, yeah. [0:20:51] And it leads her to her refrain that she repeats for the first third of the movie, and that I think forms one of the main themes of the movie, right? Which is, I just want a simple life with my family, right? With you and my family. That's all she cares about, right? And she repeats it to him, right? I don't care what other things you do, but truly, I don't want you to gamble anymore because we can't have a family like this. And it doesn't work. And she goes and sees him bet everything and lose everything, and she leaves. She leaves him at that point. [0:21:13] Yeah. No, it's the classic story, you know, House of the Rising Sun. And now, like you said, he has lost everything. This rich boy, Prince and the Pauper. [0:21:22] Right, so what happens from that point forwards is he's like the second, it's a very touching, you know, negative way scene when he loses everything. He just walks outside and he screams at the top of his lung and grabs a chair, and all the bystanders are just terrified of this guy. And you see Long'er, who just simply is laughing all the way to the bank, literally, just so proud of him and real proud of himself for winning all this stuff. And meanwhile, Fugui is completely crushed emotionally. His wife has left him. He's lost everything. He's reduced his, in the greatest shame, right? His Long'er says, oh, let your mother stay in the house a little bit longer. I don't won't kick her out immediately. So, you know, basically just honoring. And so on the day where they have to sign off over all the property, the father, he seems so calm about it. [0:22:05] He sits there and he says, well, a debt is a debt. A gambling debt is a debt. And all debts must be settled. And so he signs the thing and he says, well, if I look through all the documents, that's a signature on every that's Fugui's signature on every single one of them. This is all legal. I will honor this. So he's so composed. And the second it's finalized, he gets up and he just screams at the top of his lungs, I'm going to kill him, I'm going to kill you. And he just runs after Fugui with the cane. And Fugui is, you know, they have to hold the father back, and the father, of course, then has a heart attack and dies. So Fugui is pretty much directly responsible for the death of his father. This guy's life is, he's lost everything. He's lost his father. [0:22:39] He's lost his wife. He's lost his home. And imagine telling this guy, it's only going to get worse from there. [0:22:45] Exactly. [0:22:46] And it does. But at the initial moment, it seems okay. It seems like things are going all right. He managed to get his life back on track. [0:22:52] He quits gambling. Fugui then goes and sees Long'er, who's now living the life of a landlord, so content with himself. It's been over a year at that point, and Long'er, just to stab the knife in even further, says, Oh, I'll never gamble this way like you did. Fugui, at the beginning, he was always addressed as master, master Fugui. But then, you know, now he's like, he insists on not being called that anymore. He's no longer a master, he's just an average everyday person. He's lost everything. He lives with his parents, his sole surviving parents, his mother, and his family in this little house. And he comes and asks Long'er, the man who has taken everything from him for a loan, debasing himself so fully to demand something like that. And Long'er says, Oh, I'll give you something better than a loan. And what does he do? [0:23:31] He gives him the puppets that he used to play. And even though that may seem like an insult, honestly, the way the movie portrays it, it's a positive thing, I think. He takes it and he earns an honest living. He lives a good life. [0:23:41] Right. And this, I would argue, this is where the movie really gets started. Because this is where this ordinary man who's experienced this personal tragedy, he starts getting his life back on track. And this is when history crashes into him. [0:23:56] Exactly right. [0:23:58] And that history is the Chinese Civil War that is in 1949. [0:24:02] So in this part of the movie, Fugui and Chunsheng start performing their shadow puppets. It was a bandit king, some sort of traditional Chinese folk story. [0:24:11] Yeah, and then one night they're giving a performance, and then suddenly a bayonet comes through their screen, and they see the Kuomintang army is all assembled in front of them. And next thing you know, they've been conscripted. [0:24:26] And the KMT army is portrayed in a very negative light. Again, partly because this is when they're losing. This is where the KMT has basically lost the war at this point. This is 1949. [0:24:34] Yeah, this is, yeah, yeah, yeah. [0:24:36] World War II is over. The tide of history is against the KMT at this point. And everyone there is depressed. Everyone there has extremely low morale. Everyone seems like they want to desert as soon as they possibly can. This is not something they want to actually be trapped with. And so they meet up with a soldier who kind of shows them the ropes a little bit and helps them survive for a short amount of time. [0:24:57] And yeah, it's this one older man who's been conscripted twice, right? On two separate occasions. [0:25:03] So I think what he said is that what happened was he's been captured before, and he would actually have gone quit completely. He's searching for his brother, is what he's doing. [0:25:10] Yeah, he's back in the army just to find his brother. [0:25:12] And so he's this old, experienced soldier who's probably fought against the Japanese years ago. You know, so he knows the ropes of this. And so he kind of takes the two younger, naive men under his wing, and he helps them survive. He really does give them a lot of knowledge in terms of what to do. [0:25:26] Yeah, no, no, no, if you think about it, this guy, he might have been fighting for 10 years. [0:25:29] Yeah, he's old. He's an old soldier. He's crazy, yeah. [0:25:32] By this point, it's freezing outside. There's snow on the ground, and they just go to sleep in a trench in the middle of this freezing weather. And they wake up the next morning, it's super sunny, and like the rest of their unit has frozen to death. They've managed to survive because some of them were able to pilfer some clothing from the corpses of people who were already dead. [0:25:52] I was going to say, it wasn't just they also wasn't that they just froze to death, the wounded froze to death. Everyone else deserted. That's what it was. They probably were so warm during their sleep that they didn't even think about deserting because they actually had enough warm clothing. [0:26:05] What happens shortly afterward is that the guy who was looking for his brother, he realizes that some of the men who died were actually from his brother's unit, and they think his brother might be among the corpses. So, in the snow, they start turning over these frozen dead bodies, looking for any sign of this man's brother. [0:26:24] And then, what happens? [0:26:25] And then he gets shot by a sniper. The poor man is just shot. Just shot. That's it. They try to save his life, and they just can't do anything, and they just cover his body and they leave. And they run, and there's a great scene of these two soldiers, the two friends, fleeing, just this horde of communist soldiers just following right behind them. These two guys all alone. And they're just quickly overrun because they're cold, they're tired, they have no morale. [0:26:47] They got Zerg rushed. [0:26:48] Yeah, they got Zerg Rush, basically. But it's a very touching scene. Another one of one of those scenes that I really liked is he's Fugui carries with him those shadow puppets that he's been keeping with him because they're his living, they're his life. They're something that gave his life meaning in a very real way. And then he drops the thing while he's being chased that is full of the puppets and it breaks open. And the communist soldier walks up and he spears the shadow puppet with his bayonet and lifts it up and looks at it and tries to figure out what it is. And you think that this is going to be something bad that happens, but in reality, what happens is the next scene is him performing all the shadow puppets for the communist soldiers and everyone loving it. Everyone loves, you know, these shadow puppets. [0:27:24] It's the art of the people. [0:27:26] And, you know, I understand, Russian Sam, that shadow puppeting is just like a huge part of Chinese performance art, right? [0:27:32] Oh, yeah, yeah. It's a very old tradition. It goes back to at least the Han Dynasty, which was from 200 BC to 200 CE. So that's quite a bit of time. It might have been used as a way to summon the souls of the dead initially, but then it became more of a popular art from the Tang Dynasty all the way until the Qing. It just became the way that you pass the time. It's in a way these performances sort of would have been the equivalent of going to the coffee house to the extent that in the latter years of the Qing Empire, they actually banned puppet shows because they thought that troublemakers would be fomenting conspiracies during these performances. [0:28:10] Within the wider context of the movie, something that I find interesting too is you could kind of see the implication of the shadow puppets being appreciated by the communists as like this is like an organic thing, that these are the actual peasantry who really truly do appreciate this art form. This is just like they are. Even though he's a rich man, he's still, even though he was formerly a rich man, Fugui, he still is a man of the people and has is deeply in touch with them in a very real way, and it's something valuable to them. It's an organic folk tradition, and I think the fact that it is an ancient organic folk tradition ultimately becomes kind of a problem later on down the line. [0:28:40] Exactly right. That's exactly right. [0:28:41] Yeah, in the 90s, shadow puppetry was very much on the way out. There wasn't really as much of a need for it anymore because there were better forms of entertainment. [0:28:51] So, well, so many like classic forms of entertainment in the 20th century just vanished. [0:28:56] Yeah, so you have several movies in the 90s that attempt to capture this form of art so that some form of it may survive. In fact, Zhang Yimou actually helped to make a documentary movie about shadow puppetry with footage that he had collected for the purposes of making the shadow puppetry scenes in this film. But yeah, it's depicted in movies like Farewell, My Concubine, The Puppet Master. [0:29:19] And finally, I got a fun quote for you guys from an interview that Zhang gave. [0:29:24] Sure. [0:29:25] The shadow theater is a traditional and popular form of art. Did you have any special relation with shadow theater, especially in childhood? As a child, I went to see such shows and even brought some puppets to play Simple Shadows. It is not a very widespread popular art, except for certain regions like Shanxi. There, it is an ancient art, but unfortunately, an art that tends to disappear rapidly because the artists who knew it well are now very old. They have difficulties in training disciples, the young not being interested in this form of art. They prefer to dance in discos. [0:29:59] Yeah, there you have it. [0:30:01] Yeah, damn kids these days go into the disco instead of learning the art of shadow puppetry. [0:30:06] Thinking at its imminent disappearance, we took advantage when shooting certain scenes from To Live and made a documentary about shadow theater in China. [0:30:14] It's very interesting. [0:30:15] Well, it's the thing, yeah, because this movie does. It documents pre-revolutionary culture, and so that's that's cool that they like did their homework. [0:30:21] It's very interesting. I don't think my dad ever really saw very much of the shadow puppetry. I think by the time that he was born, I think it was already being suppressed very heavily. But I guess before the suppression, we have a much more optimistic period. [0:30:33] Right. [0:30:33] Going back, you know, he basically, the communists end up winning. He has a pretty good time in the army in terms of his actual experience compared to his time with the nationalists, it seems. [0:30:42] Yeah. [0:30:43] He actually goes home. [0:30:44] Yeah, he goes home. So he goes back to his village, and this is when you start to notice the subtle changes in how the village looks. I think this is one of the first times. Before, the village was pretty unornamented, and all of a sudden, when you go back for the first time after this time skip, you see that there are red flags everywhere, truly symbolizing that this is the birth of the new China. This is a break with the past. [0:31:03] And of course, what happens immediately after any communist takeover? You have the revolution. You have the immediate social upheavals. Just as the red flags are waving, you see the beginning of essentially the score settling, the beginning of the disruption of this ancient social order in China. And that begins with finding the landlords. [0:31:26] And of course, this is not just an ordinary landlord, as the movie makes very, very clear. Because this is Long'er, the man who took everything from him. So, as I said earlier, maybe him losing, maybe Fugui losing everything wasn't such a bad thing at the end of the day, which is what the movie makes sense of. [0:31:40] Yep, because in a strange way, as we're about to see, him losing everything ends up essentially saving his life. Because a mob tracks down Long'er. [0:31:50] He actually, he does more than just be a landlord, because if he was probably just a landlord, they probably would just have beaten him and just thrown him away. What he did was something worse than being a landlord, it was being a counter-revolutionary, and that was not only, you know, refusing to give up his land, but then to burn down Fugui's ancestral home. And Fugui, when he hears, is crushed. And that is really what gets Long'er, I think, executed, not just beaten, right? I think they would probably have done stuff to you during this time period if you were a landlord. I don't know if they would have killed you. That gets into something I think that's very important about this movie. It doesn't really portray the Communist Party in all that negative of a light. There's a lot of suffering that goes on in the movie, but again, it seems pretty clear that they killed him, not because he's a landlord, but it seems like if he had not destroyed the property, so no one else could have it. [0:32:30] Yeah. [0:32:31] Exactly. That was the real, the real problem that led to his demise. [0:32:35] That's the thing. And then, so, even though, even though Long'er is the source of all of Fugui's troubles, it's bittersweet because they realize that not only could that have been me, they're worried: is there any chance they could be next? Are they still gentry? And then, what does what does Jiazhen say? She says a really interesting, like, oh, we're just ordinary average townsfolk. Now there's no evidence of this. And on top of that, they have the discharge papers from the People's Liberation Army that shows that he was a patriot and that he fought for his country. [0:33:03] Yes, he was a good communist. [0:33:05] Exactly. Even though he was conscripted into the army, the fact that he did it is shadow puppets, the shadow puppets saved his life in a very real sense and gave him the proof that he was a good communist. [0:33:15] And then we have a bit of a time skip afterwards. So, this jumps ahead of the 1950s. And so, it jumps to the very beginnings of the Great Leap Forward. And the Great Leap Forward is the abortive attempt by the Communist Party to industrialize China along the lines of a Western country to overtake the Western countries and the Soviet Union in terms of production. [0:33:34] Yeah. [0:33:34] And what's kind of strange is that, unlike something like what the Soviet Union was doing, where they were trying to build these mass factories, while I'm sure there were, like, there was factory construction in China, it was in a weird way very individualized, where people in the villages were being told that they have to suddenly start smelting metal in their backyard, essentially. [0:33:52] Right, it's kind of a privileging of the ideas of industrialization over the actual realities, right? Not understanding that you don't just melt stuff down to actually create steel, you have to actually do a little bit more work than that. [0:34:02] Yeah. [0:34:03] And so you can kind of see that at the very beginning of this time skip because the Communist Party officials are going to every single house and asking for utensils to be handed in so that they can be melted. And so he says, oh, you can keep this one because if you use that one, you can bring water to the workers who are very, very thirsty. And their young son, the son of Fugui and Jiazhen, he basically says, oh, wait, what about this box over here? There's a little metal. And the father, Fugui, is throwing daggers at him because he opens it and says, Puppets. And the guy, and then the cadre says, oh, we can take those pins out. And then if we melt those pins, we can have two more bullets. And those two bullets could help us take Taiwan. And then Fugui, in a moment of very smart thinking, says, Oh, well, actually, I can put on revolutionary puppet shows for the workers and give them entertainment. [0:34:50] And the cadre says, you know what? That sounds good. They're pretty bored. And so we actually managed to save his puppets one more time in terms of this. And as the Communist Party officials are walking away, Youqing screams, So we're not going to be liberating Taiwan. [0:35:02] Yeah. Which to this day has not happened yet. [0:35:04] Just like the old days, Fugui starts going back into being doing puppet shows. This time they're explicitly communist puppet shows. Although what happens is that he gets really into doing puppet shows. [0:35:16] I think it's kind of funny that there's no mention at all in this movie of the famine. Instead, this village, everything always seems to be somewhat plentiful. [0:35:22] And don't forget, it's also because it's 1958. It's also at the very, very beginning of the Great Leap Forward. [0:35:28] Oh. [0:35:28] So this, again, this is what I'm saying. One of the things that's interesting about the movie is what they don't show, I think is what is interesting. What you can read between the lines. [0:35:35] Yes, that's a good point. [0:35:36] They show the personal tragedy of this family, but they don't really show the broader national tragedy of China. It's completely embodied within this single family. [0:35:44] Exactly. [0:35:44] As I said at the very beginning, you can see that this is not a movie of like, life is unlivable in communist China. This is a horrible place. It's fine. People are living their lives and enjoying themselves, and they're happy for the most part. It's not like this is some horrible dystopia. Like, it's not an easy life, but people are coming together, living together, and they're having a pretty good life. They're attending puppet shows, and they're having intimate family moments with one another. But those moments are always marred by tragedy. [0:36:09] Yeah. And then, yeah, so the next scene, we see they're really happy about the success, they think, of the Great Leap Forward because they've smelted together enough ore to make like three cannonballs, they said. But of course, the tragically that the Great Leap Forward, like we said, it was a failure. It was associated with not any kind of real permanent industrialization, but instead a massive disruption of traditional work and especially traditional food production. [0:36:37] Exactly. [0:36:38] And I was wondering, Sam, if you could bring up some data, right, about what exactly went down with the disruption of farming. [0:36:45] So, as Cnut said previously, the Great Leap Forward was an attempt to massively kickstart the industrialization even quicker than the Soviet Union had done it. And they planned to do this by both massively increasing the amount of grain production while also be building these backyard furnaces. [0:37:04] Yeah, I know the local cadre shouts: oh, in 15 years, we'll be producing more steel than America. It took a little bit longer than that. [0:37:12] But basically, it was tragedy compounded on tragedy because in 1958, you had what was called the Four Pests Campaign, which was basically a campaign to wipe out disease carriers and whatnot, like rats. But also in this list, were sparrows. They thought that these little birds were eating large amounts of grain. So what they would do is they would have contests to eradicate as many of these as possible. They would walk around beating drums for hours on end until these birds just collapsed from exhaustion. And what happened as a result of this is that the insect population of China just exploded because these birds were no longer around to keep the population in check. It turns out that insects were actually much worse pests, ironically, than the sparrows. And this really exacerbated the famine. We still don't have exact statistics about how many people died. I've seen figures anywhere from 10 million to 40 million. [0:38:04] But this was just a total disaster. [0:38:06] You said that you looked up the numbers, right? Like, how did food production change in China during this period? [0:38:12] In 1957, the national grain consumption per capita in kilograms was 204.5. In 1961, which was the worst year of this series of increasingly bad years, you had a national grain consumption of 153.5 kilograms, and the national mortality rate per thousand was 11.07. And then in 1960, which was the worst year of the famine and its results, the national mortality rate was 28.58. [0:38:39] Jesus. So this movie doesn't really touch on that. [0:38:42] Yeah. [0:38:42] And so, although, like we said, we don't really get to see the broader national tragedy of the famine, we do have this immediate and just devastating personal tragedy within Fugui's family. [0:38:56] Right. We have a moment where the district chief, the head of all the region, who we've never seen on screen, he's coming to celebrate the great success of the Great Leap Forward and the creation of the three cannonballs. And the son of the family is tired and he sleeps. But his father says, you got to go to this. You've got to go to this event because we don't want to be branded as counter-revolutionaries. It's very important that you show that you're patriotic and young. And so the wife says, oh, he's tired. He shouldn't go. And so the father says, no, he should go. So they end up going and showing this off. And then tragedy of tragedies, it turns out that as the district chief was coming into the village, he backed his car into a wall, crushing the wall and crushing the person behind it who happened to be the family's son, killing him immediately. [0:39:42] You can see this is, again, what I mean that the Communist Party is not shown to be evil in any meaningful way. This is not an act of malice. This is an unfortunate circumstance that happens. But it still kills the son. The most tragic little anecdote is that the wife, Jiazhen, was making these dumplings for him. He never got to eat. [0:40:00] Oh, so heart-wrenching. [0:40:01] And so they have his funeral, and they bury him basically with the dumplings. [0:40:05] They went to the gravesite to offer the dumplings to Youqing, which is still something that's done. [0:40:10] And that's kind of the end of the 1950s right there. [0:40:12] And like we said, like, yeah, things are going to continue to get worse for this family, because what's happening in the 60s? It's the cultural revolution. And I know there, Cnut, you wanted to mention there's an interesting aesthetic change happening here. [0:40:24] Because before it was red flags, then we started seeing in the 50s some posters come about, like very simple, like classic, like workers and soldiers on the mountains, very heroic. And then now there's a different kind of decoration happening in the village. It's a slogans all over the place. You can see them scrawled on the walls, all the Mao Zedong thoughts. And then on top of that, every house has images of Mao Zedong in it. People give each other Mao Zedong gifts. It's the birth of the cult of personality, which was not there before. [0:40:49] Right. [0:40:49] You can see that this is a delivery. [0:40:50] And also now, the little red books are everywhere we see. [0:40:53] And the armbands, the red armbands. [0:40:54] Yeah, yeah. [0:40:55] Yeah, and everyone's wearing uniforms. And then here, it opens with another, much smaller tragedy. [0:41:01] The shadow puppets, which saved Fugui's life before, when he convinced the communist army that he could entertain them, now shadow puppetry has been declared counter-revolutionary. It's too old and reactionary. It's feudal. So they're burned. And it's a very tragic scene. It's heart-wrenching. These are the things that have been with us the entire movie, too, in a very real way. They're very real characters, too. [0:41:23] Yeah. [0:41:24] And again, another important point to emphasize is: again, it seems like no one's a villain here. The Red Guards at the beginning were all acting very, very tough and like they understood what was going on, but things got difficult and it exposed them for what they were, which was children who didn't understand. They weren't malicious. They were indoctrinated into an ideology where they were convinced that they knew what was going on. But they were kids, right? They fundamentally did not understand the actual realities of the situation. It's not meant to be something like, these people are malicious, these people are evil. These people are at worst misguided. Which I think a lot of Chinese people feel the same way. Because on both sides of this issue, right, there are people who were the Red Guards and there were the people who are persecuted by the Red Guards. [0:41:56] It's not like there's a clear-cut delineation in society between these groups. A lot of people suffered in both ways at the same time. And it's very painful for a lot of people to paint one side or the other as the villain, I think. So they really try to, you can see that, to very stay away from doing that. [0:42:10] But then this, on the somber note, it skips ahead to the future. So this is when, so Mao is still alive, but the Maoist period is about to end. Things are about to change very rapidly for people in China. And I think Russian Sam has some thoughts on the last couple lines of the movie. [0:42:24] Oh, yeah. They had stopped at the market and they bought these baby chicks. And when they come back, they're wondering where they're going to put them. And suddenly Fugui remembers that he still has the crate for the shadow puppets. It's still there. And he decides that this is the perfect place to put the chicks. And suddenly, memory is just coming back where Fugui is carrying Youqing to the school. And he's just telling him, Our family is like a little chicken. When it grows up, it becomes a goose. And that'll turn into a sheep. The sheep will turn into an ox. And then Youqing asked, and after the ox? And after the ox is communism, dumplings and meat every day. I mean, now when Fugui is talking to the grandson, a very similar dialogue happens where he says that the chickens will turn into geese and the geese will turn into sheep. [0:43:06] The sheep will turn into oxen. And then the grandson asks, and what happens after the oxen? And so Fugui is struck from him because he's not sure what to think. And he says, I'm after the oxen. Little bun will grow up. A little bun won't ride on an ox. He'll ride in trains and planes and life will get better and better. [0:43:23] And normally the history of what happened after this and the turn that China took away from this, it's a very bittersweet ending, I have to say, which I think is very intentional. It's supposed to seem happy in a sense, but I don't think it necessarily is, which I think that's something that we'll talk about in a little bit in terms of what this movie, how this movie fits into the wider context of post-1989, post-Deng China as a whole. [0:43:45] Yeah, no, because, yeah, because it is true. Their grandson is going to fly in planes. He is going to ride in trains, but it certainly won't be in the communism that they're expecting. [0:43:55] The best, the true ending to this film would be the grandson going to engineering school and then going to Africa to build infrastructure in a bunch of African countries. [0:44:03] This is probably what, honestly, the ending is. Not necessarily a bad ending by any means, but certainly different than I think what they necessarily envisioned in the moment there. [0:44:12] So that's To Live, the 1994 historical drama by Zhang Yimou. Really a very important movie, very interesting. And I understand that because of these themes being discussed, it was just incredibly meaningful to a lot of Chinese audiences. [0:44:30] Right. My dad thinks this is one of his favorite movies ever watched. As I said previously, this is one of his all-time favorites. He actually didn't see it in China because he had moved to the United States very soon after Mao's death and the end of the Cultural Revolution and the complete ousting of the Gang of Four, which we'll probably talk about in a little bit. [0:44:50] Yeah, it's funny you mentioned that he didn't see it in China because even though this film was so celebrated, it was actually pretty hard to watch in China because very shortly upon release, this movie was censored by the Chinese government. [0:45:07] That's something that I find pretty interesting because as we kind of talked about with the movie previously, this is not like a super negative movie about the Communist Party. This isn't some sort of thing that portrays the communists in a negative way. [0:45:17] No, just the opposite. [0:45:18] Yeah. Like we see, again, the only Red Guard is one of the most heroic characters. And you see that, like, the nationalists come off looking way worse than the communists do in terms of how they treat their soldiers. And even before that, with the scene of the woman carrying Fugui on her back, it shows the poverty and the inequality of pre-communist China. So, like, this is not something that lionizes the past by any means. [0:45:41] Yeah, and it does consistently show historical progress despite all of the unfortunate events. [0:45:47] Speaking of unfortunate events, let's talk about what happened to Zhang's career after this movie. [0:45:52] So, this is the LA Times, February 1995. Zhang still at the heart of Chinese filmmaking. Recently, the marquee of the Shanghai Paradise Theater featured a large painted panel advertising the showing of To Live, the critically acclaimed film directed by Zhang Yimou, starring Gong Li. Zhang, the intense genius, was portrayed broodingly in the foreground. The beautiful Gong Li, dressed in a traditional silk gown with a high-buttoned collar, demured elegantly in the background. [0:46:20] Yes, you can see, even in the West at this time, there was definitely an awareness of who Zhang Yimou was and even who the actress was. So, like, this is definitely a period where China was, you know, increasingly connected with the West. I really doubt that American film critics would have been, you know, doing a movie review for something like Red Detachment of Women. They certainly wouldn't have been closely following what happened to the director. [0:46:45] Let's talk about it. Over the past decade, Zhang and Gong had built one of the world's most successful creative relationships. In film, he was Ingmar Bergman to her Liv Ullmann. Off-screen, she was Joanne Woodward to Paul Newman. They were mainland China's most fashionable couple. But there were two things wrong with this picture. First, after living together for years, Zhang and Gong recently broke up during the making of their newest collaboration in Shanghai. Second, the movie To Live is supposed to be banned in China by the state propaganda department. [0:47:18] That's like, as we talked about, it's kind of a surprising fact that this is the case. And I think it's something that is sort of a tragedy in a lot of ways, because I think this movie is very, if, you know, was more open to a lot of Chinese people, I think there's a lot of things that they would really appreciate inside of it. Of course, I'm sure that they were able to see bootleg versions of it. I think my dad probably had a bootleg version of it at some point. [0:47:39] Absolutely. [0:47:39] Let's talk about the bootlegs right now. So if this movie was banned, what is it doing on the marquee of a movie theater in one of Shanghai's elite neighborhoods, one filled with high-ranking communist officials? When asked why they had a To Live poster on the marquee, the manager of the Paradise Theater mumbles something about the film coming soon, although there has been no hint of the government lifting the ban. [0:48:01] Stuck in production hell? [0:48:02] Oh, yes. [0:48:03] As an aspiring filmmaker myself, those words are all too familiar. [0:48:07] This is a little bit different than I think what you in Hollywood go through. This might be a slightly different production hell. [0:48:12] George Lucas famously said that he would much rather be a Soviet filmmaker than an American filmmaker. Because he said, in the Soviet Union, you just got to worry about offending the government. In America, there's a million different people you can't piss off. [0:48:26] Yeah, that's so true now, especially with woke culture on the rise. Am I right, guys? [0:48:29] Okay, so yeah. So this is the thing. So the movie's banned, but you can still kind of see it if you know the right people, and they're still advertising it, which I think kind of shows that in the 90s, in the obviously quite far out from the Maoist era, it's a very kind of strange mix of liberalization and of more traditional forms of, you know, like information control and all that. [0:48:55] And notice how he's not being purged or anything like that. He's still allowed to create films and everything like this. He's not in legal trouble or anything, but, you know, they might slow things down a little bit. [0:49:06] Yeah. In a way, this is kind of similar to what we talked about in the Soviet Union on the Letov episode about a lot of this stuff being tied to the whims of individual censors rather than like an actual concrete methodology. It was just vibes-based. [0:49:21] Though officially banned, the film is widely available on video, and some theaters still managed to show it. I went back to Xi'an, Zhang said, referring to the city where he began his filmmaking career. Everybody saw it. That's the way things are these days in China. Lots of rules, but inconsistent application. Just because something is banned, and because China refused to nominate the film for best foreign language film, doesn't mean the film is out of circulation. [0:49:47] Sort of reminds you of the Great Firewall, right? Where nominally there's supposed to be this thing that's very, very closed off, but in reality, it's porous. Right? Things get through. [0:49:56] No, you definitely. And I think that's kind of an interesting metaphor for Chinese society in general. Although, in many important ways, there are very strong economic and political and cultural differences with the West. A lot of stuff seeps through. [0:50:10] Definitely. [0:50:11] Interviewed in his room at the No Frills Hotel where the film crew is based in Shanghai for his latest film. Zhang appears small, almost frail. Patiently, the strain of all-night filming sessions showing in his eyes, he answers questions about censorship and government meddling in his films. Zhang doesn't object to the process of censors reviewing his movies. He just feels that they're wrong to ban them. [0:50:35] And honestly, yeah, I totally get it. Because again, this is not an anti-communist film. It isn't an anti-Chinese film. If this movie was made in America, even by a committed American leftist, it probably would have been much less sympathetic to the revolution than what we see here. [0:50:50] Which I think is kind of, it goes along with a little bit of the film, the theme of the film, too, in terms of just enduring and surviving. Right? Things may have been bad, but in the end, if they were what they were, and you have to live with it in a certain sense. So he's living out his own artistic creation. [0:51:05] Yeah. [0:51:05] In addition to To Live, two more of Zhang's films, Ju Dou and Raise the Red Lantern, were initially banned by authorities, although later released after they collected dozens of international prizes. [0:51:17] Yeah, just like they didn't want to fess up to it until they learned that people actually like it, and then it's like, yeah, yeah, yeah, we did that. [0:51:24] That's us. [0:51:25] Why the censors ban one film yet praise others is a mystery to Zhang. Irritated that To Live was shown at last year's Cannes Film Festival without official permission from the Ministry of Radio and Television, the Chinese government in the fall issued strict new rules limiting foreign funding for Chinese movies unless officially approved. These new rules almost caused the cancellation of Zhang's latest movie, a project tentatively titled Shanghai Triad, set in the corrupt and decadent Shanghai of the 1930s. [0:51:56] That's contrasted with the corrupt and decadent Shanghai of the 2020s. [0:52:00] Yeah. [0:52:02] Although this film was censored, you know, he had the new one coming out. He was looking forward to it. So what happened to the new one, Cnut? What happens to Shanghai Triad? [0:52:11] Yeah, so this is an article from Newsweek in October 95 about Zhang's film. In the international film world, few invitations are as prestigious as being selected as the opening night film of the New York Film Festival. Last year, it was Pulp Fiction. When Zhang Yimou learned that his Shanghai Triad was the first Chinese movie ever picked for the opening slot, it was considered the biggest honor of his career. Zhang was happy. The Chinese government was happy, and the festival was happy that Zhang was coming to the glittering first night Gala at Lincoln Center. [0:52:40] Sounds like it's going to be a pretty good time. [0:52:42] Yeah, this shows what a big deal Zhang was at this time. But things weren't going to be rosy. [0:52:47] Even though he was planning on showing it, something else happened. The Communist Party discovered the festival was also showing the Gate of Heavenly Peace, a documentary examining the events that led to the 1989 protest and crackdown at Tiananmen Square. [0:52:59] Ooh. [0:53:00] They told the chairman of the film festival that the film was an insult to China, and unless it was removed from the festival, they would be forced to withdraw Shanghai Triad. The festival had no intention of buckling to the Chinese request, nor could the Chinese back up their threat to withhold Shanghai, which is owned in the United States by its distributor, Sony Classics. [0:53:17] So it's that they pulled the movie entirely because they didn't want it juxtaposed with a documentary about Tiananmen Square. [0:53:24] You can see that the Communist Party, even at this point, still has some sore points in terms of its historical memory. Again, this is not that far after the Tiananmen Square event or massacre. Part of the reason why must be because it paints the actual leadership of the Communist Party at the time in a kind of negative light. So, Beijing's solution punished Zhang Yimou. The director was advised not to come to the festival, which is, you know, in essence to say that he was forbidden. Zhang sent a cautiously worded statement to be read on opening night. Unfortunately, I cannot be here with you. If I were, I would stand on the podium and say the only two expressions I know in English: I love you all, and thank you. [0:54:04] And so, I think what's interesting about this is you can see that the criticisms of the Chinese Communist Party, there's definitely a distinct turn away from open criticism. Because if we go back in time a little bit to 1981, so just a couple years after the death of Mao and the assumption of the leadership of the reformists like Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang, we can see that they were pretty frank with their criticisms of the Communist Party, especially under Mao itself. This is from an official document titled The Resolutions on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China. [0:54:40] So, just for a quick little kind of comparison, this is basically the Chinese equivalent to Khrushchev's secret speech, right? The famous event where Khrushchev denounced the excesses of Stalin. [0:54:52] I think that's a pretty apt comparison to this, especially because this was drafted by Deng and Hu Yaobang, who ended up becoming the leaders following Mao's fall. [0:55:01] Right. And just in case anybody listening this far into the podcast doesn't know who Deng is, he was the incredibly important Chinese leader who oversaw the liberalization of the Chinese economy, the introduction of market dynamics, and then with that, the introduction of foreign funding in American factories. [0:55:22] And he was also shaped like a potato. [0:55:23] He was. [0:55:24] He was a short king, I believe. He was like 5'2. [0:55:28] He liked to wear cowboy hats. [0:55:29] Certainly had the makings of a world historical figure. [0:55:32] Let's get into this speech. [0:55:33] Yeah, so I think that what's important to keep in mind about this in particular is I think that you can really see a shift, even in comparison to the movie, in terms of what the ideology of the Communist Party is, especially compared to the Maoist era, right? Where you can see even in the movie, the Maoist era, especially during the Cultural Revolution, has this feeling of ideology as being the primary vehicle. There's pictures of Mao everywhere. People are carrying the little red book. There's a cult of personality that emerges. Deng famously never really assumed a super high position in the government. He always kind of manipulated stuff from behind the scenes. I think he was like the deputy chairman or something. [0:56:04] Well, yeah, let's get into the text here. [0:56:06] And just for some context, so this plenum, this meeting, happened, it was in 81, which is not too long after the end of the film, but a fair amount of time before the release of this movie. So it's kind of interesting middle ground where you can see how things looked really, really different after Mao. But then in some ways, by the time this movie came out, a decade and a half later, not everything had changed. [0:56:31] Right. Like, this is, I would say, frankly, a pretty harsh criticism of Maoism as a whole. The first couple sections are talking about the defeat of the nationalists and the defeat of the Japanese during the Sino-Japanese War, but eventually it turns to the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, which are depicted directly in the film. And they more or less state in this document that they successfully actually did a socialist revolution. They say that the principal contradiction within the country was no longer the contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie, but between the demand of the people for rapid economic and cultural development and the existing state of our economy and culture. [0:57:09] Was that because they believed there no longer was a bourgeoisie in China? [0:57:12] Right. It seems like they believed that the bourgeoisie had been either completely incorporated into the communist framework or that they were no longer a threat and completely brought in, which is, of course, the opposite of what Mao would actually claim in the next couple of years. So you can see this is a direct reaction to Mao. [0:57:26] Of course. Yeah, again, like, look at the movie where these high-ranking officials in the local party apparatus are told, oh, actually, you're a capitalist. [0:57:35] Yeah, and I mean, one of the stars on the Chinese flag actually stands for the bourgeoisie. They were considered like an integral part of the nation from the beginning. [0:57:42] Right, right. And so it goes on to talk about how Mao was correct. So, the exact quote is, the line and its fundamental aspects were correct, and the line being referring to Mao's thought during this time period, was correct in that it reflected the masses' pressing demand for change in the economic and cultural backgrounds of our country. Its shortcoming was that it overlooked objective economic laws. [0:58:03] He's doing the right, the classic Republican, like, oh, you socialists, you gotta read basic economics. [0:58:10] Right, he's saying that, like, on one hand, your heart was in the right place, that, yeah, you're right, we should modernize our country. And then he goes on to say that everything that you understood about this was completely incorrect. You do not understand how basic laws function. [0:58:22] No, which really, which really is, like you said, it's a really harsh condemnation. You know, like, I know there are some people who argue, some people on the internet, especially who are more fond of Deng Xiaoping will argue that you have to understand him as like a continuation, not a break with Mao. But I think that is an incredibly clear break right there. And I think you can see even more clearly in just a little bit afterwards, they say left errors characterized by excessive targets and the issuing of arbitrary decisions, boastfulness, and the stirring up of communist winds spread unchecked throughout the country. In essence, this is the Communist Party saying that during the Maoist era, it went too far left. It's a communist country saying there was too much communism. The communist wind spread unchecked. That's a crazy line. [0:59:02] Right, and he basically said that Comrade Mao Zedong and many of the leading comrades, both at the center and in the localities, had become smug about their successes, were impatient for quick results, and overestimated the role of man's subjective will and efforts. [0:59:15] God, that is wild. [0:59:17] Yeah, so you can see that this is a really serious break with Mao. It's very strongly condemning him. It's saying that, once again, he was too proud of himself. He got too big for his britches, right? [0:59:26] Yeah. [0:59:27] Think about what we just talked about in terms of Tiananmen Square being completely censored and just withdrawing a movie because it was featured alongside it. This is a similar thing, a similar level of criticism against a similar paramount leader, right? The implication of this. But this is coming from the Communist Party itself. This is a complete repudiation of most of the Maoist era's ideas, frankly. [0:59:46] Yeah, and this repudiation, you could argue, is what allowed a movie like To Live to be made in the first place. [0:59:52] 100%. You can see that in terms of what is shown in the movie, definitely. [0:59:56] You mentioned Tiananmen Square. This wasn't solely authored by Deng Xiaoping, right? Wasn't there a co-author? [1:00:02] Right. As I briefly mentioned, there's a man named Hu Yaobang who was also a co-author with this, and he's one of the other big reformers. And his death is part of what prompted a lot of the student unrest because he was seen as like one of the biggest reformers of the era. [1:00:15] In the 80s, there's this enormous rapid opening up that allows films, or really allows artists like Zhang Yimou to have a career. But then, a little bit later in the 80s, you have Tiananmen Square, and then in the 90s, there seems to be an increased suppression of critical artists. So I have to wonder: do you think Tiananmen Square and all the attention that that brought to China had anything to do with the fact that they started becoming more hardline in their censorship? [1:00:45] Oh, absolutely. If you actually look at what they were writing in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident, they were essentially saying that we had done too much political reform. Like, we've done the experiment. It doesn't bear out. It's too chaotic. We gotta roll things back. And so the relative openness of the 80s was increasingly curtailed. But again, the problem was that there were no strict guidelines about what was acceptable and what wasn't. [1:01:11] Yeah, and Sam, you mentioned political opening. And of course, at the same time, 1989, there was another political opening happening just a few hundred miles to the north in the Soviet Union. And of course, that was a political opening that went a lot more poorly for the Soviet Communist Party. It ended up, you know, completely dissolving the state, you know, putting Russia into a spiral of corruption and misery that they've only kind of really clawed their way back up from. [1:01:39] And I think that the Communist Party of China was fully aware that was happening. I think that they were very worried about that loss of control. And so I think that, in a sense, it's almost confusing cause and effect to blame Tiananmen Square for this kind of increased censorship. I think that Tiananmen, even without Tiananmen Square, there would have been increased censorship. It may heightened it a little bit, but they were already seeing the problems the Soviet Union was facing during this time period. And even today's Communist Party leaders, I think, are still aware of that fact. [1:02:05] Yes, and let's get into that right now, because here's an article from the South China Morning Post 2013. Paranoia from Soviet collapse haunts China 22 years on. In the heyday of the Sino-Soviet Brotherhood, Chinese like to say that today's Soviet Union is tomorrow's China. But since the collapse of communist rule in the early 1990s, that old saying has become an evil omen haunting communist leaders. [1:02:31] Which I think is a good motivation for crushing this kind of dissent talking, right? You don't want to actually have these kind of discussions in a similar way to the Soviet Union. I think that there's a very strong conception that's the case across all of Chinese society. [1:02:43] Yeah, yeah. [1:02:45] There were renewed shudders among the Beijing leadership following a warning from President Xi Jinping for the need to pay greater attention to the dramatic events in Moscow two decades ago. Officials have been called on to watch a four-part documentary about the historical events. This video, in memory of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the video blames Mikhail Gorbachev's radical moves to introduce Western-style democratic reforms and relaxations of party monopoly controls and ideology, as well as Boris Yeltsin's rush to privatize state-owned enterprises. [1:03:19] Which is funny because Deng, I mean, you can look at the statistics for a lot of this stuff. The massive amount of economic growth that happened in China happened mostly as a result of Deng's bizarre dual-track privatization of the Chinese economy following the Maoist era. So, again, well, this kind of tension here between you don't want to fully condemn everything that goes on there. So, it's very convenient to also blame the Western-style democracy that is introduced for the main reason for it. [1:03:48] Right. And talking about this movie to live, the USSR had already collapsed and was completely disassembling itself, you know, being sold off for scrap when this movie was being made in like 91, 92, 93. So, the Chinese censorship board would have been completely aware of what was happening. And I think that in addition to the concerns of Tiananmen, if you're a Chinese communist official and if you think that the collapse of the Soviet Union has anything to do with, you know, opening up of criticism, you're going to be really freaked out about a Chinese filmmaker, no matter how celebrated, making a movie that could be construed as criticizing China. [1:04:27] Because you need to have some sort of, even though, as we talked about, Mao is pretty thoroughly condemned by Deng and the other cadres who came into power after him. It's not a simple thing to simply excise Mao from history. The article also talks, I mean, the Plenum's historical thesis also talks about how Mao is a great hero of the proletariat revolution, and he saved and created modern China. So you can't simply toss him out and give up on him like you could with some other leaders in world history and start completely afresh, because modern communist China, modern mainland China, is a creation of Mao. [1:05:00] It'd be like jettisoning George Washington. [1:05:02] Well, let's hear what President Xi has to say. Xi, president and general secretary, appears more fascinated by the ideological aspects of the Soviet downfall than his predecessors. In an internal speech earlier this year, Xi told party officials that China must still heed the deeply profound lessons of the former Soviet Union, where political rot, ideological heresy, and military disloyalty brought down the governing party. [1:05:29] Yeah, and here's an excerpt from the speech itself. This was delivered in late December 2012, early January 2013. Xi said, Why did the Soviet Communist Party collapse? An important reason was that their ideals and beliefs had been shaken. In the end, the ruler's flag over the city tower changed overnight. It's a profound lesson for us. To dismiss the history of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party, to dismiss Lenin and Stalin, and to dismiss everything else is to engage in historical nihilism, and it confuses our thoughts and undermines the party's organizations on all levels. [1:06:04] What's also interesting to me about this in particular is it doesn't really say what it means to dismiss Lenin and Stalin or what it means to keep them around. They're kind of just stand-ins, right? You have to keep them there. But the actual content of what they believe, I don't know if that's so important as much as their symbolic figure, as much as being symbolic figureheads in terms of what they represent, right? Because I think that Lenin and Stalin, if they looked at contemporary China, I'm not sure they'd be happy with the way that it's currently going right now. Just as I don't think Mao would be particularly happy with the way that it's currently going right now. So, what does it mean to dismiss Lenin and Stalin, if not completely trample on what they envisioned a communist country to look like? [1:06:41] It's essentially about maintaining a chain of succession to prove that your line is legitimate, which is a very feudal way almost of looking at it. [1:06:51] I think I'm going to disagree with you on that one. I think most states do that. Most states, when they have continuity, they don't want to demonize their own historical figures in the past, right? I don't necessarily think it's feudal. I think it gives legitimacy to even to a democracy, right? As we talked about, getting rid of George Washington would be very difficult for many Americans, as it would basically mean the entire American project is fundamentally broken from the start, which, you know, I think you could argue is the case. [1:07:20] Why must we stand firm on the party's leadership over the military? Because that's the lesson from the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, where the military was depoliticized, separated from the party, and nationalized, the party was disarmed. Finally, Gorbachev announced the disbandment of the Soviet Communist Party in a blithe statement. Proportionally, the Soviet Communist Party had more members than we do, but nobody was man enough to stand up and resist. [1:07:46] So, what this suggests to me is that, so in the 90s, in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union and in the wake of the protests and violence at Tiananmen Square, there was an increased closing up ideologically and sort of circling the wagons in fear that the party itself might be shaken too much by criticism. And it kind of seems like that's happening again now. That in the last 10 years, Xi Jinping, he himself, you know, he is pursuing some very radical policy changes from his predecessors. You know, he's cracking down really hard on like tax evaders and corrupt billionaires, which I think, you know, it's probably a good thing, but I'm sure that many wealthy, powerful people in China are very threatened by these changes. [1:08:35] What is historical nihilism? Historical nihilism. I'm just going to say off the bat, before we get into definitions, I think that, like we said, China has its own little wokeness battle. Historical nihilism seems to occupy the same place in the Chinese culture war that critical race theory occupies in the American culture war. It's this strange, basically a reactionary bugbear that a lot of people are freaked out about, even though no one really seems to be consciously doing it. It's a label that can be flung at somebody if you don't like them or if you don't like what they say. And so as we're about to see, just like how in the United States, tons of state governments, you know, most notably or most notoriously, Texas and Florida, are just savaging their schools' history departments to sanitize history, there's something somewhat similar happening in China. [1:09:31] So here is an excerpt of the book Inside the Mind of Xi Jinping from 2017 by Francois Bougon on the origins of historical nihilism. Historical nihilism describes the total or partial questioning of the national myth constructed after 1949. Xi Jinping's accession to power did not only correspond with the revival of legendary figures, it also marked the start of a very concrete and determined political struggle against voices seeking to fracture the distorted and stated official narrative. [1:10:04] So that sounds like the 1619 Project. It seems like that's what they're going to be against. [1:10:10] Yeah, it's the same anxieties. [1:10:13] I will say that this article does seem to have a pretty clear, kind of, you know, basically anti-kind of China bias, but it really seems like what's being discussed is happening. [1:10:24] And as we're going to talk about, it's happening to the detriment of a lot of Chinese people, especially writers and artists. [1:10:32] So where does this historical nihilism come from? From the West, China's official historians reply. [1:10:38] First opium, now critical theory. [1:10:39] Oh God, China just can't catch a break. [1:10:42] Which is, you know, it's hilarious because I am sure you can find probably elected officials in America, Republicans, on record saying that critical race theory comes from China. [1:10:51] Historical nihilism is like a new religion. So according to Chinese historian Yang Jun, postmodernism came to dominate Western intellectual circles in the 20th century. The primary objective of this accompanying new historiography was to deconstruct and destroy traditional historiography. [1:11:14] Which is funny because that's the same thing that a lot of American reactionaries say about postmodernism. [1:11:19] Yeah, this is just Frankfurt school stuff, basically. But I think it gets to the heart of something very real. Something very real that I think, again, going back to what we talked about previously in terms of this is just a normal state thing, right? I think most states have this sort of self-preservation in terms of wanting to control its history. And the Chinese Communist Party is just slightly more frank about how it goes about doing it. I don't think I don't want people to get the wrong perspective on this and think that this is something unique to China. China just simply does it in a very obvious way, according to us. In America, it happens through mass culture in a very different way. That's pervaded to us, through movies, more indirectly and through other sorts of pop culture. But the same kind of ideological functioning happens. [1:11:58] You can think of the way that Hollywood often is funded by the U.S. military. A lot of films get a lot of defense funding. It's not so different, really, at the end of the day. But it's something that I think is... I'm of mixed minds about it, right? I'm not 100% sure it's a good thing. [1:12:15] One of the last things that Trump did in office, like literally a week before he was replaced with Biden, was to promote this 1776 project documentary. [1:12:26] I totally forgot about that. [1:12:28] His own like, yeah, his own, like, you know, shitty version of 1619. That's like, you know, the... [1:12:33] It's a counter, counter-history. [1:12:35] It's just like, it's propaganda. It was reinforced traditional American propaganda. [1:12:41] And what I would say to this, this might be a little bit of a spicy take here, but I think, you know, this is something that I've talked about with my dad a lot. My dad is, I would say, on the right end of the American political spectrum. He's like a libertarian. And he really doesn't like woke culture, quote unquote, in America. And that's something that he always talks about is he draws direct comparison back to the Red Guards. He draws a direct comparison back to the Cultural Revolution as a whole when he talks about woke culture. Because he says, just like in the Cultural Revolution, which we saw in the movie, where there was a lot of ideological uncertainty, like the entire past narratives of what was considered knowledge, what was considered valued in society were being rewritten. So too did the BLM protesters want to do the same thing to American history. [1:13:26] No, no offense to your father, but that is bullshit. [1:13:28] No, of course not. I always debate with him on this point. What I'm trying to get at with saying this is: I think that a lot of people in China realize this is happening and they support it to a certain extent because they don't like the excesses of what happened during the Cultural Revolution. I think that they don't like this historical rewriting, in a sense, that happened during the Cultural Revolution and the extremity. It's better to be proud of all of Chinese history than to jettison it all, right? [1:13:48] So that's so funny. So you're basically arguing that because of the trauma of the Cultural Revolution, people don't want to relitigate and critically analyze the Cultural Revolution. [1:13:59] Yeah, that's what I'm saying. It's a very weird situation. They have memories of what this path leads down. [1:14:03] You know what that makes me think of? That makes me think of all those Russian nationalist guys who have a tattoo of Stalin right next to a tattoo of the Tsar. It's a synthesis of contradictory national symbols, essentially. [1:14:15] Right. Because again, because China right now is, I think, in a lot of contradictions. I think that China itself as a country is suffering from a lot of these kind of problems, right? Where it's split between this communist past and this present state capitalist reality. That it's very hard to figure out what actually needs to be kept and what's not. So why have these discussions? Why create division? Why create instability? Why relive? Why even have a chance to relive the cultural revolution that caused so much pain for so many people? [1:14:45] There's essentially a bargain right now between the party and the general population where it's like, you guys don't think too deeply about the past. And in exchange for that, we're going to see impressive year-on-year growth, and your life is going to materially improve with time. And so basically, like, they're just happy that in comparison to their parents, they're living in conditions that genuinely would not have been imaginable. And they're happy to not really think about it. But as China's economic growth is starting to slow down, which is something that the party was very worried about when Xi first came to power in 2012, it's time to start thinking about what happens when the party is no longer keeping its side of the bargain. [1:15:33] Absolutely. I think that's a very important point. [1:15:35] And the historian goes on to say, you know, the guy that says that explains that really it's postmodernism that is wrecking China. He says that the primary objective of accompanying new historiography was to deconstruct and destroy traditional historiography. Its aim, Yang argued, was to oppose the grand narrative that it accused Marxist material history of supporting. This new historiography, you know, historical nihilism, denies the continuity of history and deliberately seeks to tear it to pieces. [1:16:05] Right, and you can see that I think that going back to the Cultural Revolution, right, that's kind of the theme of the Cultural Revolution in a sense was to destroy what old China was and destroy the traditional signs of knowledge. [1:16:17] Yeah, even though he's using Marxist language and arguing that postmodernism is anti-Marxist, which is kind of correct, like that that's true in a sense. It really seems like, though, he's basically just trying to defend not really a Marxist interpretation of history, but more of like a standard nationalist interpretation. You can swap a few words and this could be something that a Republican would say these days. [1:16:40] Absolutely. And it goes back to the fact that, as we talked about previously, Deng considered the left to be a bigger threat than the right in many ways. When we talk about left-right dichotomy in the world, I don't think China is always the easiest one to grapple with in terms of whether it's left-wing or right-wing. You shouldn't lean too heavily on that in China. It's an amalgamation of a lot of different things at once. And as this shows, it's complicated. [1:17:05] And I know, Sam, that you actually found another Chinese historian who is saying the same kind of stuff. So clearly, right now in China, like the last, really, I guess the last four years, this has been a really big deal. The struggle over historical nihilism has become this public intellectual fight. [1:17:23] So here's a. [1:17:24] Why don't you tell us what this one professor said? [1:17:27] Chinese academic under fire over historical nihilism remarks from June 24th, 2021. In his speech at the Xi'an Jiaotong University, Ge Jianxiong argued that China's official version of history had been used as a tool to maintain rulers with legitimacy for thousands of years, and that the same was true now. [1:17:46] That's the kind of thing a lot of historians would say. Like, yeah, history is a tool of power. Usually, they're using it to criticize traditional tellings of history. But what does this guy say? [1:17:55] That it's a good thing that it's actually supporting the thousand years of history. [1:17:59] And notice this is not denying the communist past, right? This is not Maoism, where it's like we must completely break with all the feudal dynasties that existed in China for years beforehand. This is explicitly saying this is what the previous dynasties of China did. Let us continue that same tradition. [1:18:13] Yeah, definitely, yeah. [1:18:15] Oppose historical nihilism, ensure the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China, read one slide in his presentation, seen in the photo showing Ge at a lectern that had been widely shared on social media. According to another photo, Ge has repeated a standard line often seen in state media: History has chosen the Communist Party, and the Chinese people have chosen the Communist Party. Another slide stated that research should serve the national interest. [1:18:38] The mandate of heaven is alive and well. It really is like a big public fight. And one thing we should mention is that, like, we're talking about censorship in China, but that doesn't mean that there are not public discussions about issues like this within China. [1:18:53] And it's all happening on social media, by the way. So, they also have Twitter flame wars, except it's on Weibo. Yang Zheng Guang, a historian in Shenzhen, said in an article posted on WeChat that it was shameless for Ge to change his stand and defend the official line. He also slammed Ge for using the line that history had chosen the Communist Party, saying the same could be said of Nazi Germany and the former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. [1:19:18] I have an important question for you guys. Who in this situation is Conceptual James and who is Nicole Hannah-Jones? Which one of the two is which? [1:19:25] Ooh, I think, I, I, I think G is conceptual G and Yang Jung Jones. [1:19:35] I will say this guy, I'm sl I'm very slightly surprised that a modern Chinese academic would equate Stalin with Hitler. I would assume they would have a very different reception of Stalin and Hitler, you know? I don't, I would, I'm surprised they would connect those two like an American might. [1:19:50] Well, I mean, there are still liberal historians in the universities, they haven't been purged. [1:19:54] Because politics don't really matter. [1:19:55] He's completely right that the argument that, like, something happened so it's good is fucking bullshit. Like, what does it mean history chose the Communist Party? History chose the Holocaust. History chose colonization and slavery. Yeah, you know what this reminds me of? This reminds me of in like 2011 or probably like 2009, Justin Bieber was being interviewed by some like teen magazine and he explained that he didn't support abortion rights and his answer was because everything happens for a reason. This guy's a Chinese professional historian. He shouldn't be operating on the same level of logic, as like 15-year-old Bieber. [1:20:32] Well, it's basic teleology. It's essentially like taking what's going on right now and assuming that this is the natural end point of history, that this is where it should have ended up, and so this is where it's end it's ended up, and therefore it's good. But again, like I said, I think there's always a practical aspect of this, right? Which is again, I genuinely just think that people in China don't want a repeat of the instability that plagued the scenes that were shown in the movie. I think that that is something that they just do not want. And what is a better way to unite all Chinese people behind an idea than nationalism, right? I think it's a very functional perspective. [1:21:08] Yeah, let's go straight to the source. Let's go to this. This is from 2013. This is just an interesting year. This is just a historian giving an academic account. Document 9, which is what we're about to read from, ordered officials to combat the spread of seven subversive currents coursing through Chinese society and listed seven don't speaks, including, among others, Western constitutional democracy, universal values of human rights, Western-inspired notions of media independence, ardently pro-market neoliberalism, and nihilist criticism of the party's traumatic past. [1:21:45] So there really was, this is a policy shift that in the early 2010s, just like in the 90s, there was a policy shift toward basically repression, toward, or at least I should say, toward increased censorship and an increased, like I said, circling of the wagons of ideology. [1:22:02] I don't think it's coincidental that these kind of criticisms emerge at a time when there are a lot of protests and civil unrest going on in Western countries during this time period, right? I think that the Chinese Communist Party always has an eye on the outside world. [1:22:16] That's a good point, yeah. And because this would have been, because this initial document 9, this initial release would have been, this was before the emergence of Black Lives Matter, but right after Occupy Wall Street, which was kind of the really, you could maybe say that that was kind of like the spark of the like modern American left liberal protest movement. [1:22:34] Yeah, exactly. [1:22:35] And it's significant that it seems that Document 9 must have been written by Xi Jinping himself. Like this was him setting the agenda for the party. [1:22:44] Yes. [1:22:44] You know what, Sam? Why don't you read those in his own words? [1:22:48] The goal of historical nihilism in the guise of reassessing history is to distort party history and the history of New China. By rejecting CCP history and the history of New China, historical nihilism seeks to fundamentally undermine the CCP's historical purpose, which is tantamount to denying the legitimacy of the CCP's long-term political dominance. [1:23:09] It's the campaign, like you said, it's their version of critical race theory, this fear of historical nihilism. [1:23:16] So the question, though, is what is China doing about it? Like what kind of actions are actually being taken supposedly in support of crushing political nihilism? [1:23:26] Right. So just like with many other things, one of the first things that the Chinese Communist Party will do in this term is to censor social media posts. [1:23:35] So China deletes 2 million online posts for historical nihilism as Communist Party's centenary nears. [1:23:42] I might argue that the Chinese people love to post maybe more than anyone. [1:23:46] They do. So yeah, that's why often, yeah, social media posts are very easy targets. Yeah, they're very, very common targets because people love to post everywhere. It's a common human thing. [1:23:57] And I think that one thing that we should mention that I think is quite important to mention is that political speech in China on social media is not typically censored. Although, like, China is not, you know, democratic in a way that the United States is in that sense, and although political organizers often are pretty badly repressed, you can criticize the government on social media. And this, usually, and this is a time when they broke from that. When this year, in May 2021, China suddenly took a very harsh turn against random citizens posting what they thought was historical nihilism. [1:24:32] Well, I'd also like to push back against that a little bit and say that they are a bit more proactive than Western social media companies and governments. Like, they regularly ban posts that contain certain keywords. Like, for example, if something happened at, like, a conference in some town, like, you might want to go on Weibo and make a post about it, only to find out that your post isn't going through because you have like this town name in it. Supposedly, at least, during the Arab Spring in China, you could not search the name Egypt. [1:25:02] I believe it. [1:25:03] Oh, yeah. [1:25:04] China's internet regulator has said it has overseen the deletion of more than 2 million posts containing harmful discussions of history amid preparations to mark the Communist Party's centenary in July. For a while, some people have disseminated harmful information with historical nihilism on the internet under the guise of reflection and declassification, said a division director at the Cybersecurity Administration of China during a press conference. [1:25:27] So you can see that unlike before where the Communist Party was directly voicing criticisms of communist history, now all of a sudden, anybody who does so is suspect of doing it unfairly. They're no longer doing it in terms of reflection and declassification. Now it's historical nihilism. [1:25:43] And that's what's kind of so interesting is that so in the wake of Mao's death and the ascension of Deng Xiaoping and the beginnings of the economic liberalization in China, basically the entire Western world expected, and to some extent still expects, that the economic liberalization was going to be met with a political liberalization. There was this assumption that because China was becoming increasingly capitalistic, it would also adopt the political preferences of the West. But clearly, that isn't happening. And it really seems like, at least in this moment, in the past decade, under President Xi Jinping, China is turning away from aspects of the Dengist legacy and potentially back toward Mao. [1:26:28] I am not sure I agree with that. In terms of rhetoric, maybe, but in practice, I would say that Xi is very much in the mold of Deng. [1:26:37] Right. [1:26:37] Just as we talked about previously, in terms of talking about Lenin and Stalin without actually thinking about what they actually would have wanted, I think it's very similar to that, where Mao becomes a hallowed elder that you simply respect for respecting sake, not because you actually understood what he truly did. Right? Just like George Washington is a deified figure in American history, right? You don't really think about George Washington as the slave owner. [1:27:01] Yeah, yeah. And I would say, even beyond the fact that he's a slave owner, one thing I just also find kind of funny is that this is much less evil, but also kind of interesting. He was a really sleazy real estate speculator. And he actually used the U.S. military, from what I understand, to his own material benefit by clearing out Native American settlements in places where he'd already purchased the land. There was an entire war over that in upstate New York, I believe. [1:27:28] The regulator said the deleted posts had polluted the online environment, and his office had launched a specific campaign for the centenary. [1:27:36] Oh, this is the centenary of the founding of the Communist Party, right? Which just happened? [1:27:41] Yes, exactly right. So it's a big year for them. [1:27:44] Just like the 1776 project. [1:27:47] Since the beginning of the campaign, we have lawfully dealt with a large number of accounts that disseminated historical nihilism, he said. We have urged various websites to delete more than 2 million posts that violated laws or regulations. [1:27:59] One thing to keep in mind about this is that 2 million posts sounds like a lot, but like China has 1.3 billion people. So like 2 million posts is not like a ton of posts by any means. [1:28:09] Yeah, I'm sure this is probably a really big deal on like one Chinese history forum. They're probably really fucking mad about this. But regular Chinese people, they probably don't even know about this. [1:28:18] I have a theory that's not really backed up by anything, but I think that what they're doing here is that the state is sending a signal to the social media companies like, hey guys, from now on we want you to keep an eye out for this. [1:28:32] That's definitely what the CCP tends to do. Even with the way it functions with the economy, it would do similar stuff to that. [1:28:37] The CAC's website invites people to report posts that distort the history of the party, or China, since the party's rule began in 1949. Other criteria given include attacks on the party leadership, slandering heroes, and vilification of traditional Chinese culture. [1:28:52] Once again, the fact that I think that Chinese culture is now just part of communist China, when in reality, the entire point of the Great Leap Forward was to smash it, right? To completely destroy it. And it's like, well, it's back here and it's actually something we want to defend. In the same vein that you want to defend Mao, we also defend Confucius. [1:29:08] If you see someone burning a shadow puppet, report them. [1:29:10] Yeah, exactly. And again, it's just China's truly just of two minds on this stuff. China's really just caught in this really weird moment where it's just not sure what it is. And you know what? That's not always the worst place to be, but it's certainly not a stable place to be. [1:29:26] Yeah, so again, the party is taking this very seriously. In fact, in January 2019, they set up this historical academy that Xi had requested, which would disseminate the official party viewpoint on history on social media, doing stuff that ranges the gamut from just cutesy comics all the way to like sharing quotes from Chairman Mao, etc., etc. This is a Wall Street Journal article. So again, there's going to be some anti-China bias here. This is from 2014 entitled China's Search for a Usable Past. So in his brilliant essay, The Search for a Usable Past, the American historian Henry Steele Commager wrote about this process in the early years of the young United States. A usable past had to be in part created because we had so little real history. We needed a new history to help define who we were, what our ideals were, who were our heroes and our villains, and what we wish to become. [1:30:25] Well, I would say it's not really a one-to-one comparison per se because China has had over 3,000 years of history. [1:30:33] Yes, China does have real history. [1:30:35] Yeah, yeah. [1:30:36] No, well, tragically, all of the authentically old American history is about civilizations that we destroyed. Or at least if we didn't do it, then some other awful European colonizers did it for us. [1:30:49] But once again, part of the point of the Cultural Revolution was to destroy the history in a similar kind of way. It was to completely do a blank slate in terms of that. So I think it's actually a stronger parallel here. [1:31:00] I don't think it's appropriate to draw a moral comparison between the Cultural Revolution and what happened, the genocide of the people of the Americas. But you're right, though, that it does sort of lead to this kind of blank slate situation. [1:31:12] Well, it also didn't succeed in the case of the Cultural Revolution. That's the thing they tried, but it failed for the most part. [1:31:18] Right, and I would say that it also failed in the terms of American history, too. It's not as if we completely wiped out Native Americans and other groups from our own history at the same time. [1:31:27] This guy could continue to say that basically China, just like the early U.S., is now searching its own new history. Mao himself is now part of Chinese history. And reconstructing and interpreting Mao is part of what China's leaders must do today. They don't seem yet prepared to reinterpret the Tiananmen events of 1989, but almost surely will need to do that at some point. [1:31:49] So what is the version of Mao that will serve the Communist Party today? [1:31:53] Which is a good question. You know, like if China no longer has a communistic economy, I would argue, then how can Mao be properly rehabilitated? Sanitized of all of his communist elements and simply turned into the founder of modern China. [1:32:07] Sort of like Sun Yat-sen. But what's funny is I don't even think he's an icon of rebellion anymore at this point. I think he's the establishment. Because I think the Chinese Communist Party does not have any affinity for rebellion anymore. I think that they've kind of given up on that. [1:32:20] From what I understand, it is very common among Russian people, not just Russian nationalists, but regular, non-crazy Russian people, to suggest that Stalin might have killed a lot of people, but he really brought order and stability to Russia. But Lenin and Trotsky, they were just rabble-rousers. We shouldn't celebrate them. [1:32:40] Yeah, that's the official Russian state narrative under Putin in the last decade or so. Like, they do polls about historical figures and who the general public considers to be the greatest Russian historical figures. And time after time, Stalin comes up as within the top three. [1:32:57] Him not even being Russian aside, just. [1:32:59] That's true, yeah. Yeah, there's just this need to say that Stalin is the good one, Stalin is the one who created order out of chaos, sown by Lenin, and so Stalin is good. Whereas, as Putin said, Lenin put a landmine under the Russian state. [1:33:14] Yeah, yeah. [1:33:15] So, this writer continues that Mao's serious mistakes must be reckoned with, but China's present leaders believe his achievements also need to be affirmed to legitimate the rule of the Communist Party. Consider, the author continues, two pressing issues for China, deeply connected to its history, about which it must decide how to interpret and use history. The first issue is where values will come from as China moves forward. China today places great value on making money and self-interested material success, long denied to the Chinese. [1:33:50] Which is true. Like, you know, like you said, China is in most, basically every sense, a capitalist country. And I think that, Cnut, what you've said before, which is quite interesting, is that it's a, I believe you said, China has a capitalist economy, but not a capitalist government. [1:34:04] Right. I saw some professor talk about that. That's basically what his conclusion was. And having spent a lot of time in China over the course of my life, I would say that's pretty accurate in terms of how it seems to function. However, there's a belief that values, in addition to individualism and materialism, are needed to hold the country together and make it a good country. So where will these values come from? The announced ideology of the Chinese Communist Party no longer seems to be a source of moral values for Chinese society. [1:34:33] I think that this article is a little outdated on this point because since this article was published in 2014, I think it was, Xi has made a very conscious move to embrace the socialism side of things much more intensely in the sense of emphasizing that the Chinese Communist Party is a socialist party, that they are constructing socialism on the path to communism, and etc., etc. [1:34:58] You have to wonder to what extent is that opportunism? Because, you know, famously, Xi Jinping's own rival, Bo Shilai, was basically almost like a neo-Maoist. And that in like the, I believe in the early 2010s, he really brought back a lot of the kind of revolutionary culture of the Maoist era. And Xi Jinping played a large part in orchestrating this guy's downfall, and he's been in prison ever since. And then sort of snatched up all of his, a lot of his ideas, you know, and incorporated them into a national political program. [1:35:31] Yeah, but that's also sort of what the problem is: that socialism is a floating signifier. It can mean whatever you want it to mean. [1:35:38] Right. It's like democracy in the United States. [1:35:40] I think that's exactly right. And I'd also say that you shouldn't always read too much into the ideological differences between the factions at the same time. A lot of it is just purely posturing in terms of just gaining support on a local level. [1:35:52] Yeah, absolutely. [1:35:53] And so you mentioned, Sam, that under Xi Jinping, there's been kind of an increased crackdown on financial crimes. And Zhang Yimou himself is actually not immune to this. But he was fined for something kind of different. If you want to, you know, get into that, Sam. [1:36:08] So here's a story from January 2014. Filmmaker Zhang Yimou fined $1.2 million for breach of one-child policy. Oscar-nominated Chinese filmmaker Zhang Yimou has been fined 7.48 million yuan, 1.2 million dollars, for breaching China's one-child policy, authorities say. The fine comes after Zhang apologized in an open letter for his quote-unquote excessive children in December. He and his wife, Chen Ting, admitted to having two sons and a daughter. [1:36:37] What I think is quite funny about this is that when you think about communist societies, you don't exactly often think of them as fining someone $1.2 million. That tends to be not what you do with people who have that large amount of money for the most part. [1:36:50] Yeah, that's true. That's true. [1:36:52] It just shows that it is not the cultural revolution. Maoism is gone. There are certain aspects of Maoism being laundered for basically nationalistic purposes, but China is no longer, in the same sense as it once was, a communist country. [1:37:07] Exactly. And again, don't get me wrong, I think that's fine to find a $1.2 million. I'm just saying. I think we can agree that this podcast is 100% in favor of, you know, tracking down tax evaders and billionaires, whoever they might be. [1:37:21] Well, unfortunately, tragically, we'll get to this in a minute. Zhang Yimou is going to have further trouble with the Chinese government. Zhang's breach of the policy has set off a firestorm, especially among some netizens who resent how the rich and famous in China flout rules and policies. Is this really a huge sum? Do people know how much he makes in a single film? Some are saying that the fines are too heavy. All I can say is that this is nothing to him. Sina Weibo user 729 wrote on China's equivalent of Twitter. [1:37:54] Wow, 729 is a hard liner. [1:37:56] Definitely. Hey, but that's what I was saying. Like, back in Maoist era, he probably would have gotten five bullets in the back. [1:38:03] But Zhang also has his defenders. Zhang is a good fellow, wrote Sarah 2007 on Sina Weibo. Even though the social maintenance fee is a ridiculous and shameless rip-off, which no one knows what use it will be put to, he knows he has no choice. And as a public figure, he has to accept the fines with an earnest attitude. [1:38:22] And going back to the movie, right? What does... What do all the characters do in the movie for the most part? They accept the tragedies that are put upon them with an earnest attitude. They do feel upset at points, but they continue on and they don't usually make too big of a deal about it. [1:38:35] No, definitely. [1:38:36] Yeah. So, yeah, well, so really, it's clear that Zhang Yimou has really had an incredibly rocky career. And so, like we said, many different movies of his in the early 90s, including To Live, were censored or at least pulled from festivals in different respects. He really clashed with the Chinese authorities all throughout the 90s. And then he sort of kind of shifted in the 2000s to doing basically kind of like bigger kind of like away from the political and toward like a bigger kind of production spectacles. Like his most famous movies in America, which are very good, they're very good action films, are Hero from 2002 and then House of Flying Daggers, 2004, which are both totally divorced from contemporary Chinese politics. [1:39:23] I would push back against that, actually. I would say that Hero, at least I haven't seen House of Flying Daggers, but Hero is a very political film. It's a highly nationalistic film. It shows that there must be one strong China, that the Chinese people must be united under a You're right. [1:39:40] It is political. The better way to say it, though, is that it's political in a way that is not remotely disturbing to the Chinese government because it depicts a time so far earlier than the Revolution. It's set during the Warring States period, I believe. And then House of Flying Daggers, I think it's set in China, but it might as well be a fantasy country. It's so fantastical. It's about, yeah, these like warrior monks who can jump really high and throw daggers really well. It's a great movie. But, anyways, he really kind of shifted his career, is what I'm trying to say, away from films that were expressly political in ways that freaked out the Chinese censor board. But then, in 2008, he directed the opening ceremonies of the Beijing Olympics. And this really was seen as such a successful spectacle. And it was cool. I remember as a kid, like, they had people like look, it looked like they were painting Chinese characters with their bodies on a canvas. It was cool. [1:40:35] Like, I would argue that this really gave a lot of people in the West hope that China would indeed become a liberal democracy because obviously they wouldn't be able to create something so beautiful if they weren't committed to liberalism. [1:40:49] That's so true. [1:40:50] So, yeah, so really that the Olympics really did wonders for Zhang Yimou's career. So, he really started rising, and his films became more about what they were in the 90s. They became increasingly political. [1:41:02] He had that one film that was called Coming Home, I want to say was like 2015, which is about the Cultural Revolution in a sense. It was critical of it, but it didn't really seem to have been politically troublesome. [1:41:13] But let's move forward to the most recent past with Zhang Yimou, because he has another movie coming out. He has a movie that was announced about a year and a half ago that was about to be shown at the Cannes Film Festival in 2019. What will become of Zhang Yimou's censored masterpiece, One Second? Zhang Yimou isn't expected to be in attendance at the 2019 Cannes Film Festival, not because his latest film was finished too late, or because it wasn't aesthetically up to snuff. Instead, the acclaimed Chinese director has suffered the perverse fate of seeing his new film withheld from contention because it is reputed to be so good that it might take home multiple awards. Something the Chinese government is said very much not to want. Why do you guys think they wouldn't want that? [1:41:57] They don't want attention, I think. They don't want this much international attention on a film that depicts a difficult time in the Chinese past. [1:42:05] I think that, talking about things like historical nihilism, I think that is exactly the kind of thing that might lead to people in China asking questions that they prefer not to be asked. [1:42:14] I feel like we have some parallels like that in American culture recently, right? I feel like there was a lot of people getting upset about like the opening episode of Watchmen, which I never saw. [1:42:23] Oh, yeah. See, it's about the Tulsa race riots, which is just this horrific massacre. [1:42:27] Yeah. So, again, this is something not unique to China in any way. The levers that China might use to manipulate this stuff are maybe a little bit more obvious, but there are still these kind of things that occur across countries, no matter what. [1:42:39] Yes, absolutely. [1:42:40] Yeah. Zhang's latest feature, One Second, was said to be something excitingly different. Details of the film's production were kept under wraps until an announcement in January that it would be premiering in competition at the Berlin International Film Festival. As the festival approached in February, snippets of information about the movie began to percolate through the Beijing film industry. Starring Zhang Yi and Fan Wei, the film was said to be Zhang's most personal project in years, one that he'd been wanting to make for a decade. Set during the Cultural Revolution, One Second was shot in and around the small Chinese town of Dunhuang, known for its evocative sand dune swath landscape. As Zhang's first pure festival film in years, One Second was keenly anticipated in Berlin by international film buffs. Many in the Chinese industry, meanwhile, simply marveled that he had been permitted to make a movie set during the politically sensitive Cultural Revolution era, which is kind of interesting because the movie we just watched was actually also set during the politically sensitive Cultural Revolution era. [1:43:32] The Hollywood Reporter spoke with two of the very select circle of Beijing industry insiders who were invited to view the film during the lead-up to Berlin, both CEOs of major local studios, and both described the film as Zhang's best work in years, were optimistic that it would win the Golden Bear. [1:43:47] Then something strange happened. Two days before the premiere, a message appeared on One Second's promotional social media accounts in China. The film had encountered a technical problem and was withdrawn from competition. [1:43:58] God, that's the classic cartoon, the classic thing. Like, something crazy happens. Oh, technical difficulties. Please stand by. [1:44:05] Skeptical that China's most technical-accomplished filmmaker could have encountered an insurmountable snafu during post-production. The international media soon surmised that the movie must have run into censorship issues. [1:44:15] You know, I just gotta say, if I was Zhang Yimou, I would try to insure all of my hotel stays in plane tickets, you know? [1:44:23] He was fined $1.2 million, so obviously he's not doing too poorly for himself. [1:44:26] Alright, that's true. That's true. [1:44:29] Zhang's team was informed shortly before the Berlin Festival that technical approval was being withheld for reasons that stretched the notion of technical to a euphemistic extreme. Someone senior in the party's propaganda department had seen the picture and felt that the general theme was inappropriate. [1:44:44] Yeah, once again, going back to this being very much a vibes-based thing without proper criteria. [1:44:49] Yeah, somebody just said, you know what, I don't really like this too much. And that's it. [1:44:53] Subsequent discussions with regulators have encouraged the One Second team that permission for a theatrical release within China will ultimately be granted. But it's become clear to them that taking the film to a high-profile festival abroad is officially unwelcome. Should a director of Zhang's stature win major awards for a film with One Second's themes, international media attention would be cast back on China's officially suppressed history. Propaganda department officials may have been sufficiently concerned by this possibility in Berlin that they resorted to the drastic step of yanking the film at the last minute via an unconventional mechanism. For Zhang, the episode may carry the uncanny feeling of history repeating itself. During the early days of his career, the director pioneered drama To Live, won the jury prize at the 1994 Cannes Film Festival, only to get banned from theatrical release at home in China because of its perceived critique of government policy. [1:45:39] Not until Zhang directed the stunning opening and closing ceremony in the 2008 Beijing Olympics was he considered fully rehabilitated. Now, Zhang has assigned on to direct the official ceremony surrounding the 70th anniversary celebration, reaffirming his status as the government's go-to creative hand, and perhaps undoing all over again any political taint stemming from perceived creative trespasses in One Second. The odds of the world ever getting a look at the film uncensored currently look slim. The chances of Zhang picking up a lit career festival win, meanwhile, are now nil. [1:46:09] And I gotta say, what this reminds me of again is like we mentioned, in 2017, China chose not to submit this really beautiful film that involved the Cultural Revolution, youth, and instead submitted Wolf Warrior 2 to the Oscars. Even though I have to think, the Chinese film board must have known that the Oscars would never give any commendation to something like Wolf Warrior 2. [1:46:30] Yeah, but Wolf Warrior 2 is much closer to the vibes that the Chinese state wishes to project right now, so. [1:46:37] So, let's see. So, what happened to this movie, One Second? It eventually was released. [1:46:43] Zhang Yimou's One Second, this is, I'm sorry, this is a Hollywood Reporter article. Zhang Yimou's One Second set for China release after lengthy censorship struggle. Renowned Chinese director Zhang Yimou's love letter to cinema, the period drama One Second, is finally headed to cinemas. Beijing regulators have approved the film for release on November 27, following a year-long censorship struggle. How much Zhang was forced to change his film to appease the censors is going to remain unknown. The original version has never been publicly shown. The new version of One Second runs 104 minutes, just one minute below the initial runtime. However, Zhang and some of his actors returned to the Gobi Desert in China's Gansu province across the last year to conduct reshoots, suggesting that the changes made to this film were more than simply cosmetic. [1:47:36] And so, where does that all leave us in 2021, with China looking not at the height of its power, but you know, in a very strong position and the rest of the world kind of trailing a little bit behind? To me, this suggests that even though China is in a very favorable position, you know, socioeconomically, geopolitically, there are some aspects of the Chinese past that they're very insecure about. And it really seems like there is, in general, concern about the long-term strength of the party. [1:48:10] To quote Premier Zhou Enlai in the 70s, when he was asked about what he thought the consequences of the French Revolution were, and he responded with, It's too early to tell. I guess we'll have to wait and see, because it's a very uncertain moment in history right now. Things are very much in the air. China has a lot going for it. Although I would think that considering how much of a firm hand the party feels it must apply these days, they don't feel very secure. [1:48:42] Cnut, it's funny that you mentioned Zhou Enlai, because I don't think we mentioned him at all this episode, but he was you could argue Mao's number two, an incredibly important revolutionary figure who had an incredibly long career and lived almost as long as Mao. Really, this great breadth of Chinese society. And I'm mentioning Zhou Enlai because there is one other kind of famous piece of Chinese, I guess, related media that I think is quite interesting. I'm just kind of curious if you guys are familiar with this. [1:49:17] Have you heard of the opera Nixon in China? [1:49:20] I have. [1:49:20] It's quite good. You know, even if you're not an opera buff, it's very like, it's kind of experimental, but it's also very approachable. And it's a traditional kind of Western opera with a slightly jazz-influenced soundtrack about, you know, Nixon and Kissinger going to China. And what I've been interested is that even though it's this American work probably from the 80s during the Reagan era, it is in its own kind of way, if not sympathetic, definitely receptive toward the goals of the Chinese revolutionaries. And the opera actually ends with Zhou Enlai himself in bed after having met with Nixon and having undertaken this immensely important, I would say, world event-you know, this huge realignment essentially of China away from the Soviet Union and moving closer toward Washington, really, which potentially may have precipitated the economic shifts that would happen under Deng. And he lies awake at night thinking about his long career, about all the changes that he's done to Chinese society. [1:50:28] And he asked the question: how much of what we did was good? [1:50:31] 70%. [1:50:35] I think that's a great place to end it. [1:50:37] Mao is 70% good, 30% bad. [1:50:40] As we talked about before, in a lot of ways, China and America, maybe more similarities and differences. You know, we got critical race theory, they got historical nihilism. We got George Washington, they got Mao. And we buy all the stuff they make, and they watch Marvel movies and love it. So, you know, we get along great. And it's only a matter of time until they make a Hamilton-style musical with Mao, where Mao is played by a Uyghur. [1:51:04] Cut that, cut that, cut that. [1:51:07] All right, well, this is another lovely episode of Gladio Free Europe. We are here joined again by the incomparable Cnut. Cnut the Great, Cnut of, I believe it was Norway, Denmark, and England. You have three kingdoms. [1:51:21] That's enough for me. [1:51:22] All right, all right. Well, thank you, Cnut, so much for coming by. Thank you, Sam, for finding this movie and finding a lot of these really great articles. And we are going to see you guys again next week. This was Gladio Free Europe. [1:51:34] All right, take care. [1:51:35] Bye. [1:51:35] Bye.