Gladio Free Europe, E42: Prelude to Mandate Palestine, Part 2 (with Kevin) https://www.gladiofreeeurope.com/episodes/prelude-to-mandate-palestine [0:00:14] And we're back with another episode of Gladio Free Europe. I'm Russian Sam, and I'm joined as always by my co-host, Halal Sam. [0:00:20] Hello. [0:00:21] And our returning guest, Kevin. [0:00:22] Hello, everyone. It's a pleasure to be here in this mandate. [0:00:26] Yeah, so I realized when I was listening to the previous episode that I had skipped over some stuff that probably shouldn't have been skipped over. So that's where we're going to start. We're going to be talking diplomacy at first. Very exciting. [0:00:42] And the first figure we're going to be talking about is Chaim Weizmann, very important man, not very much remembered for whatever odd reason, even though he was instrumental in this story in many ways. He's just not really given his due that much these days. Why do you think that is, Kevin? [0:00:59] I mean, he was a very diplomatic political Zionist. So I believe, you know, compared to other more hawkish versions of Zionism that got more important as Zionism evolved, I think Weizmann isn't a very popular figure among them. And he was very dovish compared to what became the predominant stream of Zionism. I don't know if you agree with that or if you think there's another reason. [0:01:22] I'm not sure, really. I think it just seems to me like a lot of this comes down to just personal grudges. I get the impression that he didn't have very good relations with Ben-Gurion. [0:01:34] Oh, definitely. [0:01:35] And since Ben-Gurion was such a bigwig, he was basically able to sideline him. [0:01:40] That for sure. Labor Zionists made sure to portray him as sort of a dinosaur. That was more of a disturbance than a contribution towards Zionism in the 40s. [0:01:51] Yeah, so let's talk about who this guy was. He was born in 1874 in modern-day Belarus in a small village named Motal. And he became involved with the Zionist movement when he was still in school. He was involved with Hovevei Zion, who were the pre-Herzlian Zionists who started to build settlements during the first aliyah, which weren't very successful. But he ran in those circles until he left the Russian Empire to go to Germany and Switzerland to pursue his university education. And he just barely missed the first Zionist Congress held in Basel in 1897, but he was able to attend the second one. And he moved to Britain in 1904, where he was very successful in cultivating relations with British officials, which really would prove instrumental to extracting the Balfour Declaration. [0:02:47] Absolutely. And later Jewish concessions and such under the mandate, promotion of the Hebrew language and all that. [0:02:54] Yeah, so Weizmann, he's known not just for his Zionist advocacy, but he's actually a very important person in the history of science. He was a chemist by profession, and he was the one who figured out the bacterial fermentation process, which is basically when you get bacteria to make copies of a certain molecule. That's how we get insulin, for example. Before this process came along, to get insulin, they would have to cut open the pancreas of pigs and like. [0:03:25] Dogs too. [0:03:25] Yeah, and dogs and do all these complex operations to extract it. And it wasn't very high quality, but with this process, they were able to, you know, have a consistent product that's actually medical grade and won't accidentally kill you. [0:03:41] That's the reason why Israel's main scientific center is named the Weizmann Institute. [0:03:46] So he invented this process in the aughts, that is, the aughts of the 1900s. And ultimately, this process would be used to make acetone, which was a very vital material for the war effort. It was necessary to create smokeless gunpowder as well as a bunch of other things. And up until that point, they needed to use something like 1,000 kilograms of wood to get a single kilogram of acetone. And since most of the wood that Britain would have been using was coming from the continent, Germany specifically, obviously they needed an alternative source. And Weizmann, he came in to save the day and he was put in charge of the program to create acetone labs across the country, which made him somebody who was very, very important to the war effort and gave him the opportunity to speak intimately with many very important people. He was taken much more seriously and was really on a first-name basis with many of these people. [0:04:51] So here's an excerpt from Tom Segev's One Palestine, Complete, talking about one evening that Weizmann spent with Lord Balfour. One night in 1916, Weizmann dined as a guest of Balfour's. Weizmann laid out his much-repeated argument that Zionism and British interests were identical. The Zionist movement spoke, Weizmann said, with the vocabulary of modern statesmanship, but was fueled by a deep religious consciousness. Balfour, himself a modern statesman, also considered Zionism an inherent part of his Christian faith. Soon after, Balfour declared the cabinet meeting, I am a Zionist. [0:05:22] Yeah, so there you have it, kids. All you have to do is make a massive scientific breakthrough, and you can get pretty much anything you want. Yeah, it doesn't matter how much of a crank you are. [0:05:32] He was a very diplomatic figure. He was soft-spoken. He had a very regal air to him, the way he carried himself. There's a reason he was chosen to be the first president, and he didn't become something more visible. There's a reason he got that ceremonial, largely ceremonial role. [0:05:47] Yeah. [0:05:48] Fun fact: originally they wanted Einstein to be the first president, but he turned it down because he was uneasy with some of the things that he had witnessed happening during the Nakba. [0:05:59] Self-hating Jew, self-hating. [0:06:01] Through and through. [0:06:02] Yeah, so Weizmann was very successful in presenting Zionism as representative of the opinion of world Jewry writ large, even though by that point it was a minor, minor, minor movement. The most interesting part for me personally is that he was able to do much of this stuff without holding an official position within the Zionist movement. [0:06:22] He was just sort of doing this all on his own, and he only became the president of the British Zionist Federation at the end of October 1917, right before the Balfour Declaration was published. And shortly thereafter, in February of 1918, Britain authorized the formation of a Zionist commission, so-called, which would be headed by Weizmann, which had the goal of laying the groundwork to implement the Balfour Declaration. [0:06:51] And it was on this trip that he had the opportunity to meet with Faisal al-Hashimi. He was the son of the Sharif of Mecca, the third son. He was the head of the Arab Northern Army, which was the most effective of the armies raised to fighting the Arab Revolt, I believe. And he proclaimed an Arab Syrian state in October 1918 with British support, which again had been something that the British had promised and his family, and something that they were accommodating at that point, as I said. [0:07:24] So the Balfour Declaration, as well as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, both of these things became public in November, of November of 1918. Thanks to the Bolsheviks. And it took a while for word to circulate about these things. In fact, the British military administration over Palestine actually prevented any newspapers from publishing stories about this because this was still wartime and they were worried that there might be unrest. So Faisal himself, he's hearing all of this and he's growing increasingly uneasy. But nevertheless, his father is a very big believer in the honor of the British. He wrote a letter to his father asking for advice about what to do with all of these revelations. And the Sharif wrote back to him: the Allies are greater and more honorable than that they would stray from even a single letter from their agreement with us. And they are the most scrupulous in their attention to such details. [0:08:25] The Sharif of Mecca just very much trusted the British to be accountable to their own promises to him. This was a very different world from the ones that we're currently living in, especially for these Bedouins who were living in the Arabian Peninsula at the time. They didn't really have state structures at that point. So it was very much a tribal society. And as a corollary to that, because there is no state, honor is something that's much, much more important. Honor is a matter of your reputation, as well as it's about proving that you are a trustworthy person, that your word means something. Because if you get caught lying on something significant, or for example, if you happen to kill guests, your guests, while they are on your land, which is something that the Hashemites actually had the opportunity to do because two of the three members of the triumvirate had come to visit them to inspect the armies which they thought would be fighting against the Allies, but which would actually be turned against the Ottomans. [0:09:34] And they had this opportunity to just kill two of these guys right then and there. But Faisal refused to allow this to happen because this was his land and these people were his guests. And to kill them, even though it would certainly make the war effort much easier, would be simply unthinkable. [0:09:56] Yeah, so Weizmann and Faisal, they finally met face to face in Aqaba in June of 1918. It was a rather unremarkable meeting, but it was the first of many. It's set the stage for further contact. But the meeting itself wasn't very eventful. [0:10:13] Mark Sykes had some interesting views on the Jews. [0:10:15] Oh, yeah. [0:10:16] Yeah, we'll get to that. [0:10:18] Yeah, so Faisal, he was not very familiar with Zionism. So he went to speak to Mark Sykes of the Sykes-Picot Agreement to find out what he thought about Weizmann and anything that he should know before this meeting. And Sykes responded to him. I speak the truth when I say that this race, despised and weak, is universal, is all-powerful, and cannot be put down. In other words, Jewish power would be a great asset for Faisal in this new Arab state. [0:10:46] It's interesting how we can see a parallel between this overblown idea of Jewish power and influence, both in the Faisal-Weizmann Accords, but also in the Balfour Declaration. I mean, part of the reason why the British gave such a strong show of support was because they overestimated by far what Jewish influence would get them in the context of World War I. And here we see it again to the service of Zionism, this idea which could be interpreted as philo-Semitism, but is really anti-Semitism, and the idea of a secret Jewish power that moves the strings of world power. [0:11:24] Exactly. And even in the quote, this race despised and weak, but also all-powerful. It's a very strange contradiction. And yet not only was it believed, the belief in it was vital for the establishment of the state of Israel. And Weizmann himself was very much banking on this belief. In fact, this was a big part of how he got the Balfour Declaration in the first place, because he kept implying that, oh, yeah, you know, I have my cousins in Russia who, if you signed the Balfour Declaration, could stay in the war for you. [0:11:55] Hey, what if I got some cousins who work at the bank? [0:11:59] It's genuinely anti-Semitic, but it worked to the advantage of the Zionist movement. [0:12:03] The relationship between Zionism and anti-Semitism could be an episode in and of itself, honestly. [0:12:07] Yeah, so Weizmann and Faisal, they finally meet in Aqaba. And again, it wasn't a super important meeting. Faisal wasn't very familiar with the Zionist movement. But Weizmann reassured him that the Zionists did not seek to create a Jewish state. [0:12:21] And he said that if the Zionists could come to an agreement with Faisal, then they could provide the land with much needed investments and resources. But Faisal and Weizmann would meet again in Europe, and specifically in London, in December and January of 1918/slash 1919, where they signed the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement, which is probably not something that you've heard of unless you grew up steeped in Zionist apologetics because they really loved this one. [0:12:53] Oh, yeah. [0:12:53] Kevin, can you talk about the legacy of this meeting, this agreement? [0:12:57] Sure. So essentially, what they're doing in the Faisal-Weizmann Accord or the agreement was to show a way in which the, I mean, Faisal's family, you know, the Hashemites, would somehow be able to coexist with the Zionists. So what they're saying, I mean, essentially, Zionism was trying to say that they're not specifically trying to create a Jewish state in Palestine. And they're committing to good relations between the two groups. They promised that, you know, the Muslim holy places would remain under Muslim control, that, you know, there would be boundaries established by a peace conference in Paris, but also that they would commit themselves to assisting in the creation of a Jewish national home. And that essentially, if any dispute would arise between the two parties, then it would be the British who were seen at the time as the protectors of both the Hashemites and the Zionists that would settle the disputes among these apparently newly established friends. [0:14:06] So Weizmann and his entourage showed up to Faisal's hotel room basically and presented him with this agreement written in English, which Faisal did not speak very well. He knew French. He didn't really speak English. But he had T.E. Lawrence at his side to serve as a translator. [0:14:23] Big mistake. That guy was not a very reliable translator. [0:14:27] Literal British agent. Literally working for the British state. [0:14:30] Yeah, and somehow he gets to maintain this reputation as like this super philo-Arabic guy, even though he was very much fighting for the interests of the British Empire through and through. Yeah, so basically, this agreement talked about the implementation of the Balfour Declaration, maximum Jewish immigration to Palestine with some kinds of protections for Arab peasants, freedom of religion, and promises of Jewish capital investment into the Arab state. That's what they call it, Arab state. [0:15:06] So this Arab state, as promised to Hussein by the British, we spoke about it in the last episode, the Hussein-McMahon correspondence. Essentially, it was supposed to cover the area from southern Anatolia until the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, except for Aden, which was a British colony. [0:15:27] And would remain so until the 70s. [0:15:29] Yes, and from the Mediterranean up until Iraq, basically. So it was supposed to be a very large swath of land, which included within it Palestine. [0:15:40] And yet, this agreement constantly speaks of the Arab state and Palestine, talks about setting, quote, definite boundaries between the Arab state and Palestine. And what I'm wondering here is how is this reconcilable? If the Zionists aren't seeking to create a state of their own and they're trying to create an autonomous unit within this future Arab state, which is basically the impression that Weizmann had been giving these people up until that point. [0:16:12] The Jewish autonomous house on the Mediterranean. [0:16:14] Yeah. How does this play into it? [0:16:17] Right. So ever since the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, the future of Palestine was left in a very ambiguous situation. I mean, it depends on how you interpret the boundaries set forward by the British. It looks like it's excluded, but not explicitly so. And it looks like the Hashemites certainly felt that they were entitled to at least some kind of involvement in Palestine. Obviously, this couldn't be agreed by Weizmann, but the agreement certainly leaves some space to wonder. I mean, they are talking about Palestine as a separate entity from the Arab state, and perhaps this was sort of based on some idea of a federation or something that was less than a state, but more than a minority community living within a greater state. Now, what we do know is that Zionists will make use of the Faisal-Weizmann correspondence in Zionist historiography, in propaganda, because Faisal and his family are portrayed as sort of an anti-grand mufti. [0:17:25] Basically, these are good Arabs who saw a way of coexisting with the Zionists and weren't exposed to, you know, maximalist demands for territory. Now, this is a very convenient interpretation of the accords, but it does leave out the fact that Faisal and his family had no real relation with the Arabs living in Palestine. They were foreigners from the territory of what is now Saudi Arabia that had no relation with Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Jordan, all of these lands that they claimed they were entitled to, just because the British had promised them that land. [0:18:05] It's just, it's just, it only works if you view Arabs as a monolith. [0:18:08] Absolutely. And if you grant them the legitimacy just because they were somewhat political, religious figures, and then you just assume that everybody owed them respect, but they had no connection to the Palestinian people en masse or even with the notable families who were really setting the tone for politics in Palestine. [0:18:29] Well, Faisal personally did have support among the Palestinian population, at least among the urban notables. [0:18:35] Yes, in the project of a Greater Syria, which they saw as an alternative to British and Syrian rule. Sorry, to British and French rule. [0:18:42] Yeah, so Faisal signed this agreement, but he did add his own caveat to it, saying that its implementation is contingent on Arab independence per the terms related to the British. And it's this entire paragraph, but Lawrence, with his translating prowess once again, he gave a very questionable paraphrase. If the Arabs are established, as I have asked in my manifesto of the 4th of January, addressed to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I will carry out what is written in this agreement. If changes are made, I cannot be answerable for failing to carry out this agreement. Note the absence of the word independence. [0:19:24] Yeah, which is what it says in the original Arabic. [0:19:27] In the original Arabic, it doesn't say, I'm established as I have asked in my manifesto, blah, blah, blah. It says, if the Arabs do not achieve independence, as I have submitted to the British. That is a very, very big difference. [0:19:42] Yeah, yeah. It just goes to show that there's so much ambiguity injected into this that's just very deliberate and intended just to muddy the waters. You know, he didn't have a translated copy of the text. Again, this was all being related to him by T.E. Lawrence. Which is, again, a literal British agent. [0:20:03] This also isn't the only time the British have done, the British specifically have done some fuckery with translation. Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand is another very famous example. [0:20:12] Yeah, I mean, but it absolutely makes sense from the British perspective. They have here two clients, the Zionists and the Hashemites, and they're trying to make them coexist because that's the only way the British can have, you know, a very strong rule with accomplices on both sides of the Jordan River. [0:20:31] So none of this would come to light until the 1930s. The agreement was null and void because the terms that Faisal had been agreeing to did not come to pass. He did not get his independent Arab state. I mean, he did get an Arab state, but it wasn't the state that he was promised. So this is really more of a fun factoid rather than something that had a concrete impact. At the time, at least. As we mentioned, it's heavily used in Zionist propaganda today. [0:21:02] But shortly after Faisal had signed this agreement, he was on his way to the Paris Conference. You know, the drill, it began in January 1919 to settle what the world would look like in the aftermath of the First World War. It was directed by the victorious Entente and largely led by the so-called big four, being Britain, France, the US, and Italy. And we spoke about this in the beginning to the interwar series a little bit. They were all about self-determination, Wilson's 14 points, yada, yada, yada. And so, because a lot of colonized peoples took this rhetoric seriously and assumed that it is indeed universal, a lot of delegations from various colonies all over the world tried to make themselves heard. They went to Paris trying to make this case for self-determination. Faisal went rather famously. There was an Egyptian delegation that was denied entry, and in doing so, the British triggered a revolution in Egypt, which ended with them being forced to grant Egypt formal independence in 1923. [0:22:10] So, Faisal's delegation, they could have been more prepared for the Paris Conference, honestly. [0:22:16] It seems like they didn't even have a copy of the Hussein-McMahon correspondence. Like, Faisal had written to his father asking for all these documents, and his father was just like, just go and ask for the British for copies of them. They're honest people. They won't mislead you. They won't lie. And he actually wasn't able to get his hands on these letters until after he had actually given his presentation. [0:22:42] I mean, what do you need it? They're very honorable people. [0:22:45] Oh, true. [0:22:46] And so Faisal, he was invited to present his case on February 6th, and he left a very good impression on the people who were present. He came dressed in his robes. He had a very regal air to him. He was tall, he was handsome, and he spoke this very clean Arabic that just sounds very impressive when you're listening to it, you know? Initially, he read his statement in like paragraph by paragraph, and got translators translated for him. But after he did it the first time, he insisted on reading it all the way through without a break because man knew how to create some drama. He knew how to be very theatrical. [0:23:36] Did he use any French in this? Because French was a language of diplomacy, and I'm sure a lot of British officials would have known French. [0:23:42] Yeah, no, he gave the speech in Arabic, which I mean, yeah, and it just sounds a lot more impressive than French. [0:23:47] Oh, yeah, absolutely. [0:23:49] Yeah, so to give you guys a quote from Faisal's speech, the Allies promised the Arab nation its freedom and independence at the end of the war. Now they have emerged from the war victorious. It is necessary that they abide by their promises. I am confident that the great powers will be more interested in the welfare of the Arab peoples than in their own material interests in the Arab countries. Arab national demands conform completely to the principles enunciated by President Wilson and which were agreed to by all states in the world. Very, very naive, I must say. [0:24:23] So, the Zionists were also present at the Paris conference. They got to give their own good old spiel presentation, and they just had the best map of Palestine. [0:24:34] Oh, yes, let's talk about this. So, their definition of Palestine, first of all, it extends north basically up to the Litani River in Lebanon, up to around Sidon, roughly. It extends pretty far up into Lebanon. It extends almost all the way to Amman in the east, and almost to Daraa in Syria. It has all of the Golan Heights, obviously. And it even goes into a bit of Egypt in the Sinai Peninsula around El-Arish. [0:25:01] They claimed everything, and the amount of Jews in that area was just minuscule. [0:25:07] Yeah, within what became the internationally defined boundaries of Palestine as decided by this conference, Jews were something like 10% of the population of Palestine at this point. If you add all these areas, it probably goes much, much lower. [0:25:21] Just for reference in absolute numbers, if you keep in mind what eventually became the British Mandate of Palestine after the separation of Transjordan, we'd be talking about 700,000 Arabs in total, as opposed to about 50,000 Jews. That's absolutely tiny. [0:25:37] Yeah, it's less than 10%. [0:25:38] It's just weird that there's absolutely no national, there's no natural boundaries in this map. How were they expecting to defend this? Maybe the British would just leave all their guns to them. [0:25:46] Yeah, so they made their case in front of the Paris Conference on February 25th, and they called for the implementation of the Balfour Declaration, an administration that would guarantee continuing Jewish immigration, and a British mandate over Palestine. And specifically, they wanted the British. They didn't want the French because they thought that the French language policy would be detrimental to the Zionist cause because they were all about Hebrew. But they also didn't want the Americans for a very particular reason. [0:26:15] Yeah, let's talk about that. [0:26:16] And also, it's important to point out that the idea of an American mandate was something that was tossed around quite a bit in this time. There were proposals for it in Armenia in parts of Armenia as well until that was no longer possible due to genocide. But let me just read this little quote here. Yeah, so this is a publication from the British Zionist Organization published in 1919, which is very explicit about why they don't want an American mandate. If the American idea were applied, as an American administration might apply it to Palestine, what would happen? The numerical majority in Palestine today is Arab, not Jewish. Qualitatively, it is a simple fact that the Jews are now predominant in Palestine, and given proper conditions, they will be predominant quantitatively, as also in a generation or two. But if the crude arithmetical conception of democracy were to be applied now, or at some early stage in the future, to Palestinian conditions, the majority that would rule would be the Arab majority, and the task of establishing and developing a great Jewish Palestine would be infinitely more difficult. [0:27:09] What does it mean that qualitatively the Jews are now predominant in Palestine? [0:27:14] Probably in terms of capital, I imagine. [0:27:16] And also in terms of what they view as being real people and being more advanced, supposedly in their view, even though they're actually worse at agriculture. [0:27:24] Yeah, and more educated, more literate. [0:27:27] More civilized. [0:27:28] More familiar with European civilization. [0:27:31] What do you mean European civilization? That adjective is redundant. [0:27:34] It's just racist nonsense. I mean, Zionism has always been very anti-democratic in this way, unless you just kick all the Palestinians out. [0:27:43] Yeah, so by this point, Faisal's people, I mean, Faisal's people, they didn't really trust the Zionists in the first place, but Faisal was more open to the idea, at least at first. But it seems that he got very annoyed with Weizmann and the Zionist movement at this point. When Weizmann tried to see Faisal again sometime in March, he said, What does this man want? I would do anything to get rid of him. He tires me out by his long speeches. [0:28:12] Let's talk about the mandate system a bit. [0:28:14] Okay, yes. [0:28:15] After the Paris Conference, we have a new era for what were the non-Turkish-speaking areas of the Ottoman Empire. First of all, we have the League of Nations, which is a predecessor of the United Nations, and much like its successor, it's also responsible for many, many humiliations and defeats. The League of Nations was very much based on Woodrow Wilson's idea for self-determination, for a new kind of diplomacy around the world. And part of it, part of the proposal set forth by American President Wilson, was to get rid of secret treaties, which had done so much to intensify and lead to World War I. Another one of his proposals, which the League of Nations Charter really echoes, is the idea of self-determination, which for Wilson was a key instrument in trying to stop Soviet influence and Soviet expansion, communist expansion. But self-determination was not really possible because the countries that had come out as winners in World War I really had no interest in real self-determination. [0:29:23] I mean, they were trying to protect their spheres of influence and their economic interests. So, what we do have is a sort of a new name for something that looked an awfully lot like plain old colonialism, but nominally the mandates ruled for a temporary period until these people who had no experience of self-rule were ready to govern themselves. And that is how, really, essentially, the borders of what we know now as the Middle East came to be by the partition of all non-Turkish-speaking areas of the Ottoman Empire into French and British mandates. [0:30:02] So the British were also very amenable to the mandate system because they saw it as a continuation of British politics in their colonies. Here's a quote from Susan Pedersen's The Guardians, which is a book that goes into the mandate system in great depth. I really recommend that if anyone is trying to get a handle of this very interesting moment in world history. So Pedersen writes, quote, Britain found Wilsonian ideas easy to accommodate because they dovetailed so nicely with British imperial practice. British statesmen had always hunted diligently for quote-unquote native rulers with whom they could ally and trade. A preference for quote indirect rule marked the imperium at many turns. Various princes and potentates could indeed run their own affairs, guided by British residents or consuls, and with the Royal Navy keeping the global peace. [0:30:58] Yeah, this is, I will also add that informal rule was really vital to the British Empire at all of its history. A lot of India was under kind of informal rule in the princely states, especially, which infamously led to some complications in places like Kashmir. And a lot of other places, the British really enjoyed using the system of local elites to actually do the stuff. It was the backbone of the empire. [0:31:20] Yeah, many people at the time were actually comparing the mandate system with the way that Egypt was being run for almost 50 years at this point. [0:31:29] Yes, yes, exactly. Egypt is another perfect example. [0:31:33] So this is a quote from Lord Curzon of the, if you know the Curzon Line in Poland, that's him. We ought to play self-determination for all it's worth, wherever we are involved in difficulties with the French, the Arabs, or anybody else, and leave the case to be settled by that final argument, knowing in the bottom of our hearts that we are more likely to benefit from it than anybody else. [0:31:53] Yeah, so the British were very happy about this system because, first of all, it gave them a nice glossy coat of paint on their old imperial practices and made them look much more humane. But also, it gave them really like a modus operandi by which they could accumulate these territories and act like they were not really doing anything that bad in the first place. Because, I mean, hey, these are mandates. They're not colonies. Very big difference. [0:32:20] Yes, and it's incredible how the British really came to the conference after successful years of lobbying, both with Zionists and Arabs. And this was also aided by the fact that the French had such a horrible reputation in the Middle East that essentially local Arabs wanted anyone but the French to rule them. [0:32:36] Yeah, yeah, the French had done a lot to deserve their reputation. I mean, first of all, they're just snobs, period. There was one British general who was sent to put down King Faisal's revolt, I believe. And when he got to Damascus, he went to the tomb of Saladin and he said, we have returned, Mr. Sultan. So basically, this guy was drawing a direct parallel between the France of 1918 with the Crusader states of almost a thousand years ago. [0:33:07] Yeah, the French were quite comparatively worse at PR. And obviously, local Arabs would have preferred independence, but it was fairly obvious that that wasn't a possibility. It was just a question of choosing whatever leash fit you better. [0:33:23] Yes, this is why the King-Crane Commission was so overwhelmingly anti-French. [0:33:28] So, yeah, former German and Ottoman colonial possessions, and there were a lot of them, they couldn't simply be divided up the old-fashioned way because Allied propaganda during the war spent the entire time hyping up the deplorable colonial practices of the Huns who are so brutal to their colonial subjects. [0:33:49] Which, I mean, they were. Look up the Maji Maji Rebellion, for example, to get an idea of what the Germans were doing or the Herero and Nama genocide. But the British and especially the French didn't really have a leg to stand on, comparatively speaking, here. [0:34:04] Yeah, so the 22nd article of the Treaty of Versailles, that's the one that really sets the framework for what the mandates are supposed to be. These aren't colonies. Again, these are independent states which are getting some temporary help from the civilized peoples of the world in a quote-unquote trust of civilization, who, once they learn the art of good, liberal European governance, they are free to do whatever they want. And the mandate system was predicated on three different kinds of mandates. You had A mandates, B, and C. A mandates being the most advanced of the set. These were the former Ottoman territories. B were most of the German colonies in Africa. And C mandates included modern-day Namibia, which was back then German southwest Africa, and a couple of islands in the Pacific. As we said, this wasn't your granddaddy's colonialism. This was really supposed to be something new. [0:35:06] And a lot of the people who were putting this framework into motion, they really believed in it. The mandates were supposed to have very strict limits on what happened on the ground. So a lot of colonial practices were supposed to be banned. So for example, Corvée labor was now only allowed to build local infrastructure for use by the locals. We could only use the Corvée for this. [0:35:31] That's awesome. [0:35:32] Well, I mean, when the default before then was like plantation labor, this seems like an improvement. [0:35:38] Oh, no, just mass enslavement. [0:35:39] Yeah, absolutely. It's just that if you're going to pretend to be, you know, enlightened and liberal, why even have the Corvée labor system in the first place? Well, you know, these natives, they need guidance and they're not going to, you know, whip themselves into shape. That's why they need to be working on these public works projects. So they learn a good work ethic, of course. [0:35:58] Of course. [0:35:59] But anyway, mandatory powers also had to submit annual reports talking about the progress that was being made towards self-rule in these places. And mandatory powers were supposed to respect the rights and wishes of the locals. And if the mandatory powers strayed from what was supposed to be their agreement with the locals, the locals had recourse to the League of Nations. So a lot of people submitted petitions talking about the various ways in which the mandatory administrations of their places were mistreating people or just in general not following the rules of the mandate. In practice, this didn't really do much in and of itself because the League didn't really have an enforcement mechanism, but it did have the added benefit of giving these mandatory subjects a platform to voice these grievances. And in the first place, that's a significant move because it goes to show that these are rational people who can speak to their own self-interest rather than the old colonial canards about these being basically children who are totally hopeless in the face of these Europeans. [0:37:14] But yeah, here's what Pedersen had to say about the value of the mandate system. League oversight could not force the mandatory powers to govern mandated territories differently. Instead, it obliged them to say they were governing them differently. [0:37:28] Yeah, and there was also the added benefit of the fact that these inter-country rivalries within the League of Nations itself served to the benefit of mandate subjects often because take the case of Germany, for example. They were deprived of their colonies, but they were in the League anyway. So they decided that they were going to use their platform. If they can't have these colonies back, then they might as well make it a pain in the ass to administer them for the South Africans and the British and the French and all these other peoples. [0:38:00] The Germans would try to get some colonies in a different way later. [0:38:02] So let's talk about the A-mandate governance, which were settled in the San Remo con San Remo conference in 1920. [0:38:10] Yeah, that's another favorite for the Zionists because this was the conference that, as they put it, set the internationally recognized borders of Israel. Sure. Ben-Gurion, for reference, said that the borders were wherever the army could enforce them. But essentially, the Palestine mandate was basically a special case, even apart from the mandates of Syria and Lebanon. It was kind of its own thing. [0:38:35] The text of the Balfour Declaration was written into the mandate itself, which is truly insane. [0:38:40] Yes, the mandate had essentially the mission of fostering the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine. Even if we know that the Balfour Declaration was very ambiguously worded, and even the British would eventually sort of walk back all these promises to the Zionists in the 1930s as their interests shifted to as they saw World War II imminent. In the beginning, this was a huge show of support for Zionists that actually celebrated the British assignment of the mandate. In fact, the first British commissioner was a Zionist Jew. [0:39:17] Yeah, Herbert Samuel. [0:39:18] Herbert Samuel, who was received as the Messiah. [0:39:21] So just to underline this again, like the mandates for Syria and Lebanon and Mesopotamia, these were recognized as independent states which were under temporary mandatory supervision. Whereas the Palestine mandate didn't make such a claim. Palestine was not an independent state. It was supposed to be the playground for the British to implement the Balfour Declaration, which is just something really mind-boggling when you think about it. [0:39:48] So in reference to the particularity of the British Mandate for Palestine, Rashid Khalidi wrote in the Hundred Years' War on Palestine the following text. In sum, the mandate essentially allowed for the creation of a Zionist administration parallel to that of the British mandatory government, which was tasked with fostering and supporting it. This parallel body was meant to exercise for one part of the population many of the functions of a sovereign state, including democratic representation and control of education, health, public works, and international diplomacy. To enjoy all the attributes of sovereignty, this entity lacked only military force. [0:40:29] So, basically, they're building dual power? [0:40:31] They're giving a green light to what Zionists turned into a proto-state. And this is very important to keep in mind when they created, when they declared the foundation of the state of Israel in March of 1948, they weren't really creating anything. It was just a formal declaration because all the institutions of the state, including, by the way, military organizations, we came to be, you know, with the Haganah in the 1920s, in the 1920s, sorry, and then other paramilitary organizations, they had everything, including the basis for what would be the Israel Defense Forces. But they had universities, schools, museums, even, you know, an orchestra representing, you know, the Yishuv, the Jewish settlements of Palestine. And this was formally recognized by the British. And the most important organization was the Jewish Agency, which served as sort of the government for Jews in Palestine, whereas the Arabs had no equivalent body representing them. [0:41:29] Also, the Jewish Agency still exists, we should note. [0:41:32] Yes, that's the organization you go through if you want to make aliyah or move to Israel. They do a lot of work within the Jewish communities around the world. And in Israel, they serve as a sort of parastate entity, which, like the WZO, the World Zionist Organization, can do many very ethically questionable acts towards the Palestinians without the accountability that a state has. [0:41:58] And that's just clubby. Yeah, no, the Israeli occupation is full of little shields like that, like the PA, actually. [0:42:05] So, again, just to highlight this point again, because it's insane, the text of the mandate for Palestine makes many, many references to the fostering of specifically Jewish institutions, which would allow for the implementation of the so-called Jewish national home policy. And again, the Arabs just are not mentioned at all. The Arabic language is mentioned once as one of the official languages of Mandatory Palestine. But other than that, you just have the same word games about the locals, the natives, who just clearly only have religious rights and religious and civil rights, but they don't have political rights. And this is the way it was supposed to be from the beginning. So, if you ever hear a Zionist talking about how the British were plotting against them from the beginning, just don't listen to it. Just that person is not even worth engaging with. But anyway, so the mandate would be finalized, and it came into effect in 1923 after it had been ratified by all of the parties involved. [0:43:12] And I hear you asking through all of this, my dear listener, where are the Palestinians through all of this? Why haven't we heard about the Palestinians all that much? Well, we're about to. The Palestinians, they clearly didn't have their voices heard very often. The King Crane Commission did accept petitions from the residents of what became Palestine as well. But other than that, they just didn't have much pluck in making themselves heard. But that's not really not for lack of trying. [0:43:41] From 1918, when the British began military rule, you suddenly saw the creation of a network of Muslim Christian associations in towns all across the country, which was supposed to be basically the nucleus for a Palestinian nationalist movement, which would with time accumulate power and exercise it as the legitimate governing entity of Palestine. [0:44:11] And on a more regional level, these Muslim Christian associations were more of a Palestinian thing. You had these two competing clubs for Arab nationalists. One was Al-Muntada al-Adabi and the other one was Al-Nadi al-Arabi. One of these is the literary club, the other is the Arabic Club. And so the literary club was really the organ of the Nashashibis in Palestine, at least. And the Arabic club was under the aegis of the Husseinis. The literary club had a more pro-French orientation, while the Arabic club was more pro-British. Both had a pan-Syrian orientation. In other words, they wanted to see Palestine within the framework of a larger, greater Syria project, which would encompass the Levant and Iraq and all those places, just part of one big state. And just one last thing: the Arabic club was very active in Faisal's administration. In fact, if you go to the Wikipedia page for the General Syrian Congress, which was the Congress of Faisal's short-lived state, which was very quickly stamped out by the French, they had their photo taken right in front of the Arab club in Damascus. [0:45:29] These were important people. [0:45:31] And in February 1919, the Muslim Christian Associations, these were the more local clubs again, convened to make the first Palestine Arab Congress, which drafted a resolution and attempted to attend the Paris Peace Conference to make the case to the Palestinian Arabs. But the British didn't allow them to go. And instead, they asked Faisal to represent them. But for whatever reason, Faisal didn't speak of Palestine at the conference. But it's interesting because at this point in time, you definitely had a pan-Syrian orientation, but nevertheless, these MCAs within Palestine, they wanted Palestine to be sort of an autonomous province within a larger Arab state, which would be ruled by Faisal. [0:46:19] And if we're talking about, just like when we talk about the Faisal Weizmann Agreement, this proposal to create out of all this mess a sort of a pan-Syrian entity, which had the support of some of the Palestinian notable families, will also be used later on as propaganda, as a sort of way of saying, look, there was no Palestinian identity back then because they were willing to accept a sovereign entity, including all of Syria, that wouldn't even be called Palestine, but would be called Syria. Which is a very unfair portrayal because we know that identity is a very complex thing and that they could have both a Palestinian and a Levantine identity, much like they also had a local identity and a religious identity. And all of these forms of collective identification actually coexisted and overlapped. They didn't contradict each other. [0:47:11] Yeah, so these Muslim Christian associations, they would hold many more congresses, something like seven in total, I believe. To no avail, they constantly tried to get themselves recognized as a governing body for the Arabs by the British, but the British, for whatever odd reason, simply didn't find it necessary to give these peoples the means to rule themselves in the way that the Zionists were being allowed to. [0:47:40] So, Faisal, at this point, he's no longer relevant to our story, but just to give you guys an idea of what happened to him, the British came to an understanding with the French that the mandate system would go up the way it does and that the French would get Syria and Lebanon. So, British troops were withdrawn from Syria in November of 1919. At this point, there is a very precarious situation where Faisal is trying to find an understanding with the French, which would allow him to rule this independent Arab kingdom with a lot of French input and a lot of economic privileges for the French. But a lot of people in Emir Faisal's circle, they were much more radical than he was. So, in March 1920, a month before the San Remo Conference was supposed to allocate these mandates to the different powers, the Syrian National Congress declared a Syrian Arab kingdom with Faisal as its king. [0:48:36] And the French intervened militarily, which culminated in the Battle of Maisaloun in July of 1920, which is still remembered very strongly by Arab nationalists to this day. So, Faisal himself, he was forced to flee, but he had a happy ending in a way, I guess. Ultimately, he became the king of Iraq in 1921 and he would remain on the throne until his death in 1933. [0:49:04] Yes, and after actually the Battle of Maisaloun, an interesting development took place in what became known as Transjordan, meaning the territory beyond the Jordan River, but before Iraq, between Palestine and Iraq. It became a sort of a no-man's land for a bit. And Herbert Samuel, the British Commissioner for Palestine, went out as an envoy to deal with the locals and try to enable British influence and promise some kind of self-government. But in 1920, the whole area was occupied by an army of about 300 men from the Hejaz, led by Abdallah, Faisal's brother and the son of Sharif Hussein from Mecca. And eventually, the British would actually give them Transjordan. It would become the British mandate of Transjordan, nominally under British rule, but under the local administration of Abdallah and the Hashemites, which is the reason why, until this day, we have the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan. [0:50:07] Transjordan eventually became Jordan after the War of 48, which is also the reason why the borders of Jordan look like they were written by where they were made by a ruler on a table. In fact, Winston Churchill will pride himself in having invented the borders of Jordan while being inebriated, which sounds entirely possible, since it seemed like it was a very frequent occurrence. And among the Zionists, some of them felt that this was a very inexcusable offense. The revisionist Zionists, led by Jabotinsky, felt that the British had promised the Zionists all of Palestine and had illegitimately partitioned Palestine and given it to the Hashemites, given the eastern part to the Hashemites, and they would turn that map of the entire Palestine as a symbol of the revisionist movement and the Etzel, their paramilitary organization. [0:51:03] Yeah, they had a very famous slogan. I don't remember what it is off the top of my head. Kevin, do you know what I'm talking about? [0:51:11] Both shores of the Jordan River, only thus, because they would refuse until very later on to accept that the Zionists would get no influence over what is now Jordan, where there was no significant Zionist settlement to begin with, but they felt that they were entitled to so that's how the mandate over Palestine itself came to be, as well as over Transjordan. [0:51:39] But there were a lot of other events that we haven't covered yet, namely the escalation of violence within Palestine itself. [0:51:47] Yeah, I think it, you know, obviously the British mandate is known as a time of growing violence between the two communities, but it should also be seen as sort of a coming to senses by Zionism that their encounter with Palestinians wasn't going to be the happy meeting, sort of welcome civilization that many Zionists in Europe thought they would get from the Arabs. And we're seeing that as if we read what happened in the 1920s and 1930s, which really set the tone for everything that was going to come afterwards. The War 48 was really, the fate of the war was really set towards the end of the British mandate. [0:52:30] Oh, yeah, yeah. [0:52:32] Palestinian leadership was pretty much decapitated after the revolt from 36 to 1939. Something like 10% of the male population of Palestine was either dead in jail or in exile. [0:52:47] But we have a long way to go before we actually get there. [0:52:50] So let's really look at the first major escalation of violence. There were violent incidents before this, of course, but this is the one that really inaugurates Arab hostility towards Zionism in the Zionist historiography. And that would be the Battle of Tel Hai, which happened in March 1920, centered around a figure by the name of Joseph Trumpeldor, born in 1880, lived until 1920. [0:53:18] Very interesting guy. Yeah, very interesting and very commemorated. I would say beloved by Zionist historiography. And mythologized. [0:53:28] Oh, absolutely. Absolutely. [0:53:30] And a lot of the ceremonies and the way that he's commemorated hides a lot of very interesting things about him. Like, for example, his socialism. [0:53:38] Yeah, yeah. So let's begin. So he was born in the Caucasus in 1880 into a military family. His father had been a Cantonist, who were basically these Jewish boys who were conscripted into the Russian army and made to serve 25-year terms, which technically wasn't a cakewalk. But at the same time, the way this is typically presented is that most of these boys were stripped of their Judaism entirely and made to become Christians, when in fact that didn't seem to be the case the majority of the time. So Joseph's father, Voilfi, had been one of these guys, and because he had completed his military service, he was a quote-unquote useful Jew and allowed to settle outside of the Pale of Settlement. So Joseph was born in Pyatigorsk in the Caucasus, which was a very interesting time and place for him to grow up. He got a very Russified upbringing, as many other Jews of his generation got. [0:54:38] But rather unusually, I would say, he stands out from his cohort in that he actually volunteered to join the Russian military in 1902 because he thought that as a Jew he had something to prove that he was, you know, a real man's man and somebody who's continuing in the tradition of his father, who had proven that Jews are an important part of the Russian Empire. [0:55:03] Right, and having joined the Russian army in 1902, he was unlucky enough that he got to fight in the Russo-Japanese War where he famously lost his left arm. [0:55:14] Oh, yeah, yeah. So he was stationed in Port Arthur before the war itself had begun, but once the war began, the city was put under siege by the Japanese. Lasted for a very long time, actually. Yeah, as Kevin said, he got his arm blown off during one of these battles. And he was, of course, taken to a hospital to recover. And they wanted to either give him an honorable discharge or to give him an administrative position so he doesn't have to continue fighting because no one figured that this guy with one arm could continue to fight. But nope. He said, in the words of his commanding officer, quote, I have one arm left, but as it is my right arm, I ask that I be issued a saber and a revolver so that I may resume military life alongside my comrades. [0:56:10] A real badass, even though we don't know how much of this is real. [0:56:13] Well, this particular quote is real. This is from a letter written by the commanding officer to higher ups at that point. He actually gets this down in writing. There's another version that's, I believe, I have another arm to give for my motherland. [0:56:30] Yeah, that's also a famous quote. [0:56:32] Yeah, I mean, Trumpeldor, he was quite an eclectic character, but nobody could really say that he was bad at organizing. He didn't just start the Zionist collective when he was taken prisoner. He was also instrumental in the foundation of the HeHalutz youth movement. He was an integral part of Degania, which was the first kibbutz, which really synthesized many Russian immigrants' views both on socialism and on Zionism. So he was this really important and interesting Zionist organizer who perhaps would have blended in and become anonymous over time if it weren't for the way that he actually died. Oh, yeah. [0:57:19] So you'll often come across the claim that he was the first Jew to receive an officership in the Russian Empire. That's not really true. He was actually never granted his officership because, with one exception, I believe there were no officers who were Jews who hadn't converted to Christianity in the Russian Empire. But he still did very well for himself. He achieved the rank of an NCO, non-commissioned officer. So, basically, like that was the highest position that he could achieve as a rank-and-file soldier. And at that point, he decides that he's had enough with the military. After this war, he decides he doesn't want to continue his career. Instead, he goes to law school, and for whatever reason, a couple of years after that, in 1912, he decides that he wants to go to Palestine. And as Kevin said, he became a member of the Degania collective, which is the first kibbutz. [0:58:23] It's up in the Galilee. And once the First World War began, he was exiled to Egypt because he was a Russian citizenship, so an enemy alien. And it was there that he met Jabotinsky. [0:58:35] Yeah, we actually talked a bit about this, but it's interesting. I think perhaps it's a good reason to say a bit more about this time. But as most of the Yishuv, most of the Jewish community in Palestine, were actually Russian citizens or Russian subjects or actually Russian immigrants, times were really rough in World War I. It wasn't just the shortages and the conscription, the very, very tight censorship and government control that the Ottomans implemented over Palestine during the war years, during the war years, but a lot of people had to go to Egypt. Egypt became a sort of meeting point for many of these exiled Russian immigrants. And Zionism, both within and outside of Palestine, was discussing, you know, which view should we take in light of World War I. Now, Jabotinsky was a very clear Anglophile. He was convinced that Zionism's allegiance or that its agenda laid with the British. [0:59:38] So Jabotinsky and Trumpeldor hatched together a plan to start a Jewish army unit, which wasn't entirely successful, seeing as the British didn't want to give, you know, these mostly Russian Jews from Palestine weapons and military training, but they did allow them to develop an auxiliary corps within the British Army, which they named the Zion Mule Corps. [1:00:04] Yeah, so the Zion Mule Corps, it most famously took part in the Battle of Gallipoli, which was this disaster that Churchill had gotten the British military into. But Trumpeldor, he, of course, went to fight with the Zion Mule Corps over there. Well, not fight, but to, you know, provide support. And, man, got himself shot again. [1:00:26] Yeah, he didn't have the best of luck in war, I think. He kept trying, though, which is cool, I guess. [1:00:32] So after that, he decides to return to Russia in 1917 for a couple of years. This had been after the February Revolution had happened, and he was actually petitioning the provisional government of Russia to create a Jewish army to march down through the Caucasus into Anatolia, all the way into Palestine to go break Palestine for the Jews. [1:00:59] This plan makes a lot of sense. [1:01:01] But it was also there that he founded HeHalutz, the Zionist socialist collective that Kevin mentioned. And he was laying the groundwork for this group to emigrate to Palestine up in the Galilee when the Battle of Tel Hai happened. [1:01:20] So, first of all, some background here is needed. This was a place with one of the earliest land disputes between Zionist settlers and Palestinian Arabs. So, in the area, there's this kibbutz/slash town called Metullah, which had actually been the site of a Druze village until 1895 called Al-Mutullah. [1:01:45] Yeah, and we're talking about the northernmost tip of what is currently Israel. But also, back then, I believe that this was associated with the administrative unit that would mostly encompass Lebanon in the Mandate era, which is why there was a lot of dispute as to whether this area would be under French or British control. [1:02:06] But anyway, the Druze, they really enjoyed a rebellion or two. So, in 1895, they had another one, at which point, the owner of this land decides that he's going to sell it to the Zionists. And the Druze men, a woman had remained in the village, but the men, they come back the following year and they're trying to reclaim this land that they had been living on as tenant farmers, only to realize that it had been sold literally right under their feet by this absentee landlord who decided that, you know, the Zionists were a better business partner. So, when these Druze men, they show up and they say that, you know, this is our land. This is where we've been living. Let us back in. And what did the Zionists do in response? They called the Ottoman authorities on them, basically snitching them out, saying that, you know, these are rebels. [1:03:03] And many of these people got arrested. And yeah, so this area was the site of a lot of discontent over the years for pretty good reasons, I'd say. [1:03:16] To quote from Benny Morris's Righteous Victims: For years the dislocated families harassed the new settlers, murdering one man in his sleep, stealing farm animals and crops, and firing guns at night. Only in 1904 was the matter settled when the settlers paid the Druze an additional 6,000 francs in compensation. So, yeah, there was this uncomfortable memory in this place, but nevertheless, by 1920, it seems like there were generally amicable relations between the Jewish settlers in this area and surrounding Arabs for the most part. [1:03:50] But in this period, you start having trouble again because, as we mentioned, there was a Franco-Syrian war going on. [1:03:58] Yeah, remember that the Hashemites had declared an independent kingdom under the leadership of Faisal, and to him, a lot of Arab nationalist societies had sort of become illusioned with this idea that finally they would reach some kind of Arab independence, both from the French and the British. But it was very short-lived because the French very clearly won the war. [1:04:22] Oh, yeah. Yeah, so French troops started to show up in the region, which is called Jabal Amil, in 1918. And it seems like they weren't very well liked. They were kind of assholes. So basically, everyone got fed up with these guys and they just started getting raided by the local Arabs. And after the British had withdrawn from the region, the French, they started to get very aggressive, much more so than they had been. So you started seeing these outposts in all these villages, and these outposts would be attacked by local tribesmen because they didn't want the French to be over there. The French retaliated with their own attacks, and the site from which they staged these attacks is of particular consequence. In December 26th to December 28th of 1919, the French conducted several punitive actions in the villages of Gar, Udeisa, Abil Al-Kami, and others. They confiscated property and livestock and shelled Hunin and Khalsa. [1:05:25] The French again shelled Khalsa and the surrounding area on February 19th, 1920. A large force of French soldiers of Senegalese origin camped for a short period of time in Kibbutz Kfar Giladi and around Tel Hai during that punitive process. That's from Mustafa Abbasi's From Aleppo to Tel Hai, the events of Tel Hai, and the new order in Greater Syria in 1919 to 1920. Yeah, so again, Tel Hai is an outpost, and Kfar Giladi is an actual settlement that's something like eight or nine kilometers away from there. [1:06:02] Right, it's a kibbutz in the Galilee. If I'm not mistaken, it was founded by members of Hashomer, which was the first Jewish paramilitary organization from the 1910s. [1:06:14] I've actually spent a few nights there. [1:06:16] Yeah, nice place. So, as Abbasi draws attention to, the French had been camping on the territory of these Jewish settlements, which they really weren't supposed to do. And the Jews were trying to remain neutral in this Franco-Arab thing because they didn't think it was really their place. [1:06:38] They were real deep in that fight. [1:06:39] Yeah, and they had decent relations with the local tribes for the most part by that time. But nevertheless, this was a very turbulent time, and consequently, a lot of people started to see that something wasn't totally right in the area. [1:06:56] You had this debate happening between Jabotinsky and Ben-Gurion, with Jabotinsky saying that the area was indefensible and should be evacuated, whereas Ben-Gurion basically took the position that no area settled by Jews should be abandoned, period. Which is something that we talked about in the Zionism as an ideology episode for a bit, but it really goes to show that despite the fact that Jabotinsky is the one who has the image of this hardliner, it's often Ben-Gurion who was much more hard-headed about all this. [1:07:35] Absolutely, absolutely. And in fact, if you look at the map, you can definitely see Jabotinsky's point. We're talking about a very sort of insular piece of land surrounded to the west and the east and the north by Lebanon. [1:07:48] Yeah, and this area was strategically important because the Zionists wanted to be settled near the Litani River because they wanted to have control over the flow of water because they thought that it could be an existential threat if the water upriver were blocked. And this was an obsession that they still haven't shed. [1:08:10] Yeah, that was a huge part of why the War of 67 later broke out because of anxiety over water resources. [1:08:17] Yeah, so around this time, there were approximately a hundred Jewish settlers in the area in a couple of these settlements. You had Kfar Giladi, you had Metula, you had Tel Hai itself, all very close by to each other. I mean, so come March 1st, 1920, you have the battle itself, and it's very ambiguous what happened actually, but the general story goes something like a group of Arabs shows up to Tel Hai to check for French troops because they had been camping out there less than two weeks ago, as Mustafa Abbasi points to. And this was a tribe with whom these settlers had decent relations, but there was some kind of a misunderstanding. It's not really clear. There are a couple of different versions given. And so a firefight breaks out. And when this leader of the Arabs realizes that there was a misunderstanding, so he's able to organize a ceasefire before too many people had gotten hurt. [1:09:24] And so they organize the ceasefire and the Arabs go off on their way. But as they're leaving, they get shot at again. And this is believed to have been a Jew who was isolated from the rest of the group who didn't know that they had come to a ceasefire. So suddenly, like, these guys are going away and they're getting shot at. So to their mind, it's just like, we just made a deal with these people and now they're shooting at us. Well, we've literally turned our backs. It's disgraceful. And the firefight breaks out again. And ultimately, this ended with five Arabs and six Jews dead. Among them was Trumpeldor. [1:10:02] Yeah, and with his death, and particularly with the phrase that he is alleged to have uttered before he died, which is, which is, this is of no importance, it is good or sweet to die for your country. Trumpeldor became a symbol to this day. Israeli school children take, you know, school trips to Tel Hai. There's a large statue of a lion commemorating the death of Trumpeldor. The fact that he was a soldier, that he chose to fight despite only having one arm, that he was a Zionist organizer, that he had been the founder of what many consider to be the number one predecessor of the Israeli defense forces, turned Trumpeldor into the first sort of traditional national symbol because Zionism had thinkers, had intellectuals, had politicians, but Trumpeldor was a martyr in a way. He was martyred to the point that somebody who actually stood on the opposite side of him ideologically, like Jabotinsky, he used Trumpeldor's name to found in 1923 in Latvia a youth movement that aligned with the thoughts, the main ideas of revisionist Zionism that we discussed in the Zionism episode. [1:11:26] And he named that youth movement Beital, which was two things at the same time. Beital was the name of one of the last Jewish fortresses during the Jewish revolts against the Roman Empire, but it was also an acronym for the Hebrew Youth's Pact with Josef Trumpeldor. What Jabotinsky laid out in the name was that Trumpeldor had given his life for the rebirth of the Jewish nation in a Jewish homeland, and that the Jewish youth, by becoming members of this ultra-nationalistic vanguard youth movement, this was a pact to honor and follow in the path and the legacy of Josef Trumpeldor. [1:12:09] Yeah, and from the left, you had the creation of the Gdud HaAvoda, the labor battalion, but their full name was the Trumpeldor labor battalions. And these people, very interesting history, actually, many of them ended up leaving Palestine in the mid-20s because Ben-Gurion really didn't like them. And at one point, he literally besieged one of their settlements. Like, they were going hungry because nothing was going in or out. So these people left for the Soviet Union and they founded a settlement in Crimea, actually, which unfortunately didn't end very well. A couple of years after that, that's when things started to get really kooky in the Soviet Union. So most of these people ended up getting arrested or killed as Zionist spies or whatever, even though they had willingly left Palestine to settle in the Soviet Union. [1:13:08] But it's good to die for one's country. [1:13:12] There's actually some alternative versions of what Trumpeldor might have said. So, for example, well, first of all, the phrase itself, it's based on a line of poetry from the Latin, from the Roman poet Horace that reads, Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori. It is sweet and proper to die for one's country. But alternatively, there's the version that was reported in the newspaper, Hapoel Hatzair on the one-year anniversary of his death, where what Trumpeldor is supposed to have said is, it is better to die for the homeland than to die for a foreign land, but it is better to live for the homeland. [1:13:59] I can hardly imagine somebody in the midst of battle or on their deathbed just saying such a complicated sentence in what was that person's adopted language to top things off. [1:14:11] Well, wouldn't you know there's another version that seems to be a little more realistic, although maybe not. But there's another version that says that, well, first of all, Trumpeldor, he didn't speak Hebrew very well. He continued to speak in Russian until the end of his days, and his Hebrew just wasn't really up to snuff. So at some point in like the 60s, 70s, 80s, some Israelis started to get cheeky with it, and they started to say that his final words were actually yob tvoyu mat, which is Russian for fuck your mother. And it sounds sort of like tov lamut. Like if you aren't listening very closely, there was that version proposed because at that point, Israelis, you know, they were starting to like get fed up with like this mythology that they were being taught and this was the reaction. Although it seems like this is probably not actually Trumpeldor's last words because the doctor with whom he was speaking to, he didn't know Russian. [1:15:16] So the two of them spoke in Hebrew. [1:15:18] Yeah, there's also the famous Hadag Nahash song. I don't know if you saw it. Tovla Mukhta al-Teyno, which is kind of like, it is good to spit on our country. [1:15:28] I like that. [1:15:29] Very, yeah. [1:15:30] Yeah, it's a very, very anti-Zionist song by a very interesting left-wing band, a hip-hop band called Hadag Nahash. [1:15:37] Yeah, Hadag Nahash. [1:15:39] Fun guys. [1:15:41] Tel Hai was only just the lead up for some much more atrocious violence. And just a month after that, you had the Nebi Musa riots in Jerusalem in April 1920. [1:15:56] Yeah, so just for a little context, Nebi Musa was sort of an annual spring festival commemorated mostly by the Muslim community in Palestine right around this time of the year, right before Easter. Yes, one week before Good Friday, like the Friday before Good Friday. [1:16:14] Which is like now. [1:16:16] And that included going up to the place that is by Palestinians traditionally referred to as the Shrine of Moses or Musa in Arabic. So this place is in Jericho, one of the oldest cities in the area. I think it's the oldest city in present habitation, like ever. And right around the times of the Crusades, there's been a shrine there commemorating what is supposed to be the body of Moses. Now, this traditional Muslim festival, which is usually quite joyous, in the midst of this tension between the communities, turned into quite a nationalistic affair and actually an anti-Zionist demonstration, which led to violence. [1:17:03] So, first of all, like it should be underlined that this holiday is totally unique to Palestine. It's not practiced anywhere else, and in fact, its commemoration is tied to the Orthodox Christian calendar, not the Muslim calendar. [1:17:19] Yeah, it's quite interesting. [1:17:21] It was first attested in the writings of a man named Mujir ad-Din in the 1490s. And naturally, the festival evolved with time, but here's what it looked like in the 19th century. This is a paraphrase from Haim Gerber's Remembering and Imagining Palestine. I believe I've mentioned this book in the previous episode. It's very interesting if you're looking to get a history of Palestinian identity. But anyway, the pilgrimage started in the Haram al-Sharif with the unfurling of various flags, about 30 of them, all green and embroidered with Quranic verses in gold. In attendance was the Mufti, who played the chief role, as well as an Ottoman military band and the main army commanders, as well as the Ottoman governor. This immediately transformed the occasion from a folkloristic pilgrimage to an official event. Then the procession set off in the direction of Jericho. On leaving the Lion's Gate, Yelen observed thousands upon thousands of people, including a large number of women, thronging the walls, buildings, and walls all around. [1:18:31] In this kind of large-scale amphitheater, all cheerfully watched an array of mock fights involving breathtaking horsemanship and sword play. [1:18:40] And just to make this explicit, the line of thinking here is that this was meant as a display to would-be crusaders because, again, Jerusalem had been under the occupation of the Franks for almost 200 years. So, there was a very good reason for Muslims to feel that they have to present a show of force at a time when Christians are showing Yafan Mas in Jerusalem. Yeah, we're talking about a gathering of what some estimate to be 60 to 70,000 people. A lot of speeches, the Mufti apparently gave this very fiery speech, and the crowd seemed to have shouted according to testimonies. You know, independence, independence was clearly a demand for the British to go away and to stop supporting the Zionists in their quest for a Jewish state. And they were also screaming, Palestine is our land, the Jews are our dogs, some anti-Semitic messaging, but this was clearly an occasion of nationalistic fervor that very logically led to riots, particularly when some Jews that were in attendance, they also responded that there was some spitting, some fighting, and then the situation got completely out of hand. [1:19:58] Yeah, and the Zionists had actually been warning that something like this might happen. But unfortunately, the Zionists had a tendency to cry wolf very often. So in fact, they had gone to the British the year before in 1919 and warned that the Nebi Musa festival would become an anti-Jewish riot, but nothing came of it. So consequently, the British administration just didn't think that this would be a big deal this time around either. [1:20:27] Yeah, but you know, as the riot started, they would just started looting and setting fire to some synagogues and yeshivot in the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem. Now, if anybody's been to Jerusalem, this makes sense. You have a lot of very important religious places all within very close proximity to each other. [1:20:45] Yeah, and of course, the Nebi Musa festival had an especially political turn at this point in time in 1920 because Faisal had been crowned the king of the Arab Kingdom of Syria, which was to include Palestine on March 8th. And in fact, on that day, you had mass demonstrations across Palestine, which weren't violent except for some minor scuffles. There might have been anti-Jewish slogans invoked, but that was the full extent of it. And this entire debacle points to something very interesting that you saw happening under the British administration. Namely, as the Palestinians were deprived of any political rights because, you know, this was to be the Jewish national home, they couldn't really organize outright political events. So, as time went on, you saw this increasing encroachment of the political onto the religious under the pretext of a religious celebration like Nebi Musa. You could have this massive outpouring of support for the Arab cause. [1:21:50] There had been some other things that precipitated this violence. Most prominently, you had the beginnings of the Haganah, well, before they were called the Haganah. These guys were organized by Jabotinsky and another Zionist leader named Pinhas Rutenberg, and they were just training in the streets of Jerusalem. Like hundreds of young men, many of whom had military experience as part of the Jewish Legion, were just doing these military exercises out in the open in full view of everyone. And this couldn't have helped the situation. [1:22:31] By the way, Rutenberg, that you mentioned, is one of the most interesting characters that we'll see in this time in Palestine, member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party in Russia, quite an active part in two revolutions in Russia, 1905 and 1917. Not just a political activist, not just a military organizer, but also a businessman. He got the concession to start the Palestine Electric Corporation. He was a politician, and at this particular point in time, also very likely a troublemaker, just trying to ignite the powder keg that was inter-community violence. I mean, it's interesting to imagine what would have been, I know it's counterfactual, but the Nebi Musa riots and everything that happened in the 1920s was really the very clear break where the Jewish community of Palestine and the Palestinian community took completely different routes. It marked the development of the Haganah and all the paramilitary organizations that followed it, like the Etzel and the Lehi. [1:23:39] It marked a very clear policy of Hebrew labor and purchase Hebrew products, which set about the development of two completely different economies in Palestine. And it really set the groundwork for an entire decade where even the most hopeful in the Yishuv they came to the conclusion that Palestine would be won through war. So 1920 is by all means really a before and after moment, a breaking point in Arab-Jewish coexistence. And it really makes you wonder what things would have looked like had the Nebi Musa riots not happened. [1:24:18] Yeah. Speaking of troublemakers, continuing my previous thought, you had another guy appear on the scene at this time named Usishkin, who became the new guy of the Zionist Commission on the ground in Jerusalem. And this guy, he had chutzpah. There's just no other way to put it. Here's what the first meeting between Usishkin and the mayor of Jerusalem, Musa Kazim al-Husseini, looked like. Usishkin did not deny the Jews had injured Arabs. These things could be resolved, he said, but on no account would the Jews concede their national demands. There was no room for compromise. We do not want war, he went on. In fact, we are doing everything to prevent war. Yet the Jews are not afraid of war, he said, if it is necessary. As His Excellency knew, Usishkin told the mayor, the Jews were currently equipped with everything needed for war. A war would hurt both sides, but the Arabs would suffer more, he concluded. [1:25:23] This is from Tom Segev's One Palestine Complete. And again, first meeting between this guy and the mayor of Jerusalem. Like, what was he thinking? [1:25:32] Yeah, a very veiled threat, I would say, from Usishkin. [1:25:35] So the Nebi Musa riots, it lasted from Sunday, April 4th until the 7th, a couple of days. [1:25:42] Yeah, it was ugly. Five Jews and four Arabs were dead. He had something like 200 injuries among the Jews, and as well as 20 injuries among the Arabs. And it was just a complete mess. [1:25:56] Like in Ottoman times, as the passage we quoted from the Gerber book before states, you had an actual Ottoman army unit in place, whereas this time, the military governor of Jerusalem, Ronald Storrs, who was also in charge in 1919 when the Zionists made a big huff, but nothing precipitated, he only deployed 188 policemen across the city. There just wasn't a lot to keep the crowds under control. If, you know, these two groups of people started fighting, because, I mean, a lot of hot-headed young men on both sides just looking for a fight. And in fact, the Zionists found it so unbelievable that Storrs had allowed this state of affairs to continue that there was even a conspiracy theory that this entire debacle had been planned by British authorities. Because, you know, that's another common Zionist talking point: that the British were always in the pocket of the Palestinians. [1:26:58] They were all anti-Semites. They just didn't like the Zionists. And as I hope we've made incredibly clear in this episode, the Zionists had pretty much all of the cards, regardless of the personal sympathies of a handful of British officers. This was probably a case more of negligence rather than actual conspiracy. [1:27:20] And that's what the British found in their own investigation. [1:27:25] That was the Palin report, which also found that the Zionists and the Balfour Declarations were the primary cause. They wrote that Weizmann had lost control of the movement, Weizmann representing the moderate Zionists, and instead, he was replaced by extremists. [1:27:44] Yeah, the old school Zionists. [1:27:47] This is a quote from, again, from Tom Segev's One Palestine, Complete. Bolshevism flowed in Zionism's inner heart, the court stated. Many of the Jews coming to settle in Palestine brought Bolshevik views with them. The court mentioned one such person by name, Lieutenant Jabotinsky, identified him with the Poale Zion Party, which the court called a definite Bolshevist institution. The association of the fiercely anti-socialist Jabotinsky with the Marxist Party was not the only nonsense in the report. [1:28:15] Now, this is real nonsense, as we think we discussed in the Zionism episode. Jabotinsky was convinced that Zionists couldn't be socialists at the same time because he had this idea of had-ness, which was that Zionists had to have one flag, which was pure, unadulterated nationalism, and it couldn't be combined with any idea like socialism, which naturally led to some kind of internationalist solidarity. For him, Jews had to be solidary towards Jews. Now, there is a certain point here to be made, which is, you know, Zionism has become more hawkish, and even those who presented themselves as socialists, they were far more hawkish in their views towards Arabs and what had to be done than the moderate, more diplomatically-minded old-school Zionists like Chaim Weizmann. So we're seeing a new generation in Zionism, which is much more influenced and led by the Yishuv's Jews rather than bourgeois, comfortable Jews in Europe who wrote and thought very beautiful things about the concept. [1:29:24] You know, Sam, after the Nebi Musa riots, there was a formal public letter written by sheikhs from 82 different villages in the Jerusalem and Jaffa area. And they wrote that they opposed any violence between the communities and that they actually supported Jewish immigration because it would lead to progress. Now, this idea, which seemed to have been copied from Zionist propaganda, was actually copied from Zionist propaganda. They were probably bribed into it. And it's interesting how very early on you could find some leaders in Palestinian society that were more than willing to echo Zionist talking points in exchange for money. [1:30:07] Oh boy. Finally, let's get to the Jaffa riots of 1921, which began on May Day, 1921. Funnily enough, there's a very specific reason for that. We're going to get into. And these riots, they were much bloodier than either Tel Hai or the Nebi Musa riots of the previous year. Just to give some background here, after the Bolshevik Revolution happened, you saw a bunch of splits within the socialist Zionist camp. And ultimately, this resulted in the emergence of the so-called Socialist Workers' Party in 1919. Their initials were MPS, so they were somewhat ironically called Mops, which is the Russian word for pugs. [1:30:59] Cute nickname. [1:31:00] But they were pro-Soviet and aligned with the Third International. And they saw some success in the beginning. They ran in the elections for the Histadrut, which was the Jewish labor federation, in 1920 and actually did fairly well. They won like 7% of the vote, I believe it was. But they weren't actually allowed to take their posts because Comrade Ben-Gurion, the great socialist that he was, just didn't like these guys. [1:31:34] Very weird, wouldn't you say, Kevin? [1:31:36] Yeah, very weird. It's almost like he wasn't a real socialist. [1:31:40] So the MPS, they first clashed with the British in October 1920 while they were celebrating the October Revolution. [1:31:48] Yeah, they were always very confrontational to British power. Yeah, but of course they had to compete with other socialist organizations, considering that socialism was very clearly the hegemonic political view within the Yishuv, particularly among the youth. But that also included some parties like the Ahdut HaAvoda Party that were much more closely aligned with the Zionist movement. They still portrayed themselves as socialists, but organization-wide and strategically, they were much more organically related to Zionism. Ahdut HaAvoda in particular had been born out of a split within the Poale Zion Party, the Workers of Zion Party, and they were sort of the right wing of Poale Zion. They were much more Zionist than they were socialists. And they were also doing May Day celebrations, which were quite different from the more internationalist-minded MOPS celebration. [1:32:47] Yeah, so the MOPS, they were going to have their May Day parade starting from Jaffa and marching into Tel Aviv. These places are like right next to each other. Like even today, officially it's called Jaffa Hyphen Tel Aviv. [1:33:01] The other way around. Tel Aviv Hyphen Jaffa. [1:33:04] Yeah, it's one single municipality. Yeah, so these two processions that the Mops are marching from Jaffa to Tel Aviv and Ahdut HaAvoda's are starting from Tel Aviv and marching to Jaffa. And the night before, the Mops had been distributing leaflets in Yiddish and Arabic, calling for the workers to unite and overthrow the British to establish a Soviet Palestine. So they got a visit from the police that morning, but they continued with the procession. They were shouting slogans like long live the Communist International and Long Live Soviet Palestine. And would you know it? These two processions, at one point, they run into each other, so they start fighting because, hey, what else are you going to do on May Day? [1:33:52] Yeah, and the Arab inhabitants of Jaffa saw the fighting and assumed that rather than a Jew versus Jew primary fight, this was a Jew versus Arab fight. So they gathered their knives, their swords, their pistols, and actually went out and broke into Jewish buildings, Jewish homes, killed people, and it turned into quite a gruesome scenario. [1:34:22] Yeah, this was much bloodier than the Nebi Musa riot. This ended with 47 Jewish dead and 146 injured, as well as 48 Arab dead and 73 injured. [1:34:34] Yeah, the dead included Yosef Chaim Brenner, who was one of the very early pioneers of modern Hebrew literature. [1:34:44] Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, he was a very, very big deal. He was the literary superstar of the time. [1:34:50] So, once again, the British, they get together a commission to write up a report to figure out what exactly was going on here. And there was, once again, this very anti-Bolshevik slant helped by the fact that there were actual Bolsheviks involved. [1:35:08] Well, you know, 1920 was a bit of a stretch, but you could make a point where, you know, communists are to blame for this one. [1:35:18] Yeah. And this actually led to some really funny discourse. So the Arab notables by this time, they had figured out that the British really don't like these communist guys. They don't really know who the communists are, but they know that the British don't like them. So some Arabs presented this letter to the British that was allegedly found in the pocket of a dead member of MPS, which was a letter from Trotsky, quote-unquote, the chief rabbi of Russia, to Herbert Samuel. To the British High Commissioner. Yes, yeah. The British High Commissioner is conspiring with the chief rabbi of Russia, Trotsky, to bring about a socialist revolution. [1:36:03] Yeah, it's quite an interesting point where everyone's conspiracy theory kind of meets Zionism, the British, Trotskyism, Stalinism. It all meets in what is what was really born out of just two socialist groups beating each other up on the street. [1:36:25] Yeah, so as the British understood it, this is from the report that they wrote. The Jews were supposed to be Bolshevik, and Bolsheviks were understood to be against property and government, marriage, and religion. So, in the British telling of events, the Arabs were just so incensed by the fact that you had these communists out. So, being loyal British subjects, they just wanted, you know, to keep the peace and to not destroy the religion. And the Arabs, the Palestinian Arabs, they would continue to try to play the Bolshevik card as often as they could. I once came across this really interesting article from one of the main Palestinian newspapers of the time, Filastin, from around 1925, I believe, with the headline, E Yehusa de Russia. In other words, the Jews are the masters of Russia. And it's just, it's quite a copypasta that you'd come across these days about how, like, oh, you know, 10 out of 12 of the leaders of the Bolsheviks are Jews, and the Jews are this and that, all of that. [1:37:37] You know, it's an interesting also breaking point for the Jaffa riots in 1921 because we start to see some cracks in what was once the beautiful relationship between the British and the Zionists, which continued to be quite a tight relationship. But after the riots, Herbert Samuel actually started to express the idea that, you know, the Arabs were being overly negative towards the Balfour Declaration, which, in the second part of the statement, said, you know, no harm should be done to the non-Jewish communities living in Palestine. So he started saying, you know, we're only going to allow Jewish immigration as long as it doesn't overly burden the economy of Palestine and Arab communities. And even though it took them quite a few years until this became actual policy with the white papers, some leaders in the Yishuv actually started saying, hey, you know, the British aren't as good a friend as we thought they were. [1:38:42] And even Herbert Samuel, who was once received as kind of like the Messiah, they started boycotting his presence in Palestine because they felt that the British were starting to recant the Balfour Declaration. [1:38:56] Yeah, before we walk off, Kevin, do you have any closing thoughts? [1:39:01] I think we've discussed a very interesting time for the British Mandate of Palestine. I think it is absolutely necessary to understand dynamics in these early years of the mandate to understand what happens next. These are very colorful characters that combine socialism and extreme nationalism. And that it is important to keep in mind that these people, much more than you know, very well-thinking, utopian, bourgeois, European, assimilated Jews, they're the ones that are going to set the tone for what Zionism is going to do and for what is going to be the relationship between Arabs and Jews over the following decades. So I think we've done, when I say this humbly, I believe we've done a good job of painting a comprehensive scenario of what happened in these years. I say so myself. [1:39:56] And thank you once again for helping to share your knowledge with our audience. So once again, let's give it up for Kevin. You can find him on Twitter in the episode description. And before we go, I'd just like to ask that if you enjoy the show, if you're learning from us, then please go to iTunes or Podcast Addict. Or now it's Spotify actually has ratings for podcasts too. If you enjoy what we're bringing you, please leave us a rating and/or a review. [1:40:31] I learn something new from you every day. [1:40:33] Thank you, Sam. Thanks to all the guys in the podcast and anyone listening. This is Gladio Free Europe signing off.