Gladio Free Europe, E21: The Iron Giant (with Daniel Bessner) https://www.gladiofreeeurope.com/episodes/the-iron-giant [0:00:15] And we're back with another episode of Gladio Free Europe. I'm Russian Sam, and I'm joined today, as always, by my co-hosts, Halal Sam. [0:00:22] Hello. [0:00:22] And Liam. [0:00:24] Good morning. [0:00:24] And today is also a very momentous occasion because we also happen to be joined by a very special guest. Today we have with us Daniel Bessner, who is a historian of American foreign relations, the author of Democracy in Exile, and the co-host of the American Prestige podcast. So welcome, Danny. Thank you very much for making time to talk with us. [0:00:46] Thanks for having me, guys. [0:00:48] And today we'll be discussing a 1999 movie called The Iron Giant. [0:00:52] Great millennial nostalgia there. [0:00:54] It's an animated children's movie, but it's a lot more sophisticated than I had remembered and actually has a lot of interesting things to say about American foreign policy as well as just American feelings towards the outside world more broadly. [0:01:07] Yeah, absolutely. I mean, it's a Cold War nostalgia piece. It, you know, it came out in 99, I believe. You know, so the moment of the end of history when the boomers are re-evaluating their childhood. So yeah, it's very of its moment in a sense. [0:01:24] And it's based on Ted Hughes' 1968 book, The Iron Man. He had written this book to comfort his children after his wife, Sylvia Plath, killed herself. Which I think is a pretty kind of interesting connection to, you know, the whole broader theme of mid-century American malaise right there. [0:01:40] Yeah, absolutely. I guess it doesn't get much closer than that. So, released in 1999, the Iron Giant actually is set the night that Sputnik is launched, when an enormous humanoid robot, an Iron Giant voiced by Vin Diesel, falls from the sky and lands on the shores of a small Maine town. The robot goes on a feeding frenzy, eating whatever metal it can find, and a local boy, Hogarth Hughes, rescues the robot from electrocution after he tries to eat a power station. After the kid and the giant strike up a friendship, a local government agent named Kent Mansley is sent to investigate, and that's when, you know, things really start to spiral out of control. [0:02:18] Really, this is, I think, Brad Bird's story much more than it is Ted Hughes's. [0:02:22] Absolutely. Absolutely, Brad Bird's story. And yeah, if anyone doesn't know, Brad Bird, who directed The Incredibles, Ratatouille, he actually wrote this film after the murder of his sister by her own husband with a gun. And it just had a profound impact on him. And across his grieving, he found the original Ted Hughes book. And what Brad Bird says here is: I'd read the Hughes book and loved it for its poetic simplicity. But I also had some new ideas of my own on what the film could be about. The meat of this story to me was the relationship between the little boy and the giant. I went to Warner Brothers, I said I was interested, but I wanted to go in a different direction. I told them, what if a gun had a soul and didn't want to be a gun? [0:03:05] Yeah, the giant himself says, I'm not a gun many times. [0:03:08] Yeah, yeah, it's interesting. I mean, it's so centered on the Cold War that there must have been something, you know, attractive about the politics of the moment that attracted Brad Bird to it. I don't know. I didn't do really any research on him, but I'm curious what you guys think why he would have pursued this. [0:03:29] Well, he actually does talk about it a bit. Rather than setting the film in Timeless England as in the source material, I wanted to set it in America in 1957, at the height of the Cold War, immediately after the Sputnik launch. The Maine setting looks like Norman Rockwell ideal on the outside, but inside, everything is just about to boil over. Everybody was so scared of the bomb, the Russians, Sputnik, even rock and roll. This clenched Ward Cleaver smile, masking fear, which is what the Kent character is all about, is just the perfect environment to drop a 50-foot-tall robot. [0:04:01] Yeah, interesting. Yeah, so it's a little bit of self-nostalgizing, you know, trying to overturn the nostalgia. You know, very, very 1990s. [0:04:11] Yeah, we should, yeah. [0:04:13] It's the same year as American Beauty, the same year as The Matrix, yeah. [0:04:17] Yeah, that's a gigantic year in American movies. [0:04:20] Oh, yeah, absolutely, for pop culture, yeah. [0:04:22] Although, tragically, it was actually not a gigantic year for the Iron Giant. [0:04:26] It didn't do well, no. [0:04:28] The movie got rave reviews, but like, it did very poorly at the box office because Warner Brothers did a really bad promotional campaign. They had this kind of like 50s-style horror movie campaign, but they thought it'd be really cool to sell it as if it was like, you know, like a Corman movie from 57. Yeah, so like they spent $50 million making the movie, and then they only made $31 million at the box office, which is rough, yeah. [0:04:53] Oh, wow. And yeah, if you if you, you know, factor in what's it called, public relations and marketing, it probably costs a ton of money. [0:05:05] Yeah, no, yeah, it's and it was actually kind of seen within the industry for a few years as this kind of famous, famous tragedy, this like real passion piece that was, I would say, a lot more interesting with a lot more going on than most animated films of the time. Just had made no impact on the box office and initially very little impact in pop culture, I would say. [0:05:27] Yeah, I remember it as being sort of a cult thing. I think I actually saw it. I was a camp counselor, and on like a rainy day, I saw it. [0:05:36] What month was it released? [0:05:38] July. [0:05:39] Yeah, so I must have been a camp counselor, and so I saw it with my and I remember not liking it at the time. I found it a little boring. And I mean, I think it's okay. I don't, I'm not like a gigantic fan of it. It's fine. It didn't really link me as it does other people. But, you know, that's just one man's opinion. [0:05:59] I have to admit, I saw this when I was probably five. So all of the Cold War stuff was completely lost on me. [0:06:06] Same here. At the time. [0:06:07] Yeah. [0:06:07] Yeah, of course. [0:06:09] Which made it a lot more interesting to go back and revisit. I personally enjoyed it quite a bit. Rewatching it right now. [0:06:15] I also saw it as a child. I just felt like it does a pretty good job of melding these sort of didactic elements that you would expect in a children's story with a very adult critique of the American national security state and overwhelming politics of fear, which kids like Brad Bird would have grown up with. [0:06:31] You know, before we get into those politics of fear, Danny, do you just want to share what you personally didn't like about the movie? [0:06:38] I don't think I loved the animation style. It was melodramatic in sort of that 90s big movie sense. I don't know. It just never clicked with me. It's just a movie that never really clicked with me. I'm trying to think, like, what animated movies recently have I liked. I like that multiverse Spider-Man. That was a fun movie. [0:06:59] Yeah, yeah, that's great. [0:07:00] I'm sure some Pixar movies I've liked. But yeah, this doesn't just didn't really grab me for whatever reason. Maybe I felt it was a little oddly paced and a little oddly animated. [0:07:11] Yeah, I think that the some of the emotion is a little saccharine, but I think that the kind of the core like Iron Giant and Hogarth stuff, I think that's pretty strong. And I think that's probably what most people take away from this one. [0:07:25] Oh, I'm sure, yeah, that makes a lot of sense. [0:07:28] It is a very different style aesthetically from the rest of Brad Bird's movies. [0:07:31] Oh, totally. [0:07:31] And you know, also what I didn't realize as a kid was that so much of the giant himself is CGI, and the CGI today looks a little bit rough. [0:07:38] Yeah. [0:07:39] Yes. [0:07:39] For sure. Yeah. [0:07:40] Well, you know, Sam, you mentioned Sam, Russian Sam, mentioned American fear, and that's such a great through line for this movie. And I know one thing that you even dug up is it goes right back to the beginning. Because if you look at the Declaration of Independence back in 1776, so much of it is just a list of grievances, and it gets into some pretty interesting fears. Like, for instance, they say about the king, he has excited domestic insurrections among us, and he has endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian savages, whose known rules of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions. And, you know, beyond this, Samuel Adams even had this completely paranoid belief that the British crown actually wanted to enslave white American colonists. It's kind of ironic that they had this persistent fear of being enslaved when the majority of the signers of the Declaration of Independence were themselves slave owners. [0:08:33] It's basically like, despite the fact that they were so afraid that they personally would be enslaved, there was a persistent fear of like slave revolts and black republics, so-called, especially after Haiti had happened. I think the Haitian Revolution sort of represents the earliest encapsulation of this idea of an alien foreign menace that, in a sense, might even be connected to some kind of blowback from American policy. The idea that the Americans as the leaders of this horrific slave empire might deal with some kind of punishment. And I think that in a small extent, the later fears about things like Sputnik amid the Cold War, I think had this kind of grain of blowback as well, this grain of retribution that the United States has this, you know, globe-straddling empire. What's going to happen if people who don't want to be in that empire decide to fight back? [0:09:27] So what's the larger point you're making? [0:09:29] I guess just that this movie really kind of is about the current of fear in American politics, specifically the fear of the foreign threat that half the time we ourselves played some role in creating. [0:09:41] Yeah, the question is that that's almost a feature of every society. It's interesting to explore what's a peculiarly American about that. [0:09:54] Yeah, and I think Haiti is absolutely crucial to the development of that. [0:09:58] Yeah, and of course, you know, the Haitian fear specifically was just unbelievably racist, going right into like, you know, the racial anxieties of the time. In one of our last episodes, we talked about how even Italian-American immigration in the early 20th century was seen as this, you know, like potential racial pollutant. And that basically, if you want to sell anything in America, fear is the best way to do it, whether it's isolationism or whether it's imperialism or whether it's, in this case, you know, in the case of immigration, you know, just complete hard line of white supremacy. [0:10:33] Yeah, well, it's interesting. A lot of recent historical work, just to, you know, I just want to talk about isolationism for a second. A lot of recent, a lot of recent historical work has kind of revealed that there was never really an isolationist movement, that the only isolationism was basically whether to stay in or outside of the Western Hemisphere. So it's kind of interesting. You know, like isolationists always involved dominating Latin America and the Caribbean and, you know, some of the Pacific Islands. So yeah, I just wanted to make that point, you know, because I think people use that term a lot. [0:11:05] But for our purposes, the most pertinent fear in the American public consciousness would have to be the second Red Scare, which, of course, is most famously embodied by the House Un-American Activities Committee, which was founded to investigate people who were accused of being communist or fascist. [0:11:18] Yeah, I think I should add that that is somewhat ironic that it initially was not an entirely anti-communist organization. [0:11:25] Yeah, it started actually as an anti-New Deal thing for the most part. Started, I think Martin Dies was a representative. He was a Texas anti-New Deal Southern congressman. And it started, I believe, as a sort of reaction to the alphabet soup agencies that the New Deal got going in the mid-30s and onward. [0:11:45] Yeah, but by 1945, it had morphed into a permanent standing committee, and that's really the most active phase of its existence. That's when McCarthyism comes to the forefront. It's what people think of when they think Red Scare. And of course, the Hollywood blacklists and the State Department trials are the most best-known aspects of this, but it's really only the tip of the iceberg for the insanity that was gripping American public life in that period. [0:12:07] Well, and you noted, Sam, Russian Sam, that the Smith Act also, maybe even more so, represents kind of the politics of fear during World War II and immediately after. [0:12:16] Yeah, yeah. So the Smith Act passed in 1940 when the German overwhelming of France in such a short period of time created this massive fear about fifth columns. So the Smith Act criminalized conspiring or calling for the overthrow of the American government. And of course, it was mostly used to prosecute supporters of fascism and Trotskyists, funnily enough. But after the war, it found new life as a tool to decapitate the Communist Party of the United States of America. [0:12:40] Right. [0:12:40] And then in 1950, you have probably the most famous case of alleged, you know, Soviet spies in the U.S. [0:12:47] Basically with the Rosenbergs. [0:12:48] Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, of course, you know, arrested in 1950. They were ratted out by, I think, Ethel's brother, accused of passing information, nuclear information to the Soviets and conspiring, and then sentenced to death for treason. [0:13:01] Yeah, yeah, the only Americans to be executed for espionage during the Cold War. [0:13:04] Yeah, yeah, the Rosenbergs. Yeah. [0:13:06] Have any of you ever seen Angels in America? [0:13:08] No, I have not. It's a blind spot of mine. I'm so sorry. [0:13:12] Oh, you should see it. It's a good culture. [0:13:13] How old are you guys? You guys sound young. [0:13:16] I think we're all mid-20s, I think. [0:13:18] Yeah, 26 here. [0:13:19] Mid-20s. [0:13:20] Yeah. [0:13:20] Okay. You should check it. You should see Angels in America. It's very good. [0:13:24] For sure. [0:13:24] So Ethel, she probably wasn't really involved in this. But she did know. She might have made it to him a bit in like a typewriting capacity, but she didn't actively participate in the spy ring itself. And the fact that she was actually executed for this was viewed as a particularly egregious offense. And in fact, many people point the fact that the death penalty was applied to the Rosenbergs as a symptom of anti-Semitism in American society at that point, because this just wasn't something that anyone else was subjected to. [0:13:51] Yeah. [0:13:52] Yeah, no, absolutely. [0:13:53] But I think it also just kind of just shows that there was this increased, the beginnings of an increased fear over nuclear war. A fear that was in some ways pretty rational, I would say, but was a fear that was also somewhat deliberately organized, often by pretty well-intentioned people who wanted to inform the public about the potential dangers of nuclear warfare. But we should mention that nuclear bombs weren't always seen as this item of terror. And it actually took a few years for that really to get going. [0:14:25] What do you mean? [0:14:26] Well, one thing basically we realized is that for the first couple years after the bombings of Japan, there was this kind of nuclear optimism in this country, this sort of better living through chemistry that included the atom bomb, which is pretty funny to think about. [0:14:40] Yeah, it's wild. I mean, these things seem pretty over-determined. I mean, I think that once the Soviets got an atomic weapon in the late 40s, in the autumn of 1949, late summer, autumn. Yeah, I think it's hard to go back on that one. But yeah, I think like nuclear weapons, obviously their meaning changes over time. [0:14:58] Yeah. Well, you know what, Halal Sam, can you read that quote we have? [0:15:02] Of course. On August 17th, amid stories of the surrender ceremonies in Tokyo Bay, H.V. Kaltenborn reported a sobering assessment by Air Force General H.H. Arnold of what an atomic war would look like. Quote: As we listen to the newscast tonight, as we read our newspapers tomorrow, let us think of the mass murder which will come with World War III. A few days later, he added, We are like children playing with a concentrated instrument of death whose destructive potential our little minds cannot grasp. [0:15:27] Yeah, that's an intense quote. [0:15:29] Another one that's kind of interesting is that George Orwell actually was the first person to use the phrase Cold War right around that time because in fall of 1945, he basically just predicted pretty aptly that nuclear power is going to completely change warfare and that a war like the Second World War probably won't happen again. [0:15:48] It was Orwell? [0:15:49] I think it was actually. [0:15:50] Oh, right. Lippmann maybe made it popular. [0:15:53] Did Orwell first use the term in 45? [0:15:56] Yeah, supposedly he's the first citation in 45. [0:15:59] Oh, interesting. Okay, yeah, because I know it's Walter Lippmann, the columnist, who made it like a thing. And Bernard Baruch also uses it. Okay, yeah, he used it precisely right in this October 45 essay. Oh, interesting. [0:16:12] Yeah, well, as Kanban taught all of us, so Walter Lippmann stands behind literally everything America did in the first half of the 20th century. [0:16:18] Yeah, he's an important guy, still waiting on his. There was a good biography that came out about 40 years ago by Ronald Steel. But yeah, I think Walter Lippmann is doing an updated biography. [0:16:32] Yeah, but despite grim warnings, stuff from people like H.H. Arnold, it took a while for people to really acknowledge what had happened. The popular mood just didn't really seem all that worried. [0:16:42] Yeah, I think part of it's because, yeah, nuclear bombs were seen as a tool of victory. So why would Americans fear them if they were only being used on our enemies? [0:16:48] Right. [0:16:49] In a 1945 Gallup poll, 69% of respondents thought that the nuclear bomb was a good thing, with only 17% saying that it was bad. But then by 1947, that 17% had more than doubled to 38%. And this was even before the Soviets got the bomb, which I think kind of goes to show is that there was this basically concerted campaign by nuclear scientists to raise awareness of the potential dangers of nuclear weapons that seems to have been pretty effective in the years immediately following World War II, kind of ending this sort of nuclear summer and giving people sort of, I would say, more realistic fears for the most part. [0:17:27] Yeah, nuclear scientists were pretty much getting the Fauci treatment immediately after the war. [0:17:31] Yeah, and also, you know, the further you get away from the bombing of Japan, the less it seems imperative, which is crucial, too. [0:17:39] I think that's a very good point as well. [0:17:40] Yeah, yeah. [0:17:41] Like, I think probably the most, one of the main words of warning was the Frank report in 45, which basically just said that using these bombs is going to unleash a nuclear arms race, which is going to both harm America's global image, but also, you know, put a lot of people in danger. And it even called for the international control of nuclear arms. The Szilard petition also in 45, which is kind of interesting because it was, this is what I actually hadn't heard of this, where Truman was basically given this potential option, which he rejected, which would to tell the Japanese about the bomb and give them the terms of surrender before the bomb is actually used. But then a biggest, actually, apparently, Truman never even saw this petition. And some other White House official rejected it. [0:18:26] Yeah. [0:18:26] Yeah, and of course, all of these petitions, all of these reports were authored by scientists who had been active in the Manhattan Project, the people who had actually developed this. [0:18:34] Yeah, yeah. [0:18:35] And then in 1945, you have the FAS being formed, the Federation of Atomic Scientists. There's an 19, there's a great Einstein quote about this. The village square must carry the facts of atomic energy. From there must come America's voice. [0:18:46] Yeah, so the scientists were very active in raising public awareness, and they intentionally went with a direction that was sort of very fear-centric. It was part of an intentional strategy because as one nuclear scientist quoted in the New Yorker in 1946 said, only one tactic is dependable, the preaching of doom. Anything else is met with yawns. [0:19:05] Yeah. [0:19:07] And then Szilard from the Szilard petition, he also said, it's remarkable that all these scientists should be listened to, but mass murders have always commanded the attention of the public, and atomic scientists are no exception to the rule, which is a pretty interesting assessment of their own job. [0:19:23] Yeah, there's a lot of interesting writing from that period. It's really where a lot of the sort of founding moral debates of our time were originated. [0:19:31] And I guess, you know, one lasting kind of, you know, aspect of nuclear moralism from that era that we still have is the doomsday clock, which was put together in 47. Still operational to this day. [0:19:41] Yeah, yeah, yeah. [0:19:42] And then you've got Eugene Rabinowitch, who was the editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, who's probably one of the leading kind of nuclear critics at this time. He basically said, like, you know, there's a pendulum and only a few more swings and atomic explosions will strike midnight for all civilization. And that's really where this kind of idea began, that we are just ever close to a nuclear confrontation. And I'm kind of curious, Danny, if you think that, do you think the messaging is correct? And do you think that was also effective at potentially defusing full-on conflict in the Cold War? [0:20:19] Which specific messaging? [0:20:21] Oh, just the idea that we are just moments away, we are a hair trigger away from global annihilation, which I feel like undercut so much discourse from back then, especially. [0:20:30] Yeah, I mean, I think it was one of the several factors that helped Americans accept a transformation in their society to essentially a permanently mobilized one away from a time where the United States wouldn't have large standing armies, you know, which is a moment when the U.S. really only dominated the continent and the Western Hemisphere. And to a greater or lesser degree at certain points within that, actually. But I do think the fears of nuclear annihilation did help Americans, you know, acquiesce to the new militarized permanent mobilization. We're going to muster national resources in the service of the Cold War posture that really defined the U.S. after World War II. [0:21:20] Yeah, yeah. [0:21:21] And what I think is interesting kind of on the home front is that although this campaign succeeded in telling people that nuclear weapons are dangerous, I think it backfired in that they didn't exactly communicate that nuclear weapons are bad. [0:21:36] Yeah, they made the case that they were physically dangerous, but as a moral or ethical issue, they didn't really focus on that. [0:21:44] Yeah, and I think that as soon as the Soviets got the bomb, it became sort of like a good guy with the gun situation. Why would you, how can you speak about disarmament when the most dangerous evil empire over in Eurasia has the same weapons that we do? [0:21:58] Right. I think that's right. [0:21:59] Yeah, so this was just one more fear to the boogeymen that were sort of haunting the Zeitgeist at that point. Like Americans were just, I'm afraid that there were reds hiding under their beds, that communist conspiracies of world domination are taking over, that they're selling our precious bodily fluids. [0:22:13] Yeah. [0:22:14] Yeah, purity of essence, right? As they're wont to do. [0:22:18] Scientists, whose profession requires a recognition of facts, however unpleasant, Eugene Rabinowitch wrote, cannot but admit the fact that their campaign has failed. Dissecting the propaganda campaign in which he himself had played a prominent role, Rabinowitch concluded that he had been worse than a failure. It had actively encouraged the very resilience reliance on atomic weapons the scientists had hoped to avoid. The scientists' endless insistence on the awesome destructive potential of the atomic bomb had left American people half-educated. The lesson of the bomb's terrible power had been well learned. The lesson of international control and cooperation as a means of escaping that terror had not, leaving a net effect of despair and confusion. Quote, while trying to frighten men into rationality, scientists have frightened many into abject fear or blind hatred. The alarming developments that had come with a rush at the end of the decade, President Truman's hydrogen bomb decision, the demands for American atomic superiority, the quote, clamor for the use of atomic weapons in Korea, he said were rooted in part in five years of indoctrination by scientists who had drummed into the public consciousness the bomb's irresistible power. [0:23:19] And of course, this movie gives us a really great glimpse into that with the figure of Kent Mansley, who is sort of the agent, I guess, who was sent to investigate reports about this so-called iron giant. And there's this really great moment, which I feel like is probably the highlight of the movie, where Mansley and Hogarth are sitting together in the diner, and he's just explaining to Hogarth the stakes of what's going on. And he just screams about, I'm talking about your goddamn security, Hogarth. While you were snoozing in your little jammies back in Washington, we're wide awake and worried. Everyone wants what we have, Hogarth. Do you think this Metal Man is fun? But who built it? The Russians, the Chinese, Martians, Canadians? I don't care. All I know is that we didn't build it, and that's a reason enough to assume the worst and blow it to kingdom come. [0:23:59] Yeah, yeah. It's just specifically this idea that our enemies may have capabilities beyond our awareness, you know? And that goes right into Sputnik. [0:24:07] Yeah, which is something we still have to worry about today. Like, you know, maybe the Russians have these hypersonic rays that are giving people, you know, weird headaches and shit. [0:24:14] Absolutely. [0:24:15] Well, I think it's kind of funny to see the ways that the United States tried to alleviate potential nuclear hysteria at this time, or at least, you know, I thought hysteria, just the fears that are being the public, especially as the missile crisis approached in 62, I believe it was. One thing that I know, Russian Sam, you thought might have been this kind of interesting, interesting connection with the nuclear awareness was the fact was basically suburbanization as well as the highway system, because both of these had very interesting implications for the event of a nuclear war. [0:24:50] Oh, yeah, absolutely. So American planners were very worried about the fact that America was such an urbanized society that in the event of a nuclear strike, it would be very easy to kill massive amounts of people in the cities. But if everyone's in suburbs, you know, spread out across a much, much larger area, not as much of a risk. [0:25:10] Yeah, but even there, people were still crazy worried about that. Like my grandpa, who, you know, love him, but he was a bit nuts, had a fucking fallout shelter with cyanide in it just in case. [0:25:19] Really? [0:25:20] Yeah, he lived, they were in Yonkers just above the Bronx. So he was like, oh no, if something happens. [0:25:26] Well, you know, Perlstein's book mentions that I believe every synagogue in America started building a nuclear shelter. [0:25:32] Theirs did. Their synagogue did, I think, but I didn't know everyone. [0:25:35] Wow, that's wild. That was just, it was just part of the zeitgeist. I guess, you know, civil defense in general was this major concern across all sectors of the United States at this time. [0:25:43] Oh, yeah, and absolutely. To read a quote from a book titled, Civil Defense Begins at Home by McEnaney. A civil defense arose as the domestic analog of the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. Domestic quote-unquote preparedness, readiness, or home defense, whatever the term, represented the militarization of everyday life, especially family life. Although through its home protection programs, the FCDA tried to establish a permanent military presence in the civilian domain by asking Americans to adapt military hierarchies, training styles, and technology rituals. Indeed, Truman, Eisenhower, and FCDA officials all framed civil defense as a way of life. [0:26:19] And so, this way of life probably had its most visible representation in all the shelters that started being built. And you actually, you can still see them. I remember I was walking in Manhattan a couple years ago, and I saw a nuclear shelter sign just on the street somewhere. [0:26:30] Yeah, no, my building has one of those signs. [0:26:32] Yeah, yeah. [0:26:34] I think most buildings in the 50s certainly will have that. [0:26:37] Yeah, and of course, civil defense became a major obsession for the American public, especially when it came to the domain of so-called fallout shelters, which was something that the government tried to do something about. In January 1951, in part spurred by the fear that the Korean War was a diversion, which would set the stage for a Soviet attack on Western Europe and the United States, Truman signs an executive order which brings the Federal Civil Defense Administration into being. And the FCDA was initially conceived as the organ which would create a national shelter system to protect civilians in the event of a nuclear exchange. But Congress just wasn't really into the idea at all. They perceived it to be a socialistic project, basically. So the FCDA was, throughout its entire existence, really lacking any funding for significant infrastructure development. So as a result of this, they just were limited to mostly creating public information campaigns. [0:27:37] And so barring locally passed ordinances, the onus was really on the individual to ensure their own safety by creating private fallout shelters. The term actually used by the FCDA was quote-unquote self-help defense, which really speaks volumes about the nature of this stuff. [0:27:55] Yeah. [0:27:56] But I guess another kind of funny expression of that in the 50s was the much sort of less visible, or at least less, you know, physically visible, duck and cover civil defense campaign. [0:28:06] Which comes up in the movie. [0:28:07] Yeah, you see the kids watching something called Atomic Holocaust. [0:28:11] Yeah, with a squirrel dressed like a general. Yeah. [0:28:15] And I guess it's only really, it's only barely an exaggeration of what children were actually watching in that time. You know, Bert the Turtle from 51 is the most famous. I mean, the movie itself just like shows a little girl hiding under her desk and like the nuclear bomb like explodes everything around her, including like the physical building itself, except for the desk that she's hiding under. [0:28:35] Yeah, I remember when we were talking about this, Sam, you thought it was much more... Your parents didn't grow up here. And so you thought it was kind of more exaggeration than it actually is. [0:28:44] Yeah, no, no, that really is what duck and cover stuff was like. [0:28:47] And one thing that you dug up was that like it was worthless half the time, the advice that they gave in these videos. Like, they would even say that like, if you have no shelter available and a nuclear bomb is coming down, find a tablecloth to cover yourself. [0:28:59] Yeah, yeah, it was just basically to so people wouldn't freak out. Like it felt like the United States had a plan. [0:29:06] Yeah, people were literally told that radiation burns are just pretty much like a sunburn and that if you're exposed to nuclear fallout, you should just wash yourself thoroughly with soap and it'll be fine, I guess. [0:29:15] Yeah. Yeah. [0:29:17] You know, but on the subject of freak out, freak out Americans did in 57 because that was when, in a sense, American fears were realized with the launch of Sputnik. When, you know, the Soviets beat us to space. America had no capability at that time of launching a satellite and the Russians had done it. And I think there was this big fear that it might have been a lot more than a satellite. Or even if Sputnik itself is just a satellite, what could be happening next? [0:29:43] Yeah, right. So the US and the Soviet Union had both committed to launching a satellite into orbit a couple of years before this. But the Soviets actually ended up beating Americans to the punch with Sputnik 1 finally being launched on October 4th, 1957. [0:29:57] Yeah, and it was actually, it was a repurposed ICBM, which is pretty interesting, especially because at the time, in 1957, the U.S. didn't have any ICBMs at all. [0:30:05] Yeah. [0:30:06] And of course, the interesting fact is that the Soviets had actually announced that they had successfully tested this ICBM in August, but people didn't really notice. Nobody really cared until Sputnik. At which point this panic was really weaponized by the American defense industry as well as politicians for their own ends. [0:30:22] No, yeah, the U.S. lost their mind because of Sputnik. [0:30:25] It was seen as evidence that the Soviets were winning the Cold War, really. That they're so far ahead of us. How can we catch up? You know, five years from now, we're all going to be, you know, speaking Russian and drinking vodka. [0:30:37] And of course, the funny thing is that Sputnik didn't really do anything at all. [0:30:41] No, it was, yeah, it was a little, yeah, a ball that emitted radio signals. [0:30:44] Yeah, yeah, yeah. I think actually the best example of this, LBJ actually called the Sputnik launch the second Pearl Harbor. [0:30:51] Oh, yeah, yeah. And it was used to justify massive investments in American education and a lot of elements of the social democratic state that worked throughout the late 50s and 60s, which is always a story in this country, which is that social democratic reform is almost always linked to militarism. [0:31:09] Yeah, and that's such a great point because actually we were just about to mention that this was the era of the gaps when you start to see the talk about how the Soviets are beating us in this field, beating us in that field. And one of the biggest things that was discussed was the supposed education gap. [0:31:24] Yeah, and that's a big thing. And I guess you kind of still hear this today in dialogue with China, but there was this idea that, you know, that like the U.S. does not have the same scientific expertise that the Soviet Union does, and that we have to fill the gap. So, like you said, like, so this involved more investment in education, but it was completely militarized, especially when it comes to higher education. And, you know, I know so many American universities still have links with RAND and the security state today. [0:31:51] Less so than they did. There's a good book on this called Armed with Expertise by Joy Rohde. And really, the height of that stuff was the 50s and 60s. Now, less things are directly connected to American universities. There's still a bit, but we haven't had the height of that for a while. Now it's sort of like become disconnected from universities. So it's interesting because is that better or worse that the deep state just went underground as opposed to having sort of a visible presence? Yeah, some sort of presence where it could be criticized, at least on university campuses. So there's an irony there. Oh, yeah. [0:32:31] It was either Stanford or Berkeley in the 60s, there were flyers passed around saying like these professors at our school are involved in the Vietnam process. [0:32:38] Yeah, the big one was at MIT, the Center for International Studies there, where Walt Rostow and Max Millikan and Daniel Lerner and other people like that had spent a lot of time in the 50s and 60s. And a few of them, particularly Rostow, had a fairly influential positions in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. [0:33:01] Just curious, as someone who is involved in academia or has been more than us recently, I believe, what kind of connections do you think exist today with security and education? [0:33:12] There's much, like, there's not as much. It's mostly an individual people going back. Sometimes you'll get, you know, grants. There was more of that during the, you know, the so-called war on terror than there is today. I imagine that if the United States ramps up the, you know, the quote-unquote new Cold War with China, we'll see more money flow to universities for things like that. But I think at this point, it's kind of at a low point. [0:33:36] That's interesting. Do you think that means it's also, I assume that also means that academics have their lowest point of influence over security? [0:33:44] I mean, I don't think academics have been especially influential for a while as a class. I mean, some of them as individuals are important, but I think think tanks are just far more influential than academics. And, you know, people who get PhDs who want to do that stuff mostly go into think tanks, less so into academia. [0:34:01] I think that in general, this whole idea of like the education gap, which, you know, that whole era, like you said, it was completely militarized. And I think that in a lot of these conversations, talking about the ways that Soviet brain power exceeded the U.S., it was just seen as this exact same conversation as how Soviet missile power exceeded that at the U.S., you know. Yeah, and that's when universities benefit. [0:34:23] I'm also mostly talking about the humanities and social sciences in the hard sciences and developmental sciences. It's different, yeah. [0:34:31] Yeah, aerospace might be a little different, yeah. [0:34:33] Yeah, yeah, very different. [0:34:34] Yeah, a lot of that is still government-funded, as far as I'm aware. [0:34:37] And I guess, of course, the discussion over missiles was just occupied so much public discourse at this period. Just the idea of like in the 1960s, what should our missile capacity be? And the answer was basically always, as far as I can tell, as large as possible at this point. [0:34:53] Yeah, especially as the 50s wore on, and JFK has that whole missile gap thing. But the realities of the defense program are different. But I think the important thing is that, you know, this helped win people, win ordinary Americans over to the side of fighting this long Cold War, which is really critical. [0:35:10] Yeah, yeah. And one interesting kind of tactic I know that the U.S. did at this time was the way they exaggerated the Soviet arsenal. They had pretty good intelligence on a specific location where missiles were stored, just one single location. And they extrapolated from this. Whether or not this was honest, I don't know. They assumed incorrectly that because there was this one large missile arsenal, there had to be dozens of others. In fact, there were not. And this is a really smart tactic in just convincing Americans that the Soviets were just so much more powerful than us. And when people panic, they're way more likely to go along with whatever security proposals you're proposing. Yeah, no, I think that's right. Yeah. It's hard to convince people that we're the underdogs, but they managed to do it. Yeah, they have a lot of experience with it. [0:35:58] Like just a couple of years before the missile gap, you had the so-called bomber gap, which was basically the same exact story, except this time it was bomber planes. [0:36:06] Yeah, this is how we got the U-2, right? [0:36:07] Yeah, this is how the U-2 got funding because of the so-called missile gap. And Eisenhower was very much fed up with these constant panics, but oddly enough, he didn't really do much of anything about it. He sort of just went along with it, even though privately he had his own reservations. And then after that, you had the missile gap when his own vice president Nixon was running against Kennedy, who used it to great effect against the latter to show that the Republicans were weak on national defense, which is a long-running tactic. [0:36:34] That's true. [0:36:35] Is that the first example we have of there probably are others, but of Democrats running to the right on defense? [0:36:41] Well, I think that that sort of distinction doesn't really make sense before World War II. So that's really a post-World War II phenomenon. [0:36:49] You know, the parties just look differently. [0:36:52] I was just kind of wondering why Eisenhower just didn't really bother to say anything. Well, he had the military industrial complex speech, but I guess the ironic thing is that he spent his entire career basically establishing that same complex. [0:37:05] Yeah, you know, that's the irony of Eisenhower, that many have noted sort of the man who did more to institutionalize the military-industrial complex than anyone ends his presidency railing against it. [0:37:18] Yeah, this is an incredibly unfavorable comparison, but it kind of makes you think of, you know, George Wallace in his final campaign, like, you know, renouncing his segregationist ties and saying, like, oh, I'm so sorry. I want to die with a clear conscience, I think, was his language. [0:37:31] But of course, this missile gap discourse clearly hasn't ended because just earlier this week, what was one of the biggest stories? China and the hypersonic weapons. [0:37:42] They just aren't very creative anymore. They just keep pulling out the same exact script. [0:37:47] Yeah, they're playing the hits. [0:37:49] Hello, Sam. Could you read off the beginning of this article? [0:37:52] So this is the Financial Times from October 20th, just a couple days ago. The Chinese military conducted two hypersonic weapons tests over the summer, raising U.S. concerns that Beijing is gaining ground in the race to develop a new generation of arms. On July 27th, the Chinese military launched a rocket that used a, quote, fractional orbit bombardment system to propel a nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle around the Earth for the first time, according to four people familiar with U.S. intelligence assessments. [0:38:17] The missile gap discourse basically continues to the present. We've swapped out the Soviet threat for China, but it occupies the exact same place in the kind of public consciousness. [0:38:27] Although there's one key difference, there's one very important difference, which is that the Soviet and American economies were not intertwined in the way that the Chinese and American economies are. [0:38:35] Yeah, that's I agree with that. But I think in general, this just kind of shows the broad trends of American fear have really not changed that much at all from Sputnik to the present. And I think that this movie, The Iron Giant, is just a really cool way to basically encapsulate that mindset and the way it kind of can drive people crazy. [0:38:56] And it came at exactly the right time. The Soviet threat is gone because Russia is now immiserated. [0:39:01] Like you mentioned, Danny, it's a great end of history movie. Yeah, absolutely. [0:39:05] The Soviet Union is now gone. The Russians are immiserated. China still hasn't fully risen yet. It's the time to reflect on this stuff. [0:39:13] But now it's back to another arms race, I guess. Yep, yep. [0:39:17] Now we're done playing war on terror. Now we can bring out the big guns, fight an actual country rather than just a bunch of insurgent militias. [0:39:25] Now you can have people panicking about. And this is an actual quote from the hypersonic missile article saying that these hypersonic missiles seem to defy the laws of physics, which is, yeah, just a very persistent tactic by these ghouls to just constantly amp up the threat, to constantly inflate fears among the American public to push for greater and greater military spending. [0:39:47] Gotta use an F-35 for something. [0:39:49] Yeah. [0:39:50] I don't have strong opinions on this, but just about a month ago, maybe two months ago, the previous story like this was all those UFO sightings, which were basically the same kind of story. There's some kind of entity out there that is making these aircraft, and we don't know what it is. And of course, like the pop culture headline was just aliens or whatever. But really, it seems like most attention was basically towards China. The idea that the Chinese government may be able to construct some aircraft that Americans cannot properly detect. [0:40:23] There's this general, this very weird, like vague fear right now. Like, Avanis and Newcomen's known are obvious. I've mentioned this part of this, of like these advancements that we can't even conceive of by these other countries. [0:40:32] Yeah, yeah. And it's kind of funny because I think it's that in this case, it seems to be there's this general idea among a lot of Americans that our whole imperial process is running out of steam. But there hasn't, except for maybe arguably with the Afghanistan withdrawal, there haven't been really any material setbacks. And I think this is when people start to construct these basically imagined opponents, like missiles that defy the laws of physics or a medical condition that probably does not exist. [0:41:03] Yeah, it's all part of the sort of insane imperial fantasy world that these people create for various psychological reasons, oftentimes, and material reasons to try to get funding. [0:41:15] Yeah, every empire has had something like this. I mean, the British had all these insane fears about all the different imperial subjects, you know, massacring them or whatever. [0:41:22] Yeah, precisely. Yeah, no, yeah, so yeah, the more things change, the more the terrible foreign threat stays the same, it seems like. [0:41:30] Yeah, no, it's a sad fact. A sad fact of affairs. [0:41:36] It's interesting. [0:41:37] You know, I think once we're, if we don't attack the structural foundations of the empire, dollar supremacy, the basing system, I think we're going to see things like this just recur. [0:41:47] Well, that's really fundamentally the problem, as you have noted in your own book, that we're essentially disempowered. That basically the levers that control our democracy are just totally not connected to any of these security concerns. Like, sure, we can state our opinion or whatever, but it it doesn't really matter. [0:42:04] It doesn't matter, and mostly because, you know, ordinary Americans, or at least the bourgeoisie, whether they're ordinary or not, aren't affected by the wars. You know? So what do they care? They're not going to not really do anything about them. [0:42:16] No, absolutely. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. It makes me wonder maybe there should be a real iron giant, you know? Maybe like if someone did have, you know, something that could really strike fear in the hearts of this government, then maybe things would actually change for the better. [0:42:28] Yeah, I don't think anything could really do that. That's the problem. I can't imagine what would force that. I just don't see it. Not personally. I mean, I might be wrong, but. [0:42:37] Well, all that being said, Danny, thank you so much for coming on to chat with us and bringing some of your insights. [0:42:44] Yeah, thank you. [0:42:44] Thank you. [0:42:45] Any last thoughts on the movie, Danny? [0:42:47] Yeah, it's okay. I mean, see it if you like. It's a classic Cold War thing. But yeah, I wouldn't like heartily recommend it. [0:42:56] Well, thank you so much for coming on, Danny. [0:42:59] Yeah, thanks for having me, guys.