Gladio Free Europe, E54: History of Morocco, Part 2 https://www.gladiofreeeurope.com/episodes/history-of-morocco-part-2 [0:00:15] And we are back with another episode of Gladio Free Europe. I am Russian Sam, joined as always by my co-host Liam. And today we're continuing our Moroccan chronicle. In part one of our Morocco series, we breeze through the history of Morocco from its very beginnings to the meteoric rise of the Alawi dynasty. We left off with Sultan Muhammad III, with whom we're going to continue. And last week, we did an episode about the Barbary Pirates, a phenomenon that stretched the coast of North Africa from Morocco all the way to Libya. And now we are continuing our story. We're going to continue from the rise of Muhammad III, as I mentioned previously, who would rule from 1757 all the way until his death in 1790. Muhammad would prove to be a very versatile ruler. He grew up in the midst of his grandfather's autocratic experiment gone awry. [0:01:11] He saw it fall apart. And Muhammad was primed to understand that Morocco's future depended on institutional fixes. Muhammad passed a number of reforms that did much to address Morocco's immediate problems, but unfortunately these fixes would go on to cause problems of their own in the future. [0:01:29] Right, and what I find pretty interesting about Muhammad is that the kinds of things he did to fix or strengthen the Moroccan state were totally different from the kinds of things that European monarchs were doing around this same time. And given the fact that the Alawi dynasty is still in power today, it's kind of hard to say he was ineffective. He just did some things that might seem counterintuitive to, you know, us coming from a Western background today. [0:01:54] Yeah, he was acting very well in the context when which he was presented, and it was a very bad context. He definitely did the best of it, but unfortunately for him, his succession would be fraught, and following his reign, Morocco would once again return to the state of turmoil that followed his grandfather's tenure. During this time, the problems which accounted for the common weakness of the Moroccan state would rear their head in full force. There would be religious conflict, there would be famine, there would be plenty of economic failures, and there was an increasing mood of competition with foreign rivals. Meanwhile, in neighboring areas, the newly formed United States engaged in its first overseas war. Although Morocco wouldn't be directly involved in the hostilities of the First Barbary War for the most part, this invasion would itself be preceded by a French invasion of Egypt only a few years prior. [0:02:50] Both of these events would create ripples within Moroccan society itself. Morocco was in a state of endemic weakness that it just couldn't escape from, and in the near future, these problems would precipitate direct Western intervention in the coming decades. [0:03:04] Well, all right, Sam, let's get into all this. Tell us who exactly was Muhammad III and how did he get started? [0:03:10] So, Muhammad III, he was born in 1710, and he grew up during his grandfather's tenure. His first 17 years happened during his grandfather's reign. And just a little reminder here: his grandfather was Ismail, who was this notoriously brutal sultan of Morocco, most famous for creating this powerful army of African slaves, the Abid al-Bukhari. [0:03:33] Yes, that's right. [0:03:34] Although we don't know much about Muhammad's early life, we know that he was largely raised by his paternal grandmother, Khnata bint Bakkar, who was a very learned woman for her time, and she instilled in him a great love of learning. So he was very erudite in all kinds of fields, especially religion. He was a big religion head. So we talked about his father Abdallah in part one. As you may remember, he had very serious problems during his reign and he would be removed from power five separate times during Muhammad's youth. The final time would happen in 1748 when Abdullah was deposed by the Abid al-Bukhari, the African guard, and replaced with Muhammad himself. But there was one little snag in the plans of the Abid al-Bukhari. Muhammad never asked for this. Although for a few short months in 1748, Muhammad would formally serve as a sultan, his father was ultimately able to muster another army and take back the throne, this time remaining in power until the end of his life in 1757. [0:04:44] Although the Abid al-Bukhari had once been a fearsome army in the time of Ismail, by now, by the 18th century, it was really a shadow of its former self. Eventually, Muhammad would once again have an unpleasant run-in with the Abid al-Bukhari, and this would end with the further decimation of the force. But we'll get to that in a little bit. But we have to understand how Abdullah was able to recover the throne. And not just once or twice, mind you, but again, five times. [0:05:15] Yeah, five separate times, which is pretty impressive. Like, I think it's not that interesting or unusual that he was overthrown multiple times. I think what's interesting is that each time he was overthrown, he was able to claw his way back. [0:05:28] Yeah, and he was able to do this because he was very adept at levying tribal forces known as the Jayush from various tribes in Morocco, especially from the Udaya region. The deal here was that these tribes would levy Jayush to help the Sultan in his various campaigns, and in exchange, they wouldn't have to pay taxes as well as gaining access to a number of other privileges. So, after a brief stint as sultan, Abdullah had enough faith in his son to keep him within the government. He would be installed as the governor of Marrakesh, one of the four imperial capitals, and at that point, Morocco's largest city, where he really got his hands dirty learning about the complexities of government and economy in Morocco. He was just all up in that stuff. So, by the time that Muhammad would finally ascend to the throne, he was already in his late 40s and he was coming to it not as a spring chicken, but as an experienced politician with decades of experience in both governance and navigating court intrigue. [0:06:36] This meant that Muhammad was very capable with dealing with the challenges of the Moroccan state, at least within his own lifetime. [0:06:43] Right, and the first of these challenges came back from the Udaya region, that place where his father Abdullah had always levied his troops. Because when Muhammad ascended to the throne, leaders from those Udaya tribes demanded more privileges, maybe trying to take advantage of Muhammad's perceived inexperience. But Muhammad wouldn't take the bait. You know, he had a nice dinner set up. He invited all of these guys to come and feast with him so that they can talk about their problems and find a fix, hopefully. But unfortunately, the evening wouldn't be quite so pleasant for the tribal heads. Because once they reached the new capital of Rabat and joined Muhammad for the festivities, they found that they were instead placed under arrest. [0:07:29] This was a really quick solution to the Udaya problem, and it showed a very strong will. And it also served as a show of force to other potentially disloyal tribes who think that they could maybe get one up on the central state. [0:07:47] Yeah, and after dealing with these guys from the Udaya region, Muhammad began to make a lot of new changes to the Moroccan state. [0:07:54] And like we mentioned, these were changes that were often pretty different from the kinds of changes happening in Europe at this time or in the Ottoman Empire. [0:08:02] Right, yeah. Muhammad, he realized that unlike fellow Muslim powers like the Ottomans in Constantinople or the increasingly autocratic governments on mainland Europe, Morocco just didn't have the tax base to support a strong centralized state. Instead, Muhammad would very skillfully leverage decentralization and the devolution of power. He hoped that by doing this, he would be able to reduce expenses and this would no longer require such a high tax burden, which would allow the country to develop itself economically. [0:08:39] And do you think this is because like Morocco just didn't have the tax base available that the Ottomans had, or that Spain had? Is that why? [0:08:48] I think that the main problem is really the lack of infrastructure. Just to give an example, during the reign of Ismail, as far as I could tell, there were no famines in Morocco, even though this was something that had become a regular problem in later periods. And I suspect that this had to do with the fact that just roads were busted, people were afraid to travel because banditry would be a problem. And if you can't really bring your goods to market, in the case of agricultural produce, they just go to waste. [0:09:22] Yeah, no one could buy them, yeah. [0:09:24] Yeah, so rather than trying to play the absolutist monarch like his grandfather, Muhammad saw himself as a broker between different factions within Moroccan society. And we're going to describe some of these factions later on in the episode. But for now, let's just take a quick detour to talk about the way that this isn't really something that you would expect if you read solely European sources from the 20th century. Because those books are full of really just Orientalist talking points about how Morocco was this stagnant place where nothing ever changed, nothing happened. And of course, this was far from the case. In fact, I was surprised to learn that Ismail, he was aware of the English Civil War. He tried to arrange a marriage between himself and one of the daughters of Louis XIV. [0:10:22] That's interesting. That could have really changed history if Louis had accepted. [0:10:27] Yeah, well, I guess we'll never know. But anyway, so Muhammad, he set about building this new decentralized state where taxes were not collected by this massive army as had been done with the Abid al-Bukhari, but instead, Muhammad decided that he would delegate. He would have a bunch of underlings who would be trusted to ensure that revenues would continue to flow upwards. This meant that there would be less discontent among the groups like the Udaya because there wouldn't be as many taxes. But also, in addition, this meant that Moroccan society was much more plural-centric. He wanted to keep it that way at that point in time. He wanted to avoid the concentration of power in a single ruler, as had been done by his grandfather, because he saw that in an autocratic system, once the autocrat is gone, things just sort of fall apart. So much more power was delegated to local officials, and Muhammad expanded the civil service to deal with these kinds of affairs. [0:11:33] So while the office of the Sultan became less absolute in this period, I'd say the government itself expanded. [0:11:41] That's interesting. You know, this kind of reminds me, like a very crude kind of European example, maybe, is that I've read that in France and England a little bit earlier, I think that you had a kind of similar argument about whether the king should be, you know, absolutist or should be, like you said, this broker. And at least the way the English put it is that the French king in the 17th, the 16th and 17th centuries became this absolute figure, whereas the British king became, like you said, this broker who delegated more power to the new British bureaucracy. I'm sure this is, you know, totally different what was happening in Morocco, but it does kind of seem like it's this idea that the king remains the center of the government, but doesn't do everything himself. You know what I mean? Like these permanent bureaucratic positions can be established to take power instead, and that could actually really benefit the state long term. [0:12:33] Yes, exactly. And this was buttressed by the fact that although Muhammad was delegating more power to outside forces, the Sultan would go on to play a more important symbolic role than he ever had in Morocco. I have here a quote by the historian Abdallah Laroui, whose book, The History of the Maghrib, is a very good book for getting a sense of the history of the region. As reorganized by Muhammad III, the Alawite regime did not command, it negotiated, both with foreigners and with local authorities, using the army only to hasten negotiations. In this respect, he achieved a certain success, but all in all, his solutions of the problem of operating a state under unfavorable economic conditions amounted to combining in one and the same person a king and an emperor, a military and a religious leader. From then on, this dual power was embodied in the sovereign himself, but the balance thus was unstable and ceased to function once a foreign element entered in. [0:13:34] This is what happened at the beginning of the 19th century. The diplomacy of the Alawite sultan succeeded with the foreigners as it had with the local authorities, if delaying the inevitable can be termed success. [0:13:45] So, I guess what he's saying here is that, you know, the changes that Muhammad made were quite successful in the short term at keeping his dynasty on the throne, but ultimately, in the face of eventual European aggression, it does kind of seem like the Moroccan sultanate was not as strong as it potentially could have been if it had made other decisions. But I also feel like if it had made other decisions, it might not be the Alawis on the throne at all. Morocco, as we know it, might not exist. [0:14:12] Yeah, exactly. So, Muhammad realized that revenues could be more consistently extracted through trade and duties on trade rather than internal taxation. And so, to this end, Muhammad III started to develop much closer relations with Europe than his predecessors. And as we just mentioned, Ismail, he had quite a keen interest in European affairs decades prior. But by the second half of the 18th century, the gulf in technological and economic development across the two sides of the Mediterranean had widened significantly. Muhammad realized that it was more important than ever to stay in contact with the Europeans if he wanted to remain competitive. So, to this end, one of the first things that Muhammad did when he got to the throne, he granted a trade monopoly to the Danish in 1757. And similar deals would follow with Britain, Sweden, France, and Venice, as well as other states. [0:15:09] It's funny that you mentioned the Danish because, you know, they're actually going to come in at the end of this story, the Danish and the Swedes also. This is a little bit of diversion here, but I know that we're going to mention how in this era, corsairing declined. I think we mentioned last week that some of the final victims of corsairs tended to be Scandinavian, because the Moroccans realized that Sweden and Denmark were small nations compared to France and England, which meant that if they held hostage some Danish sailors, they were a lot less likely to end up getting punished by any kind of Danish fleet coming down. [0:15:44] But all that being said, trade shouldn't be seen entirely through the Mediterranean slash European prism. In fact, the Trans-Saharan slave trade was traditionally Morocco's biggest source of revenue. But unfortunately for Morocco, as Europeans became better at seafaring, there was less of a need for the Moroccan intermediary because, of course, goods would be cheaper at the source. So, goods like clothing, slaves, gold, and ivory were some of the most important products that went into Morocco. And Morocco mostly exported agricultural produce, wool, fine leather things, etc., as well as other things from other parts of the Islamic world. But the problem was that as the Trans-Saharan gold and slave trade waned, more and more of Moroccan capital left the country. There were extreme gold shortages to the point that Muhammad III basically had to convert his Spanish and Portuguese currency reserves into gold to keep the economy going. So, given that simply transporting goods across the Sahara was no longer enough to make enough money to earn the necessary revenues, Muhammad III embraced a more multi-pronged strategy. [0:16:57] To this end, many new ports were built in Morocco. The most prominent of these would be a new port city called Essaouira, which was also known by Europeans as Mogador. And this became the primary port of trade with Europeans. It was a really convenient location. It was right on the Atlantic and next to Marrakech. It was a year-round port, unlike most of Morocco's other ports, which silt up at certain times of the year. And also, this had the added benefit of having a single major port for dealing with the Europeans, which meant that Muhammad III had a more effective way to deal with smuggling, that is, people trying to escape taxes by just going directly to the Europeans. So the city and port had to be designed totally from scratch. And to this end, Muhammad III hired a French architect named Théodore Cornut. Now, when I was doing research for this episode, I found that many guidebooks for some reason say that Cornut had been captured by the Moroccans during a raid on Larache, and he was held prisoner until he designed the city. [0:18:12] Oh, it's like the just like the stories about Cervantes. [0:18:16] Yeah, but unfortunately, the real story is nowhere near as exciting. He was just hired by Muhammad. [0:18:21] Is there any chance to think that he might have lied about being forced so when he got back to Europe, no one would be upset that he worked for the Muslims? [0:18:28] Oh, maybe, maybe, yes. That could make sense, actually, yes. But Cornut, as it turned out, he wasn't the best at his job, so he was fired a couple of years later. He didn't really do a good job of building fortifications, but the city itself would be designed on a grid thanks to his plans. Although, future fortifications would have to be built by others. One of these figures was a renegade who was called Ahmed El-Inglizi. [0:18:59] Inglizi, does that imply that he was a British fellow? [0:19:04] Yep, yep, exactly. So just again, very cosmopolitan place, people coming over from many different parts of the world, not at all like the total backwater that you would expect. [0:19:16] Right, right. Which you should mention, the idea that Morocco is a backwater is absolutely what the European colonizers themselves would think like a century later. But when you look at the country itself, that absolutely was not the case. [0:19:27] Well, by that point, it had become more of a backwater, but we'll get to the reasons for that a bit later. But at this point, absolutely not the case, can't be argued. So the idea was to force foreign merchants to establish full-time missions in Essaouira by giving them very generous tax benefits, which would have given these people a good reason to settle. So because of this, for reasons we'll get to shortly, this also meant that Essaouira became a very Jewish town, with Jews representing maybe like a third or 40% of the population. [0:19:59] Wow, wow. So that's like up there with like Salonika. Like that's like a very large population. [0:20:04] Yeah, yeah, exactly. So by 1780, Muhammad's plan had borne fruit. There were 12 European merchant houses stationed in Essaouira with over a thousand Europeans living in the city. [0:20:17] So mission accomplished. And Essaouira, it was only one of the many cities which would be built during the reign of Muhammad. A lot of territory would also be recaptured from the Spanish and the Portuguese during his reign. So the territory of Casablanca was abandoned by the Portuguese because it was totally leveled in the earthquake of 1755. That one was so strong that it also destroyed Lisbon itself. [0:20:43] Oh, I've heard of that. [0:20:44] Yeah. Yeah, so this earthquake was powerful enough to just totally wreck this town. [0:20:50] Yeah, the whole Atlantic seaboard. Yeah, that's crazy. [0:20:52] Yeah, so because there was nothing left, the entire city had to be built from scratch during Muhammad's reign. And he's really the reason why Casablanca is Casablanca. The city was painted in the distinctive white look, which still characterizes it today. There was also the city of El Jedida, captured from the Portuguese this time, not abandoned, but it remained in ruins until sometime later. There was also the city of Fedala, which is today called Mohammedia. [0:21:19] Is it after Muhammad III? [0:21:21] Muhammad V, I believe. This was a post-independence thing. [0:21:25] Okay, okay. [0:21:26] But this port was created specifically for the purpose of the grain trade. So as you can tell, Muhammad III, he was able to take almost all of the European enclaves which remained on Morocco's borders. [0:21:37] Yeah, the conquistador cities, basically. [0:21:39] Yeah, although he would be unable to dislodge the Spanish from Melilla and Ceuta. [0:21:44] Where they're still today. [0:21:46] Yeah, plus a couple of other insignificant, like islands and outposts that mostly weren't peopled. But in addition to these new port cities, Muhammad III played a very active role in the renovation and further improvement of many cities which already existed. There's a reason why Abdallah Laroui called him the architect of modern Morocco. [0:22:08] Cool, yeah, yeah. Kind of like a Napoleon III figure. [0:22:11] And all these ports, they were very important because, again, it made year-round trade possible. As we mentioned on the Casablanca episode, the northern coastal areas of the country were particularly treacherous in the autumn and winter, which is why the Americans were able to remove suspicion that they were actually planning to invade Morocco from the north because it would have been a suicidal move to do it at that time of year. And in fact, we'll see this dynamic crop up again more than once in the coming Moroccan episodes. But although we all love our ports, there was a lot more going on under the hood. [0:22:45] So as we mentioned, the Moroccan state looked to cultivate institutions for the sake of expanding trade. And to this end, Muhammad III's reign would see the emergence of a class of people called the tujjar al-sultan, which was a class of merchants which was largely Jewish for a number of reasons. First of all, there was the fact that Jews didn't have the same religious restrictions placed upon them as Muslims. But also, there was the fact that many Jews had relatives living abroad who would be invaluable for forming international links. [0:23:19] Right. And you mentioned that the island of Djerba in Eastern North Africa also had a big Jewish community. [0:23:25] Yep, yep, still does. Still does. Still a very active Jewish community. One of the few Jewish communities that weren't totally destroyed after 1948 in the Arab world. But in any case, Jews also had the advantage to the Moroccan state of being a small minority who were often despised by the population writ large, which put them in a very vulnerable position. And this would increase incentives to stay loyal to the Sultan. Yeah, yeah. [0:23:52] And then that's just like in Europe. Like in medieval England under the Normans, the Norman kings were generally somewhat tolerant towards Jews, but many local officials and dukes were not. So this meant, like you said, there was a loyalty to the person at the very top. [0:24:07] Yeah, exactly. And this vulnerability, it meant that these Jews could be screwed over without risking discontent throughout society writ large. This was not really a rationale that was limited to the Jews. There were many other institutions like this. Within Morocco itself, there was the Abid al-Bukhari. [0:24:25] Oh, right, because they were slaves, yeah. So they had like their, they literally had no rights, they had no bargaining power, they would have to stay loyal. [0:24:31] Yeah, yeah. Further out east, there were the Mamluks. In the Ottoman Empire, there were the Janissaries, and so on. This was a very common tactic that stayed around for a very long time for good reason. It was effective. It was cruel, but it was effective. And these international merchants especially needed to be Jewish because Muslims had religious unease with travel into lands that weren't under Muslim rule. This dynamic was far from limited to Morocco itself. So, in Algiers, for example, you had very similar dynamics. Take the case of the fly whisk incident, which provoked the French invasion of Algeria. What had happened there was that France had accrued a large debt to Jewish merchants who had connections to the dey during the Napoleonic Wars, and they were really dragging their feet on repaying it. And the incident just cascaded until some guy got hit on the cheek with a fly whisk, and the rest is history. [0:25:27] Very, very bloody history. [0:25:30] Wow. Well, we're getting a little bit ahead of ourselves here. Sam, I know that can you tell us a little bit about a guy that you mentioned a little bit last week who was the Jewish pirate Samuel Pallache? [0:25:40] So, Samuel Pallache, he wasn't one of the tujjar al-sultan like these guys, but in many ways, he was kind of a precursor to them. He was, again, he was a corsair who was sent as an emissary to the Dutch in the early 17th century for the purpose of conducting an anti-Spanish negotiations as well as to conduct trade. Pallache was likely the subject of Rembrandt's famous Man in Oriental costume painting. [0:26:09] Oh, interesting. I had no idea. [0:26:11] It's that Dutch Sephardic connection. And at one point, he had been an anti-Spanish pirate because, because again, Sephardic Jews had a bit of a sore spot over the way Spain had treated them. [0:26:23] Oh, yeah, understandably. And we should mention, you know, speaking of the Dutch in general, the most feared of all the corsairs was Jan Janszoon, who was also Dutch. He was a Dutch Christian, but still. [0:26:34] Yeah, so all that is to say that this idea of the tujjar al-sultan was Jewish. It was present in Moroccan history before then, but Muhammad III would really systematize it. I have a quote here from a guy named Schroeter from the book In the Sultan's Shadow. These Jewish merchants also initially received reductions or exemptions and customs duties. The Jews in turn would pay back the Sultan in monthly installments to the port authorities. Sometimes, financial arrangements would be made through the agents of the Jewish merchants living in Marrakech, who repaid their debts directly to the ruler. Since loans in accordance with the Sharia had to be paid interest-free, the Sultan would, in effect, receive interest indirectly, through repayment of loans at various exchange rates via Jewish agents at the court, through the collection of duties generated by the commerce of his royal merchants, and through the market taxes that the import and export trade produced. [0:27:26] In order to redress the disequilibrium between foreign and indigenous traders, the government also often gave credit on duties to the Moroccan merchants or exemption from duties for a period of time, about which the European merchants constantly complained. Such a system of trade could well be defined as royal banking, with the royal bank contracting loans and extending credit to all sorts of merchants. Yeah, so again, this is a pretty sophisticated system that's being set up. And again, note that these people were perpetually in the Sultan's debt, which was another benefit of putting all the important trade into their hands. So, because of this, the Jews became a very important element of the Moroccan system of trade, and they allowed for royally sanctioned trade to take place, and which eased the collection of duties and ensured that revenues would flow into the treasury. Often, they had a more or less complete monopoly on the import-export trade. [0:28:20] So, many of them did well for themselves as well. And because of these tujjar al-sultan, the Makhzen was able to create state monopolies, which would remain in place until the 1850s, when the British and the Spanish were finally able to get a free trade treaty with Morocco. But despite the great lengths that Morocco went through at this time to secure financial autonomy, it still wasn't enough to create a revenue base powerful enough to sustain the state in the more modern stance. And to understand that, we have to look at taxes, really. [0:28:52] It's kind of boring, but taxes are very important. They'll tell us. [0:28:57] Well, so I know that in traditional Islamic societies, there was a lot of rules about taxation, right? Like, I know that Islamic scripture has a lot more rules about taxes than anything in Christianity does. [0:29:07] Well, actually, there are very few rules, but there sort of there were ways to get around them. So, according to the Quran and the early Hadith, there were really only supposed to be a handful of taxes that could be levied on civilians. The first of these is one of the pillars of Islam, Zakat. This was the religious tax of 2.5%, which was paid by Muslims. There was also the ushr, which was sort of a 10% flat tax on agricultural produce. In addition, there was the jizya, which was sort of the poll tax for non-Muslims. [0:29:41] That's probably the most famous tax, I feel like, at least in the West, in Islamic societies. [0:29:46] Although in Morocco, there was another tax levied called the Kharaj, which was originally supposed to be a land tax specifically for non-Muslims. But in Morocco, it was often collected under the pretext that the land had to be conquered by the Muslims in the first place, so the inhabitants still needed to pay the tax on the land. That's what I mean about loopholes. They're always finding ways to do it. [0:30:08] Yeah, it's funny. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, so much of religion is all about that, right? Finding ways to fool God. [0:30:14] Yeah, or his representatives on earth. So increasingly, of course, there was a problem because as the complexity of the state grows in modern times, there needs to be a corresponding tax base to keep it going. Otherwise, you'll see quite a bit of stagnation. Just compare what happened in Morocco to what happened in Qing China. At the beginning of the 17th century, you had the Kangxi Emperor, who was one of the greatest emperors of Chinese history. And he was really convinced by the eternal efficacy of his reforms to the point that he made a pledge that taxes would never be raised again. And his successors would keep that promise, which meant that China maintained the exact same tax base that it had at the start of the 17th century, all the way in the 18th century, when the population had tripled in the intervening 150 years. So that goes to show, just no system exists in a vacuum. [0:31:13] There are always going to be new pressures, and you're always going to have to be vigilant to make sure that things stay in running shape. Because if you don't, one day you're just going to wake up and find that things are no longer working. So because the Moroccan tax base was so lacking, there were various attempts made to fill the shortfall. On the one hand, custom duties and corsairing were a preferred method of making up the shortfall, as these were legal per the Islamic Orthodoxy and also didn't piss off the people living in the country. And in fact, in the case of Corsairing, it was also helpful that this maintained the legitimizing principle of the dynasty, jihad against the Christians. So you could always point to these corsairs and say, oh, yeah, yeah, for sure. These guys, they're giving half of everything that they steal to the sultan. [0:32:07] But that's good because it means we're doing jihad against the Christians. We're doing what the dynasty was founded for. [0:32:14] Trust the plan. [0:32:15] But again, a corsairing, it caused a lot of problems. So although it would continue under the reign of Muhammad III, it became less prominent as time goes on, as trade was developed more closely. Although none of the Moroccan sultans would explicitly bar trade with non-Muslims, to trade with non-Muslims in certain goods was kind of legally ambiguous because the reasoning was that if you're trading these goods to the infidels who could in turn use them to wage war on the Muslims, that's bad. But because of this, just Muhammad III understood that there was really no getting around it. There needed to be more taxes. [0:32:58] So to this end, he reintroduced the so-called maks tax, which, maks, it's a very interesting term. It's very much a catch-all term to refer to any kind of taxation that isn't prescribed by Islam explicitly. Miller in the History of Modern Morocco gives some examples, including: quote, people had to pay taxes when making ferry crossing between Rabat and Salé, when they butchered a sheep, or when they used the public scales in the marketplace. So, this encompassed a very wide range of activity. We'll talk a bit later about how tax collection worked in more detail, but essentially to levy taxes at the point of entry of cities, which was much easier than in the normal state of affairs, the normal way that the Moroccan state would gain revenues. But the problem was that, first of all, no one likes taxes, period. But second of all, maks has a very particular connotation in the Arabic language, very pejorative, in fact. C.R. [0:33:56] Pennell cites the following definition from Lane's Arabic-English lexicon, which reads, What the Sultan's guards take wrongfully on occasion of buying and selling. And also quoted is a tradition that the Prophet Muhammad declared that, quote, the takers of maks will not enter paradise. [0:34:16] Man, no one likes taxes. [0:34:19] Yeah, no. But again, maks was not really new. Sultan Ismail had collected maks during his reign despite the opposition of the ulama. Didn't have good relations with the Ismail in the first place for reasons we got into in the previous episode. But it was really fraught because this was not religiously grounded and also because it hit urban dwellers. It doesn't seem nice at all, but hey, this is what it takes to run a modern state. Although this is what is necessary, if people aren't used to it, they're not going to be very happy about it. So, so, and so anger with these maks taxes would cause problems for Morocco towards the end of Muhammad's reign. But in the meantime, let's talk about some of the other things that he did. [0:35:05] So, again, corsairing became much less significant in terms of revenues. Actually, we're going to get to the last gasp of corsairing at the end of this episode. But, more importantly, for nerd stuff, there were finally ministers serving in a semi-official capacity. [0:35:20] Right, this is the bureaucrats we talked about earlier, the new guys who were loyal and dependent on the king, but had powers that had previously belonged to the Sultan. [0:35:31] Yeah, so you had a new class of viziers who, although technically they didn't have formal power, they had a lot of leeway in giving advice to the Sultan. And as they were supposed to be experts in the thing they were doing, this was often much better advice than previously would have been gotten. You had a large range of these ministers introduced. One of them was the Vizier al-Bahr. Vizier of the Sea, literally. But that term came to refer to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. [0:36:03] Yeah, you know, one important foreign affair to mention here is that Morocco had very early relations with the young United States as early as 1777. Interestingly, relationships would, they would eventually formalize relationships pretty early as well in 1786, you know. Before that, there were some issues with an American ship called the Betsy, which was captured by Moroccan pirates. And the way they had resolved this was they would organize kind of a system of tribute paid by the Americans to the Moroccans. But that might kind of come back to bite the entire North African region. [0:36:36] Yeah, but the case of the Betsy is actually quite funny because basically what has happened was that Muhammad III learned about the Declaration of Independence in 1777. And because he was so interested in fostering trade with as many foreign peoples as possible, he instantly proclaimed that Americans were welcome at his port. Although this wasn't really noticed by Washington at the time, they had bigger fish to fry. So, to cut to the chase, after years of trying to make contact with the Americans, with the Americans ignoring them, Morocco just took the Betsy hostage until the Americans would finally notice them. And in this way, they were able to secure their treaty, and Morocco became the first foreign state to sign a treaty with the United States. But there were other very important reforms as well, namely in the domain of religion. [0:37:31] As we mentioned at the top of the episode, Muhammad had a very strong religious education, and so consequently, he was constantly making arguments on Islamic grounds. So, one of the things that he argued was that he was, in fact, allowed to levy the maks because Islam, although it doesn't sanction it, really, it also means that non-Islamic practices should be used if it serves the interests of the Muslims. Very pragmatic turn there. But perhaps more importantly, under his reign, the idea of the Sultan as Imam, as the religious leader, par excellence, was taken much more seriously. So, because of his grounding in religious doctrine, he was even personally revising religious curricula in this period. And since religious institutions were the main educational institutions of Morocco at this time, this was a very big deal. So, Muhammad, he argued that the Sultan was the supreme religious head of Morocco, which really irritated the ulama, these urban notables who had a grounding in Islamic education, from well-connected families for the most part, of course. [0:38:38] But one of the things that he did that really pissed people off was to create state rolls of shurafa, sharifs, the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. And there was a lot of fraud going on with this status at the time because it was both very desirable from the perspective of prestige. Like, oh, I'm descended from the Prophet, I'm hot shit. But also, it came with a lot of benefits, such as tax exemption. So naturally, people were just rushing to falsify their genealogies so that they could say, Yeah, yeah, you know, I'm exempt from taxes because I'm descended from this guy. You might have heard of him, his name is Muhammad. As we mentioned in the previous Morocco episode, a Moroccan Islam, it was really quite orthodox on the surface. [0:39:24] Right, yeah. Going back to like the Almohads, to the Almoravids. [0:39:29] So, on the surface, it was very orthodox, but this was only when it was going through the prism of the urban ulama, who were the ones who were actually writing the kinds of stuff that got preserved for the most part. But in reality, the religion practiced by most people was quite different. [0:39:46] Yeah, in the countryside, especially. [0:39:48] Yeah, the Sufis were very prominent. So, you had a lot of zawiyas, ziwaya, Sufi lodges, basically, which were the center of the faith for most Muslims, especially out in the countryside. And there were different Sufi orders called turuq, tariqa in the singular. And all these orders would have their own lodges. So, the popularity of different orders varied throughout the country, but they were very well ensconced all over it. So, in an attempt to ease internal tensions with regards to his taxation policies, Muhammad invested quite heavily in renovations for these lodges as well as mosques. But unfortunately for Muhammad, this would not be enough. All good things must come to an end, and ultimately, some people got really big for their britches and decided that, hey, why not rebellion? [0:40:43] Ah, it's a classic theme in Moroccan history, isn't it? [0:40:46] So, the move away from an absolutist state on the model of Ismail, it certainly helped to calm tensions at the beginning of Muhammad's reign. But despite this, there were nevertheless attempts to revolt. As we mentioned previously, Muhammad would once again have to crush the Abid al-Bukhari. Why did he have to do that, you ask? Well, it was because this army made one last play at the throne in 1775. Just as they had replaced Muhammad's father Abdullah with Muhammad, they tried to do the same to Muhammad himself by replacing him with his son Yazid. The revolt began while Muhammad and Yazid were away in Marrakesh, and once news reached them that the Abid al-Bukhari were getting restive, Muhammad sent Yazid off, who was then about 25 years old, to go to Rabat and deal with the guards. But rather than put them down, Yazid decided, hey, yeah, maybe I should be Sultan. [0:41:45] And he would go on to lead the Abid al-Bukhari to the treasury and the armory and just let them take whatever treasure and weapons they wanted. [0:41:55] Man. [0:41:57] He attempted to get various tribes on his side, but they just really weren't having it. So, although the situation might sound bad for Muhammad, he had much better relations with the nomadic levies, the Jayush. So, Yazid and his Abid al-Bukhari were unable to get the support that they needed to impose their will over the rest of Moroccan society. So, shortly after this, Yazid would be defeated in battle by his father's levies and he would seek refuge in a zawiyah until he was granted a pardon by his father. Basically, because zawiyas they had a similar system in place called hurm, which is basically like this idea of sanctuary. [0:42:41] Like, if someone is in a certain place, you're not allowed to remove them by force. Churches in Europe also often had this kind of rule. Yeah, it's like this right of sanctuary, yeah. [0:42:52] So, for whatever reason, Muhammad, he just had a soft spot for Yazid. He was really a softie compared to his grandfather, but unfortunately, this mistake would come to bite him in the ass because Yazid, he was just the very restive type of fellow. So, all was really not well in Morocco. Many people were completely incensed with the attempts to expand the tax base, and Yazid, Muhammad's son, again, he was an opportunist and he saw that he could use this discontent to levy his own power. So, because of his son's behavior, the final decade or so of Muhammad's reign would be marred with a return to the kind of chaos that he had worked so hard to prevent. [0:43:43] But let's talk about Yazid. Who was Yazid? [0:43:45] Yeah, who was this guy? [0:43:47] Well, first of all, rather interestingly enough, it seems like he might have been born to an Irish mother. So, Yazid, he would be involved in governance from a very early age, but unfortunately for his father, this experience would not serve to Muhammad's benefit. So, Yazid, again, he just kept launching rebellion after rebellion. In fact, this case with the Abid al-Bukhari wasn't even the first. The first happened all the way back in 1768 when Yazid allied with the notables of some Berber tribes to take power. Although this rebellion was shortly broken, he was quite persistent. After another rebellion, Yazid again took sanctuary in Azawiya, from whence he would continue to foment rebellions because his father just refused to violate the sanctity of the refuge to arrest him. But ultimately, Yazid got bored with the state of affairs. He went off to the east for a couple of years before returning in 1789 and getting back into the game. [0:44:48] And this time, Muhammad was finally fed up with his son's antics to the point where he began to besiege Yazid's forces. But unfortunately for Muhammad, he would die in April 1790, just as this siege was ongoing. And this would put an end to the siege as well as give Yazid an opportunity to come through, to come to the throne in a legal manner. And this will come back up shortly. But while he was over in the east, Yazid picked up a few things. While some of us might go to places and come back with, I went to X and all I got was this lousy t-shirt, Yazid, he wasn't into those kinds of tourist trinkets or souvenirs. He decided he was going to dream on a bigger scale. He was going to bring an ideology back to Morocco. And this was the ideology of Wahhabism. [0:45:40] Yeah, yeah, because Wahhab was probably just, he was in the 18th century, right? And well, if anyone's not familiar, Wahhabism is the most hardline, in common parlance, you could say, most radical conservative form of Sunni Islam. During the Bush years, you'd often hear stuff like, oh, Islam needs a reformation. They desperately need a reformation. But unfortunately, Wahhabism was the reformation. Well, yeah, so yeah, so tell us more about Yazid himself. So what did this new Wahhabism, how did it inform his government? What was his government like in general? How was he different from his dad? [0:46:12] Well, he was quite different. First of all, he was very much of an opportunist. And as I mentioned, he was able to rally a number of interest groups which were quite unhappy with many of the ways that his father had been doing things. Maks was the biggest point of discontent writ large, but the urban ulama were also very unhappy with the fact that they suddenly had to prove that they actually were descendants of the Prophet rather than just making such claims. So he also got their backing. But to add the cherry on top, Yazid accused his father of having abandoned the jihad, which again was one of the legitimizing points of the Alawi dynasty. And by the way, this wasn't true at all. As we saw, Muhammad III, he would take almost all of the remaining European enclaves that remained at Morocco's borders. But his failure was that he just wasn't able to take Ceuta and Melilla. [0:47:10] Although he did try to take Melilla in 1774, the siege would ultimately be fruitless because his army just wasn't up to task. In response to this, he would go on to say that, quote, Ceuta is the heart of Islam, but only a crazy man or a fool would consider attacking it. Nothing will come of this except for the disgrace of Islam. So basically, he was recognizing the limits of Moroccan power at that point, and to some people that just translated to capitulation. But the kicker here was that Yazid, he also tried to, you know, resume the jihad, and this time he'll do it proper because he's a good Muslim, unlike his father. But, wow, surprise, surprise. Yazid just didn't have enough forces to militarily dislodge the Spanish from Ceuta, although he tried to besiege them in 1791. But the power that he did have, it was good enough for one thing, namely to catalyze the disintegration of Moroccan authority. [0:48:10] So when his father died in April 1792, he took the throne, not without contestation, but his reign would be very brief. He would only rule until 1792. [0:48:21] Wait, this is the same. So he had a one-year reign. [0:48:23] Yeah, one and a half-ish. [0:48:25] Yeah. But hey, bringing over Wahhabism is a pretty big change in just two years. [0:48:29] Yeah, so he was basically able to maintain control of the cities, but many urban centers as well as the countryside just were out of his grasps. And we're going to get into that in a second, that kind of urban role distinction. [0:48:44] But Yazid has a rather prominent distinction under his belt. He was not a fan of the Jews, as it turned out. He had many prominent court Jews executed, and he encouraged people to plunder the Jewish quarters across Morocco, the mellahs. [0:49:02] And that's an awful contrast with his father, right? All these people who basically invited here to live in the country, and then as soon as the son takes over, nope. To me, it seems like he was just really playing to popular prejudice because many people in Moroccan society just weren't big fans of the Jews in general. And I gotta wonder the fact that, you know, the Wahhabism might have been part of it too. If he suddenly was instilled with this new religious fervor, I would assume that the Jewish community was probably the most prominent non-Muslim community. They'd be easy targets. [0:49:30] Oh, absolutely. So here's a quote from a contemporary historian named Muhammad Ad-Du'ayev. He wrote that, quote, and he, that is the Sultan, ordered that the Jews be plundered wherever they may be found, and in every mellah, in every town of Morocco, because he, may God save him, hated Jews and Christians. [0:49:51] And I know you dug up another quote contemporary that's even more terribly illustrative. [0:49:57] So yeah, Muhammad here says, They fell upon the Jewish women and took their virginities, and they did not leave a single one of them. They plundered whatever was on them and left their naked corpses as a lesson to those to take warning. They destroyed the roofs of their houses, excavated them, and went down into the wells. They mistakenly did this even to some houses of neighboring Muslims. It was a tremendous event. Yeah, here he's talking about what happened in the city of Tetouan. Again, right up by the coast, founded by refugees from Muslim Spain, many of whom would have been Jews. But although the events in Tetouan were particularly graphic, Jews in Morocco writ large just didn't fare well. In fact, I even found some testimony saying that a number of Jews had even been crucified. [0:50:43] Whoa! In the 18th century, it's wild. [0:50:46] Yazid, he spent much of his short reign when he wasn't messing with the Jews, attempting to put the genie back in the bottle, but it really wasn't any use. Aside from his own brothers who were trying to take the throne, he also had to deal with a lot more ground-up resistance because there were a lot of tribes who just weren't a big fan of him. So he died very unexpectedly in January of 1792. Yeah, just two years after, yeah. Yeah, he would be succeeded by his brother Suleiman, but rebellions would continue for many years to come. [0:51:19] So who was his brother? [0:51:20] Yeah, so his brother was again named Suleiman. He would reign Morocco from 1792 to 1822. And upon Yazid's death, Suleiman was one of Muhammad's many sons who were vying for the throne. It would take him six years to really consolidate his rule, but even then, it was constantly put under strain by tribes chafing under state rule, as well as various other interest groups. So Suleiman's rule from the very beginning was on very tenuous ground, and so he did not seek to reimpose the taxes which had been abolished by his brother. But Suleiman did have one major success. He was able to expel Ottoman forces from Oujda, all the way in the east of Morocco, which had been captured a couple of years before in the course of the chaos. And Morocco really lucked out there because if the Ottomans had remained in place, the area likely would have fallen into French hands just a few decades later. [0:52:17] Oh, right, yeah, because Ottoman territories became Algeria, which became French Algeria. Yes, exactly. And returning to the Jews, Suleiman, he would formalize the practice of confining Jewish residences in large coastal towns to these mellahs, these special Jewish quarters, or ghettos, for lack of a better term. This was already the case in inland cities, more established cities like Fez and Marrakesh, but he extended this to the newer cities, which were built as hubs of trade with Europe. He would also create a number of new restrictions on Jews, such as mandating that they couldn't wear European clothing. They had to wear like special Jewish clothing that designated their status as Jews. [0:53:02] That happened in Europe too, famously in the Middle Ages. Like, you know, if you're trying to be racist against someone, you have to know who you're being racist against. [0:53:08] But it seems like this wasn't particularly well enforced because, again, the state in Morocco just had seen better days. [0:53:16] But where Suleiman really stands out is in the realm of Islam. As we mentioned, his brother Yazid had caught the Wahhabism bug when he was over in Arabia. And so there's Wasawizer General. [0:53:29] So under Suleiman, there's a continual turn toward intolerance, I guess? [0:53:34] I mean, I wouldn't frame it primarily in terms of intolerance, but Wahhabism, it really began to play a stronger role in Morocco in Suleiman's reign. And this would be marked by very naked hostility towards certain Sufi orders, turuq. Although this wouldn't be all of them, as Suleiman was himself a Nasiri, who were sort of these like very austere Sufis. In fact. [0:54:05] So yeah, so they were hardline enough that those guys were okay because he was part of them. [0:54:09] Yeah, which really goes to show that although you often hear about Wahhabism being fundamentally incompatible with Sufism, this wasn't necessarily the case. Suleiman was a Nasiri, and some other lodges would continue to exist in Morocco as well. But there was a much larger problem at play here, other than unorthodox beliefs. And the problem here was that the Sufi brotherhoods would be at odds with the state-centric idea of Islam. The idea that the Sultan is also the Imam, the head of the Islamic community, and the head theologian. So to this end, Laroui writes that many turuq were sent away from Morocco itself into areas outside of the state, such as Oranie in what is today Algeria and West Africa. And in fact, these Sufi lodges, which had been asked to move to West Africa, would play a very important role in the Islamification of West Africa, which was largely a late 18th, early 19th century phenomenon. [0:55:17] But there was also a problem on the domestic fronts because although some Zawiyas were allowed to remain in Morocco, Suleiman really wanted to have the ability to appoint their heads, which was again the state exercising control over a powerful interest group in a way that they weren't amenable to at all. But aside from purely practical matters of power, a Suleiman under Wahhabi influence had problems with Islam as it was being practiced because basically he thought that the stagnation of his country and perhaps other Muslim countries was the result of these innovations or bidah introduced into Islamic practice after the life of the Prophet. So, by staying true to a puritanical interpretation of what Islam was supposed to be through the prism of what it supposedly was during the time of the Prophet, by just following these precepts, greatness could be restored because God would be happy and you would finally have this ideal Islamic society built along the lines that God wanted. [0:56:28] So, quoting from Pennell's Morocco from Empire to Independence, quote: In 1811 and 1812, Suleiman condemned religious dancing, the use of music and ritual, pilgrimages to the tombs of marabouts, and other forms of popular religion. In fact, he would go so far as to remove the dome from his own father's tomb because he thought it was too ornamental. [0:56:51] That is austere. And also, I think we have to mention, you know, that like religious dancing, at least in the Western imagination, is like totally synonymous with Sufism. [0:56:58] Yeah, yeah, there was a very strong association there for a reason. But despite the fact that Suleiman was Mr. Islam himself, Mr. Wahhabiyah, jihad wasn't part of his program. In fact, in 1817, after the conclusion of the First Barbary War, he would abolish the Corsairing fleet that remained and sold the ships that had been used for that to Algiers. So ultimately, Suleiman's hostility to many of the zawiyas incensed rebellion from many rural sectors because, again, this was the religion of the common people, of the rural population. So, combined with his continuation of Muhammad III's policy in trying to validate Sharifian ancestry. [0:57:45] Like, yeah, ancestry from the Quran. [0:57:46] From Muhammad, yes. He just managed to piss off enough people that it was ultimately his undoing. [0:57:53] And I think we'll have to, I think we're not going to get to his undoing until the next episode. But before we, we've some, we have a lot of stuff, kind of bigger picture stuff now. [0:58:01] And before we take a break, can you give us like kind of a little bit about Suleiman's trade policies? Because I know that in your interpretation, Sam, a really important part of the story of early modern Morocco are the ways that Morocco was or was not able to keep up with their Western competitors in the world of trade and economics. [0:58:20] So Suleiman wasn't quite his father in this regard. He was much less keen on trade. And I've found contradictory explanations for this. Some say that this was because of religious beliefs. But on the other hand, it could also be plausibly argued that a bigger culprit here was the Napoleonic Wars clamping down on commerce in the area. So Suleiman, he wouldn't kick out European merchants, although he did invite them to leave and many of them would take him up on this offer. But really, from what I found, either scenario could plausibly make sense. Many people were really unhappy with the presence of Europeans in Moroccan cities, and there was a lot of discontent with grain exports, which was really a constant theme. So perhaps maybe he thought that it was to his advantage to adopt a sort of siege mentality and focus on internal affairs so he could put Morocco on a strong enough footing to better deal with the outside world. [0:59:26] But regardless of his reasoning, trade was never really fully abolished, as I mentioned. And in fact, Suleiman was particularly interested in maintaining the import of European weapons, as Morocco just didn't have the capacity to create arms of the same caliber as contemporary Europeans. But this was, again, this was for internal reasons, to make sure that there was enough weaponry and good weaponry to keep Morocco under control in the face of all these rebelling interest groups. So, in Suleiman's schema, he thought that he'd be able to get all the revenue he really needed by sticking to the same internal taxes that were sanctioned by the Sharia. And again, that's what God prescribed. So, basically, if it's good enough for God, it's good enough for us. We just have to get it downright. But this was really a problem because tribes weren't really keen on paying taxes, period. [1:00:25] It didn't matter to them whether they were Quranically sanctioned or not. So, it seemed to work for a while, but the entire system really spiraled out of control in the final years of Suleiman's reign. When there were a number of natural disasters, famine was once again on the menu, unfortunately. But unfortunately for Suleiman, he was unable to really do anything about the structure, so the tax regime was kept in place, which was a massive burden on the countryside. And eventually, many disparate elements within Moroccan society, who Suleiman had alienated over the course of his kind of bumbling rule, would finally succeed in deposing him. [1:01:09] His army would finally be crushed by rebellious zawiya forces and various allied tribesmen in 1822. And although he was defeated in battle, he was totally unharmed because, again, the body of the Sultan is sacred. And revolt in Morocco was usually framed in the terms of, oh, well, you know, the Tsar is good, but his advisors, they lead him astray and they cause all these problems. [1:01:33] Yeah, of course, yeah, yeah. [1:01:34] So, Suleiman, he would be released unharmed after only a couple of short days, but this was the end of his reign, really. He abdicated in favor of his nephew Abd al-Rahman, who would rule until 1859 and whose tenure would see an unprecedented level of European activity. [1:01:51] Right. So, we'll have to wait until next episode to get into Abd al-Rahman, but this episode is not done yet. We'll take a quick break right now, and then Russian Sam, you can tell us all about the internal factors that led to this kind of instability. The divisions in Moroccan society, the beginnings of foreign intervention, and possibly most disastrously, the role of famine in Morocco. [1:02:22] So, let's continue. We're going to be talking about Moroccan agriculture first and foremost. And let me tell you, when I started reading this stuff, I didn't think I would be that interested in agriculture because, I mean, I'm a city slicker. I don't know anything about this stuff. [1:02:36] Yeah, you're no hayseed. [1:02:37] But it is interesting. Just for context, before we begin, Moroccan urbanization rates were pretty low at this time, somewhere between 5 to 10% at the turn of the century, which, of course, means that the overwhelming majority of the population was rural. [1:02:54] Right, and this was at the start of the 19th century, which was the exact same time when the West was really rapidly industrializing. England in 1800 was already about 30% urbanized. France was lagging behind a little bit at 22%, but that's way higher than Morocco. [1:03:10] Yeah, the only, funnily enough, in Western country that had an urbanization rate equivalent to Morocco at this time, as far as we could tell, was in fact the United States, whose leading exports were cotton and tobacco, which was mostly grown through slave labor. [1:03:27] And of course, you know, it's kind of odd to think about now, but enslaved people were overwhelmingly rural in the USA. So a huge chunk of the population was basically forced into, you know, not being able to urbanize. So it's a very interesting situation here. [1:03:40] Yeah, exactly. And again, there are parallels to Moroccan society. I mean, how Morocco even had sugar plantations at the turn of the 18th century. So these two countries have a lot in common in ways that generally aren't thought about. But in any way, Morocco has a massive problem on its hands from a geographical perspective. And that being that its climate is just really bad for getting consistent yields, which is a problem if you're trying to build a modern state because you need consistency in agriculture so that there can be smooth operations from one year to the next. [1:04:22] Right. But you know, some of our very astute listeners might realize that it wasn't necessarily always like this in North Africa because about 2,000 years before the start of the 19th century, Morocco had actually been the breadbasket of the entire Roman Empire. You know, a lot of research lately has shown that the end of grain shipments from Morocco and Algeria into Italy was actually a huge part of the downfall of the Roman Empire and the eventual de-urbanization of Italy after the fall of the Western Empire. So I guess the big question is, why exactly was that no longer the case by the 19th century? Why was Morocco no longer able to sustain such consistent agricultural yields? [1:05:06] And Europeans certainly had that question, and they came up with some rather interesting answers. So when France went into Algeria and North Africa writ large, they of course decided that they were going to blame the status quo on the Arabs specifically, because per the conventional thinking of the time, the water flow in these regions remained constant, which means that the onus was really on the pastoralists, that is the Arab pastoralists living in the region, for clearing the land and turning what had once been lush farmland and forests into desert. As the story goes, the pastoralists really burned down the forest and destroyed the shrubs through overgrazing and deliberately desertifying the region because it would be easier to move their flocks that way. If I could just jump in here for a second, that kind of reminds me of how in a lot of discussions about the much earlier aridification of the Sahara, a lot of traditional discourse, you know, basically has blamed ancient pastoralists, the ancestors of modern North Africans, for overgrazing the Sahara during the Green Sahara period. [1:06:17] But recently, climatologists no longer think that was really the case and that human activity might have some kind of a role, but really broader climatic forces were the bigger reason why 4,000 years ago, the Sahara began to aridify. And I think that it might be a similar case here, right, Sam? That you started seeing these various natural forces across Morocco and Algeria that meant that it no longer could be the breadbasket that it had been under the Romans. [1:06:45] Oh, yeah, yeah, we'll get to that. But first, let's talk about where this idea comes from. In fact, the Europeans weren't the ones who came up with the idea. The 14th-century historian slash sociologist slash all-around polymath, Ibn Khaldun. [1:07:04] Yeah, we mentioned him before. [1:07:05] Yeah, he referred to the migrating Hilal tribes of the 11th centuries as swarms of locusts who, quote, ruined gardens and cut down all the trees. And again, the Europeans were just looking at these throwaway references and taking it at face value that this is what the situation must be. And again, it's very convenient that you can suddenly point your finger at this group of people who currently inhabit the region whom you could say don't really deserve to have total control over the land. [1:07:38] Yeah, and if I could just add this a little bit more context here, you know, ironically, even Khaldun himself was an Arab. You know, he was an Arabic-speaking North African of distant peninsular origin. And I also think that the fact that, on one hand, that alone means that he wasn't saying like the Arabs did this. You know, he wasn't blaming all Arabic speakers. And I think the other thing that might be relevant here is that by the time European colonialism would really begin in earnest in North Africa, from what I understand, there is a big desire to separate the Arabic-speaking and Berber-speaking segments of the population. And so I also wonder if another ulterior motive could be, you know, by blaming medieval Arabs for this supposed agricultural destruction, they could potentially, you know, turn these two sides of Moroccan society and Algerian society against each other. [1:08:28] Yeah, so for colonizers, as I mentioned, this narrative of Arab destruction of farmland had the advantage of not only reprimanding the local population for their poor management of the land and highlighting the need for foreign intervention, but it also meant that resources allocated to improve agriculture needed to go to the settlers and not to the native population who are, you know, undeserving and incapable per their own history. So laws allowed for the expropriation of lands from natives under the pretext that preventing deforestation needed to be done, which wasn't really a problem anymore, really. But I mean, it's just interesting how all of these discursive modes really operate in the service of colonial aims. [1:09:15] So one of the books that I looked into for this specific topic is Diana Davis's Resurrecting the Granary of Rome, which really covers the history of this stuff in great detail. Davis argues that the deforestation of North Africa was really a process that began thousands of years before the Romans even. [1:09:36] Right, during the end of the Green Sahara period that we talked about. [1:09:39] And in fact, Davis argues that the Roman-intensive agricultural techniques in fact contributed to the depletion of the land, while pastoralism gave the soil time to recover by the time that Europeans got back to North Africa in the 19th century and started to do all kinds of agricultural shenanigans over there. And as we discussed in episode 33 on the crisis of the third century, the aridity of all of these places increased during this period for reasons that really had little to do with human activity. Long before the Arabs got there, long before anything untoward was going on there, just weather patterns were shifting such that these climes were no longer as conducive to agriculture as they had been before. Yeah, Davis writes, Morocco has the highest rate of forest cover over the Maghreb and is usually considered the most severely deforested historically of the three countries of that region. [1:10:36] The pollen core data published to date shows that since the appearance of trees in the mountains of Morocco between 3,000 and 8,500 years ago, there have been fluctuations in the tree cover, including some deforestation in a few areas, but not in others. Overall, the samples show no definitive overall pattern of massive deforestation on the order frequently claimed 50 to 85 percent over the last 2,000 years. Yeah, and data from Algeria and Tunisia largely tell the same story, according to Davis. Right. Like, so trees were chopped down, but she writes, none of the colonial estimates took natural regrowth of arboreal vegetation into account when making evaluations of North African forests. Estimates of deforestation implied a somehow permanent loss of the trees believed necessary for civilization. [1:11:22] That's just really funny that they're acting like once you chop a tree down, like that's the end of it. [1:11:27] Oh, yeah, no, absolutely. Especially because, you know, like, think how much tree clearing happened all across Europe. You know, like, most of the old-growth forests in Western Europe, especially in Britain and France, were basically destroyed, you know, in this time. There's only a handful of forests left in England at all, and only a handful in France as well, I believe. [1:11:44] Yeah, yeah. The Europeans were chopping down wood like nobody else's business for all kinds of reasons, but for some reason, it's North Africans who are defective for doing it. But in any case, this isn't to say that North Africa isn't well suited to agriculture. So for example, the northwestern plains of Morocco are really famously lush. There's a lot of variability in rainfall in the country, ranging from an average of 2,000 millimeters per year in the northern Rif to 50 to 100 millimeters in the south. So there's quite a bit of range. But there's a lot of range even within those ranges. And just it's very difficult to get a consistent yield in these climates. Like, just for reference, even the French who were employing the most modern agricultural techniques then available in the 1880s had really variable results. Per hectare wheat yields could average from 500 kilograms of wheat in 1876, declining down to 200 in 1877, back up to 550 in 1884, and then down to less than 400 in 1888. [1:12:59] It's just very difficult stuff, and they didn't give Moroccans the credit that was due to them. They were just looking at the status quo that was quite destructive. [1:13:09] Yeah, and think another really unfortunate factor here is that not only is it very hard to get consistent grain yields out of North African soil, but the fact that it's such an overwhelmingly agricultural population means that a lot more people were needed to produce enough food. So it was a lot harder for them to urbanize than it was for somewhere like England where agriculture was more productive. [1:13:31] Yeah, and to put the cherry on top, really, Morocco was very, very vulnerable to famine. There was a plague slash famine under Muhammad III, which lasted from 1776 to 1782, which saw the population of Morocco go from somewhere around 5 million to somewhere around 3 million. And that wasn't even the worst of the famines, frankly. Famine could have a large number of reasons. It could just be drought. It could be locusts who are endemic to the region and are really quite partial to the stuff that we grow for ourselves. These conditions would persist for a very, very long time. Just for reference, there's this Moroccan novel called For Bread Alone by Mohamed Choukri. Here are the opening lines of that novel. For reference's sake, the author was born in 1935, and this is very much autobiographical. In the late 30s, early 40s, this was still the state of affairs. [1:14:34] Surrounded by the other boys of the neighborhood, I stand crying. My uncle is dead. Some of them are crying too. I know that this is not the same kind of crying as when I hurt myself, when a plaything is snatched away. Later on, I began to see that many people cried. That was at the time of the Great Exodus from the Rif. There had been no rain, and as a result, there was nothing to eat. One afternoon, I couldn't stop crying. I was hungry. I sucked my fingers so much that the idea of doing it again made me sick to my stomach. My mother kept telling me, Be quiet. Tomorrow, we're leaving for Tangier. There's all the bread you want there. You won't be crying for bread anymore once we get to Tangier. My little brother, Abdel Qader, was too sick to cry. Look at your little brother, she told me. [1:15:16] See how he is. Why can't you be like him? I stare at his pallid face and sunken eyes, and I stopped crying. But after a few moments, I forget to be inspired by his silence, and I begin to cry once more. When my father came in, I was sobbing and repeating the word bread over and over. Bread, bread, bread, bread. He began to slap me and kick me, saying, shut up, shut up. If you're hungry, eat your mother's heart. I felt myself lifted into the air and he went on kicking me until his legs were too tired. [1:15:46] Yeah, it's a very heavy read, by the way, just so you know before you get into it. But yeah, this was something that continued to be a problem even when Morocco was under European protectorates. And yeah, it was just very difficult. Even right now, they're having quite a bit of difficulty, even though something like 40% of their population is engaged in agriculture. Yeah, not 95%. [1:16:18] I also think that, you know, the fact that the Europeans were totally unable, and I would guess, made little effort to stop these famines. That's some great, you know, classic hubris, right? Like, they blame the Moroccans for not being able to feed themselves and all that for supposedly destroying the great agricultural systems of the Romans. But then as soon as they get there, they make no effort to fix that supposed problem. And instead, these problems persist under, you know, European authority. [1:16:42] Yeah, yeah, absolutely. It really wasn't just famine that was killing people. There was also a big problem with plague coming around every couple of years. [1:16:52] Yeah, well, hey, remember, you know, the famous Camus book, The Plague, is set in Morocco, I believe, Morocco and Algeria. [1:16:57] Yep, exactly. So there was a plague epidemic in 1799 slash 1800, which is thought to have reduced the population of the country by half. One English eyewitness wrote, quote, the living did not even have time to bury the dead. In this case, it was kind of a net positive for survivors just because of how cheap everything became. [1:17:19] Right, just like after the Black Death in Europe. [1:17:22] Exactly, but this was very much a self-reinforcing cycle. Plague meant that there would be fewer working hands to cultivate the land, which meant that agricultural yields became more vulnerable, and it was just a self-perpetuating cycle. And this inability to produce an agricultural surplus meant that resources didn't exist to build up Moroccan infrastructure in a way that needed to be done. So regular internal unrest also meant that what infrastructure did exist was often quite damaged. So Morocco was in severe need of roads and irrigation canals, but the state just didn't have the means to really make that happen. We saw that under the reign of Mawlay Ismail, there was a very autocratic style of rule with harsh rule of law and crushing any potential alternative power bases, which allowed for internal disorder to be minimized. And it meant that there was more of an ability to create sufficient agricultural surplus to stockpile so that in the following years when this is a problem, there would be enough on hand to keep people from going hungry. [1:18:38] And in fact, it did work. There were no famines recorded during the reign of Ismail. [1:18:44] That's funny. It's kind of like a little early 19th century Stalinism, you know? These like harsh reforms meant to suppose, hopefully, end famines for good. Although, I guess in this case, you know, there was another famine in the 30s, so it wasn't a permanent solution by any means. [1:19:00] Yeah, yeah, it just was very difficult to keep a lid on things for long enough to create the conditions that would allow for famine to not become a fact of life every decade or so. Ismail, he was very much someone who centered power in his own hands, and that meant that things would be in running order. But of course, the problem with autocracy is that sooner or later the autarch dies, and that's sort of when things happen to fall apart. We saw that with Ismail, we saw that many times in Moroccan history. There was also the problem that what surplus did exist in agriculture would largely be parasitized by the court and notables as more time went on and as suddenly there was a larger European presence at the ports within true trade. [1:19:53] Yeah, yeah. Yeah, and I've done some readings so far about later 19th century Morocco, and that was just an enormous issue. There was just so much graft on a level that's not even comprehendable today, both by these European advisors and by local Moroccan courtiers. [1:20:08] I know that after Ismail in 1825, there was another famine, and this one, I guess, really drained the coffers because they had to import grain from abroad. And so this is 1825. In previous decades, it was almost impossible to import foreign grain because of the European blockades during the Napoleonic Wars. Suddenly, now, you know, the wars had ended. It was, you know, peace in Europe. It was easier to trade with Europe, but that now meant that the ability to trade with Europe led to this huge economic crisis because they wanted to buy so much grain. [1:20:38] Yeah, and as a result of this crisis, Morocco would say for one last time, Lord, forgive me, but it's about to go back to the old me. So they tried to corsair just one more time, just one more job. So in 1826, an Austrian ship had the misfortune of being attacked. But this was no longer the 17th century. [1:21:05] Right, right. And we'll get into why at the end of this episode, why it was no longer the 17th century anymore when it came to piracy. [1:21:11] Yeah, so the Austrians retaliated by burning Moroccan ships in the port of Larache. And that was the point when the Moroccan state finally decided that Corsairing had outlived its usefulness. [1:21:24] So if they couldn't make money from piracy, how was the Moroccan Sultanate able to, you know, raise funds at all? [1:21:31] Yeah, so as we mentioned previously, taxes and the ability to create them or lack thereof was really one of the main points of analysis for writings on Moroccan society. And before we go further, I just want to go on a little tangent, which may seem irrelevant at first. Maps, maps, we stare at them, we love them. I think probably many of our listeners probably spend many hours of their lives playing map-based video games. But on serious note, maps of states really carried with them a very specific set of assumptions that tend to go unquestioned just because we're so used to them. The main one being the idea that you have these delineated borders which show areas where the state has absolute control. And this is often untrue even now in a time when we have much better administrative technology. Whereas in former times, like the state was just totally limited in its abilities. [1:22:29] Like, we often hear about autocracy. Hell, we just talked about autocracy in the context of Morocco during the reign of Ismail. But again, and by our own standards, it's likely that Ismail would probably have something like the equivalent of maybe a school board getting resources from the taxpayers. So let's just look at one example, a spicy one. Let's look at Taiwan right now. The PRC, People's Republic of China, mainland China, considers the island of Taiwan to be a province in revolt, whereas the Republic of China, which is the government of Taiwan, on the other hand, de jure, although thankfully no longer de facto, considers mainland China to be its territory. [1:23:17] Right, and I believe they also have territorial claims on parts of India, parts of Russia, and all of Mongolia. Everyone knows that, you know, Taiwan is never going to retake mainland China, but it's still part of their political culture. And I guess I assume on some Taiwanese maps, they still include mainland China and Mongolia. [1:23:37] Oh, yeah. Yeah, for sure. So if you look at a PRC map of China, you'll see that Taiwan is a part of China. And vice versa, if you look at an ROC map, well, for older maps, for sure, at least. So it's very easy to take this at face value and ignore the actual facts on the ground. In reality, Beijing doesn't actually have control over Taiwan, and Taiwan especially doesn't have control over the mainland. So all that is really to say that the state had very tenuous control over much of what can be considered its territory. And this goes like a hundred times over for the period that we're talking about now. [1:24:22] And so when you look at a map of Morocco, you're looking at this, you know, country about the size of California, covering all kinds of climates, all kinds of people, very diverse in many ways. But when Europeans first started looking at Morocco in a more scientific way, they spoke of this rough division between these two ideals. You had the Bilad al-Makhzen, the land of the Makhzen or treasury slash state, and you had the Bilad al-Siba, which literally means the land of dissidents or land of revolt. So the Bilad al-Makhzen, as the name implies, refers to the places where the state was in control and could extract taxes without exerting itself too much. So these were mostly the cities and the surrounding countryside, as well as rich agricultural lands, because that kind of stuff isn't really movable wealth. It's not like a pack of camels. You can't just pack up and take all of your agricultural produce and land to another place. [1:25:29] It doesn't work like that. Whereas the Bilad al-Siba, it was the total opposite. These territories were firmly in the control of various tribes who acted autonomously for the most part. It was usually located in mountainous regions because the lowlands were much more easily accessible. And when Europeans looked at Morocco, that's what they saw. And there is something to this dynamic, but there need to be major caveats before this perspective is adopted wholesale. The way the Europeans saw it, the Bilad al-Siba wasn't really Morocco proper because the people didn't really have allegiance to the central state, which isn't really true. But before I continue, I just want to add that Europeans didn't invent either of these concepts. They already existed. In fact, the idea of the Bilad al-Siba goes all the way back to the 11th century, and it refers to the idea that the people in the countryside, they're living in a state of jahiliyyah or ignorance of Islamic law or the Sharia, which is why it's the land of dissidents in the first place. [1:26:42] So this concept had some grounding in the history of the region. [1:26:47] This term was used mostly in Spain and North Africa. But in any case, because the state had such tenuous control over these areas, taxes had to be collected through an overwhelming show of force. So that meant that the Sultan was regularly on the move between the different capitals of the country. He would have a large army called a mahalla, which would move between the four imperial capitals with him, as well as using those capitals as a staging ground to go into the different outlying areas. So the function of these visits was to collect back taxes as well as to appoint local government representatives. As we mentioned previously, under Muhammad III, the modern iteration of Rabat, which is the current capital of Morocco, was built up. So with that, you had the fourth imperial capital, and the Sultan was really constantly moving between these cities with his retinue for these purposes. [1:27:55] Each of these imperial capitals was situated such that most of the country could be visited with potential backup not so far away. Right, I guess that's why, you know, Tangier, which would become a very important port, but that's all the way at the tip of Morocco, it would never be an effective capital. So the four main cities here would be Fez, Meknes, Rabat, and Marrakech. And if you look at a map of Morocco, you'll see that you can sort of like draw a path from Fez to Meknes, to Rabat to Marrakech, and then back to Fez. And that's roughly how these mahallas and sultans would travel. Just did a constant circuit. [1:28:38] It kind of reminds me in medieval Europe a few centuries earlier, there was this constant kind of expectation that the king was supposed to be mobile. And it sounds like it's kind of a similar thing here, that because there weren't strong enough permanent government institutions, the king physically often had to be present in the various parts of the kingdom to maintain control and authority. [1:28:58] Yes, exactly. And so in areas that had more state control, the sultan was able to rely on a specific class of notables with long-standing direct ties to the state to exercise control over these areas as the crown's representatives. Whereas in more tribal areas, it was much more of a bottom-up process. So, because you're well respected within your tribe, you could be selected as crown representative of your people. So, yeah, it was very variable, and it would take some time for more modern forms of state building to come up in this country. But as you can see, although these tribes weren't particularly excited to pay taxes, as we mentioned in the previous Morocco episode, the Sultan was recognized as a religious figure, even if his sovereignty wasn't 100% accepted by everyone. As we mentioned the last time, the Sultan had baraka, which is sort of a blessing of his physical body slash charisma. [1:30:06] So, his very body was considered sacred, and this was added to by the fact that he was a Sharif or a descendant of the Prophet. So, even in cases when the Sultan's mahalla and local tribes came to blows because the tribes didn't want to pay taxes or some other dispute, there was great care taken to make sure that the Sultan wouldn't be placed in harm's way physically. [1:30:34] Yeah, because if the body itself is blessed, then you know it's like it's a pretty big deal if the body gets damaged. [1:30:39] And to continue to talk about the Bilad al-Siba, Bilad al-Makhzen. [1:30:44] Right, which again, just to remind the audience, it's the concept of the land of rebellion, essentially, and the land of the treasury. [1:30:50] Yeah, so when Europeans got there and they saw like the cities, that's the Bilad al-Makhzen, countryside, that's the Bilad al-Siba, and that's the end of that, but it really didn't work like that. These boundaries weren't set in stone by any stretch of the imagination. So, so areas that were under crown control in one year could be in a state of revolt the next, and vice versa. And even in the case of a revolt, that didn't translate to a total severing of connections between the Bilad al-Makhzen and Bilad al-Siba. These people still had to live together, and these relations just never really ceased to exist. In his book, Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco, Edmund Burke III wrote, quote, There was in fact a wide variety of kinds of relations which tribes could have with the Makhzen, from full-fledged acceptance of government rule to the exchange of letters, the periodic sending of embassies to court, the supply of troops at moments of external threat, and the occasional contribution of gifts at principal Muslim festivals. [1:31:59] So in conclusion, there's again something to the distinction, but it's not as rigid as it was made to seem. But because of the way that Moroccan society was framed, this axis of the Bilad al-Makhzen versus the Bilad al-Siba would often overshadow other very interesting dynamics within Moroccan society. [1:32:24] We'll get to the biggest one of these shortly, but let's consider the north-south divide, which isn't something that you often hear about, even though it's persistent in many different countries around the world. [1:32:36] Right, so you mentioned that, like, I think that most of the capital cities of Morocco, I believe, would probably be considered in the south, right? Because they're quite far from somewhere like Tangier in the north. [1:32:46] No, not exactly. So, like, the city of Fez, it would be considered to be squarely in the north, whereas Marrakech would have been very squarely the south. But as we've hopefully made clear, Morocco had a very long history of involvement with the Iberian Peninsula. So, because of that, the north of the country would have consistently been much more Andalusi in its orientation and culture for centuries because there was the constant flow of people back and forth while parts of the peninsula remained in Muslim hands. [1:33:21] Right, and as we mentioned, you know, even before the Islamic period, and in our first episode of Morocco, there was a long history of contact across the Straits of Gibraltar. But unfortunately, with the Reconquista in 1492, there would be a massive outflow of Muslims from Iberia into Morocco itself. Right, and actually, and I remember just if anyone heard our episode on the Barbary Corsairs, in the case of the city of Salé, even a century after the Reconquista, once you started seeing ex-Muslims being expelled as well, you suddenly had Moroccan cities like Salé doubling in population overnight because this was a really massive migration of Iberians into Morocco. [1:34:01] Yeah, and these Iberians, they would leave a very strong mark in the north of the country. So, for example, you have the city of Tetouan today, whose current iteration was founded by exiles from the kingdom of Granada. And I say re-founded because the city had existed before then, but it was razed by the Spanish and Portuguese some decades before it was refounded. There were other cities like Rabat, Tangier, Chefchaouen, etc., that became home to many people from the peninsula. [1:34:34] Yeah, you actually, this reminds me, Sam, a while back you told me personally that you read about some guy, I believe his last name was Bargaz, B-A-R-G-A-Z, which is almost definitely the Arabic spelling of the Spanish name Vargas. [1:34:48] Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, one of the signatories of a treaty in the 1880s between Morocco and Spain had the surname Bargash, from Vargas, of course. [1:34:58] Right, right. Yeah, so I guess hey, the legacy of Andalusia, you know, survives today in Morocco. [1:35:03] Yeah, so the traditional northern capital of Fez, it would be very heavily influenced by these Andalusis. And of course, these people, they had been exiled from their homeland where they'd been living for hundreds of years. And naturally, this didn't give them warm feelings for Europe. So the north in Morocco was in fact much more hostile to Europe than the south. But despite the fact that they were quite hostile to political powers of Europe, they held on to many aspects of Andalusian culture, which would become quite important in the near future. [1:35:41] Some great foreshadowing there. [1:35:43] But on the other hand, you also had the south, naturally. And that part of the country was much closer both physically and economically and culturally to the Saharan world. [1:35:53] Right, yeah, countries like Mali and Mauritania, which had been linked in their own way to Morocco for also thousands of years. [1:36:00] Yeah, and they didn't have the same hard feelings towards Europe as their more northern neighbors because their history was quite different. And this zone was really represented by the southern capital of Marrakech. And again, just a caveat, like I'm laying out this distinction, but you should note that the Bilad al-Makhzen and the Bilad al-Siba shouldn't be taken too literally. Neither should this be taken too literally. It's a very rough schema that really sheds quite some dynamics on Moroccan society, but which isn't supposed to be taken at face value. [1:36:38] Right. [1:36:39] And I think that brings us now to another, probably the most important division in Moroccan society, which is also very problematic, is also has been exaggerated, you know, in its salience by Europeans and also leads to a lot of interesting ramifications today. [1:36:56] Yeah, we're talking, of course, the Arabs and Berbers. [1:36:59] Right. So we've talked all about this in multiple episodes now. You know, so obviously the Berber peoples are or were at one time the Berber-speaking indigenous inhabitants of North Africa. They have their own storied history with interactions with many of the various peoples of the Mediterranean and all across Africa. But then after the Islamic period, you know, the introduction of this new Arabic-speaking ruling class, you saw a slow shift towards an Arabic-speaking political body and eventually, at least by the dawn of the 20th century, sort of a political identity of Arabness. And to what extent this political identity of Arabness included the entire population of Morocco, regardless of linguistic origins, was a huge burning question in the colonial era, was a huge burning question in the 1960s during the pan-Arabist movements, and remains a pretty important question about Moroccan society today. [1:37:55] Yeah, let's rewind quite a bit to talk about the Berbers themselves. And the Berbers, they're people who lived throughout North Africa prior to Arab, Roman, or even Punic encroachments. That much isn't disputed. But note that I said people, not the people. Because the fact of the matter is that you really cannot speak of a singular Berber people, period. There are really dozens of different Berber ethnicities who speak mutually unintelligible languages, which are related, but so distantly related that these people can't really speak to each other in the same language anymore. They have very different lifestyles, which could range from the nomadic desert dwellers like the Tuareg, all the way to the agricultural pastoralist mountain people, like the Kabyles in Algeria. But within Morocco itself, there are approximately three different Berber languages with many sub-dialects in each of them. I mean, I guess all of that was a long-winded way of saying that Berber is a designation given to an out-group. [1:39:04] So we could really compare perhaps the way the Arabs grouped all rural peoples under this rubric of Berbers to the way the Romans just initially spoke singularly of the Keltoi or the Germani. [1:39:17] Yeah, no, yeah, exactly. And again, we should mention that, you know, the word Berber itself, probably no coincidence, it comes from the Greek and Roman word for, you know, barbarian. So this is an exonym applied, I think, first by the Arabs, you know, who, as far as I can tell, weren't super interested initially in identifying the distinctions between the indigenous peoples of North Africa. They were all barbarians. [1:39:41] Yeah, but nevertheless, it's really indisputable that the people who would come to be called Berbers are ancient. And I'm going to underline and bold ancient. [1:39:51] Yeah, we're talking a time scale of many thousands of years, not centuries. So their various Berber languages appear to have split up from each other centuries, millennia before languages like, you know, Romance languages or Germanic languages or Slavic languages. [1:40:07] Yeah, so these are Afro-Asiatic languages. They're related to languages like Somali, Egyptian, and Semitic languages. [1:40:16] Yeah, and again, very distantly related on a time scale of thousands of years, a greater time scale than between any surviving European languages. [1:40:24] Yeah, so the Berbers, or people who we would call Berbers, show up in the written record very early. The Egyptians had quite extensive relations with the so-called Meshwesh, who live in what is today Libya. And in fact, there were even Meshwesh kings in Egypt from the 11th to the 8th centuries before the Common Era. Yeah, and so because of the Egyptian written record and later contact with Semitic-speaking peoples and with the Greeks, we know that the Meshwesh would have spoken some kind of a Berber language. So that goes to show that Berbers could be found from Egypt all the way to the Canary Islands and as far south as what is today Mali. We went over Berber history in very broad strokes in an earlier episode, but just to recap, the Berbers faced discrimination on account of not having an Arab lineage in the 8th century, and the course of events in what became Morocco were such that Morocco wouldn't be ruled by an outside power until the 20th century. [1:41:28] But just because they weren't militarily conquered doesn't mean that Arabization didn't happen. Arabization made sense, a lot of sense for Morocco from both the geographical and political point of view. [1:41:41] Right, because to point toward an Arab heritage in an Islamic society would basically show that you are closer to the tribes of the Quran, that you are holier than the people next door. [1:41:51] Yeah, and Arabic isn't just the language of Islam, but it's also the language of high culture and literature around the region. [1:42:00] Yeah, yeah. And we should mention that in the Middle Ages, you had this similar kind of cultural and linguistic interest in Arabness and the Arabic language all across much of Africa, much of the Saharan world, and including parts of tropical West Africa. Like places like, I believe, northern Nigeria, you had people claiming an Arab heritage. But the difference, for whatever reason, was that in Morocco, eventually you started seeing Arabic shift from being the language of liturgy and the language of politics to actually being the spoken language for the vast majority of the people, particularly the Moroccan high culture, the court culture. [1:42:39] Yeah, so the court culture, it became Arabized over time, and that trickled down to some extent. But again, this wasn't really a matter of mass migration. There was the large invasion of the Banu Hilal tribal confederation of North Africa, which happened in the 11th century. But that was the last large-scale influx of people into North Africa. [1:43:03] Right. We talked about in our episodes on Sicily, even when you had Berber-speaking dynasties taking power across North Africa, it was common that after a few centuries, they themselves would adopt an Arabic language and culture, even if they didn't necessarily have that at the time of their initial seizure of power. [1:43:22] It deserves to be said that to a very large extent within Morocco, the Arab-Berber divide is really an urban-rural divide, first and foremost. And in fact, if you look at ancestry itself, I found this very interesting. Self-identified Berbers in Morocco, on average, have more Arabian ancestry than self-identified Arabs. [1:43:43] Yeah, that's very funny. It's not about heritage really at all. It's about what part of your heritage do you claim? That's really what this is. [1:43:50] Yeah, just people who love to make up lineages for themselves, just to sound prestigious, but you know, a lot of that is bullshit. [1:43:58] And I think this happens so often, where like these supposedly ethnic distinctions, when you look closely at them, they are really more than anything cultural and political. And that different people have different reasons for valuing one part of their heritage over another. You know, there might be, if you speak a Berber language as your first language and you're very proud of that, you're probably more likely to call yourself a Berber. But whereas I also understand that there are some people who speak Arabic as their first language, but they themselves identify as Berbers also. And I would bet that if you look centuries prior, when there was less Arabic spoken in Morocco, you probably had a lot of Berber speakers calling themselves Arabs, because that could point to this real or imagined peninsular Arab identity. [1:44:43] But just going back to the fact that self-identified Berbers have more Arab ancestry, this actually makes a lot of sense when you consider it from the perspective of Moroccan dynastic history. What was going on is that you had these consecutive waves of Berber tribal confederations creating their own states. First, you had the Madrasids, then you had the Almohads, then you had the Al-Moravids, and so on and so forth. And all of these people were the hinterland Berber origin people who, when they took power, became more culturally Arabized. Meanwhile, the Buko, the people who came in with the Banu Hilal Confederation, they would retain their Bedouin customs and would continue to live right next door to various Berber tribes, which facilitated mixing to a large extent. [1:45:33] Yeah, yeah. And you know, I also, a big thing here is that so these distinctions between Arabs and Berbers, or at least the imagination of a sharp division between these two cultures within Moroccan society, this would really be enforced really for the first time from what I understand. It would really become essentially a legal separation due to French colonialism in Algeria. And that's a little bit outside of the scope of this episode, but I think this kind of, you know, explains why this distinction that was very messy and not necessarily any distinction at all in some places and in some times in pre-colonial North Africa became a big distinction. And I have to wonder, Sam, if part of this is because the French, especially, they were really interested in this political distinction between the Bilad al-Siba and the Bilad al-Makhzen. And I wonder if, because they were so interested in that political distinction, they thought that they could elevate it or something by mapping this ethnic distinction or even a racial distinction onto that as well. [1:46:33] Oh, yeah, yeah. There was absolutely a racial element here because a lot of the tribes, like the Kabyles, with whom the French would be coming into contact, they would be quite pale. Sometimes they even had blonde hair or blue eyes. And the French took this to mean that, oh, you know, these guys, they're descendants of crusaders who all the way in Morocco, yeah, yeah. Yeah, so so these are our fraternal people, and so they should be held in higher regard. [1:47:03] And I think also in a kind of a more practical level, also, if they could sow a division within these two aspects of Moroccan society, then groups like the Kabyles, these Berber tribes, could be potential allies of the French against the Arab ruling class. [1:47:18] Yes, exactly. But we have quite a long way to go before we get to that stage of imperial shenanigans. [1:47:25] We're going to have to start right back from the beginning. The beginning of Western incursions in North Africa. [1:47:31] Because, you know, so we talked about in our last episode in the ways that the Portuguese and the Spanish had attempted to impose themselves in North Africa, but had mostly been beaten back. And we talked about how in this episode, the only remaining Iberian holdouts would be the two cities of Ceuta and Melilla, which are still in Spanish hands today. But then, just a few decades after the Iberians had been kicked out, basically, there is a second, totally different wave of European and broadly Western intervention. And that starts kind of in a surprising way. [1:48:07] Yeah, and in fact, we're going to start right back at the beginning, at the first war that in North Africa that most Americans have heard of. That would be the Barbary Wars. [1:48:19] Yes, so yeah. [1:48:20] So the Barbary Wars, obviously, this connects back to our previous episode on Corsairs. This kind of shows how corsairing in the Mediterranean, which, you know, began with the Barbarossa brothers in the 15th century, would basically, it would start to decline in the 18th century, but it really would persist until the beginning of the 19th century. We mentioned that the very last gasp would have been that one failed state-sanctioned Moroccan, you know, corsairing voyage in the 1820s. But what really caused the end of the Barbary piracy, which had plagued the European coastline for so long, was this surprising intervention by the very young U.S. Navy and most famously, the U.S. Marines. So, to set the stage here, American merchants were always quite active, not only in the Atlantic, but also in the Mediterranean. New England was a really big hub for trade and manufacture as early as the colonial era. [1:49:15] So, a lot of American sailors were active already in the old world by the time of the Revolution. So, in 1781, when the U.S. is formally recognized as an independent country, you already have a lot of American merchants in the areas where corsairs are active. And the corsairs realized that although these American merchants spoke English, they flew a different flag and they were no longer English subjects, which meant these American sailors were no longer under the protection of the feared Royal Navy. [1:49:47] So, Morocco in the 18th century, it really lacked the influence to reign in piracy. [1:49:53] Including, yeah, including piracy of American ships. And worst offenders for American ships, at least, would be corsairs operating out of ports like Algiers and Tunis and Tripoli. Right. So, these aren't in Morocco proper, but they're right next door. They have very strong trade and oftentimes political relations. And I think there was some kind of an expectation that, as the biggest kingdom in the region, and as the co-religionists, that the Moroccans, I think they had some kind of expectation that they should be able to clamp down on this piracy, but they were totally unable at this point. There was no strong Moroccan navy at all in the 18th century. [1:50:30] Yeah, not at all. So, from 1784 to 1786, there were several U.S. ships that would be captured by Barbary pirates flying under various flags. George Washington would send rival statesmen John Adams and Thomas Jefferson to London to negotiate with these pirates. And on the advice of the Spanish, who had dealt with Barbary piracy themselves for around 300 years at this point, the U.S. was able to organize a deal to buy these pirates off. John Adams convinced Washington that this was the ideal scenario because it would ensure that American travelers could make their way safely across North Africa and create a future diplomatic channel with local governments that could lead to trade benefits in the future. [1:51:17] Right. Remember, it wasn't John Adams alone going on this delegation. He was with Jefferson, who was very unhappy because he saw this arrangement as not a pragmatic solution to a difficult problem, but instead surrender to a hostile government. And I think it probably didn't help that he believed this hostile government was also fundamentally less civilized than his own, you know, Western American nation. [1:51:40] Yeah, so when John Adams became president after Washington in 1796, Jefferson was very excited to point out the burgeoning cost of this so-called Barbary tributes, which in some years could take up to 20% of the U.S. federal budget. But what really hurt John Adams ultimately was the political cost of this. Jefferson was able to mount the first political opposition campaign in American history, largely on the issue of Adams' supposed weakness in the face of Barbary piracy. [1:52:10] Right. And so 1801, you have two really big events happening that are totally related to this. First is that Jefferson beats John Adams and is ushered in in the first real transfer of power in U.S. history. They call it now the Revolution of 1801, because you had a complete turnover in government. And the new Congress that came in with Jefferson authorized the creation of, for the first time, a fleet of frigates to be officered and manned as the President of the United States may direct. Really, essentially, you know, the first real American Navy. [1:52:43] Yeah, so only a couple of months into his first term, Jefferson was able to rebuff the Pasha of Tripoli, who had asked for his customary annual payment. As Jefferson had refused, the Pasha ordered that the American flagpole be chopped down at the harbor, which signaled to American merchants that they were no longer welcome in Tripoli and was in effect a declaration of war. [1:53:06] Right. And then in the May of that year, the new American fleet sailed into the Mediterranean to see what's up. They dock at the port of Messina in Sicily, which at the time was part of Naples. And through negotiations with the Neapolitans, they figure that, you know what, we're going to war. And so usually this would be a pretty big deal, right? So America is a young nation. Only a few years ago, its independence is recognized. And now it's imposing itself in the affairs of the Mediterranean, you know, right in the waters of Spain and France and all these important nations. So it's kind of interesting, Sam, that the European powers didn't really make any effort to intervene here, but there's an obvious reason why that was, right? [1:53:52] Yeah, this would have been a time of great war. Naples was itself in a state of war with France at the time. [1:54:00] Right, because this was in the middle of the Napoleonic Wars. So I kind of wonder if this was probably a deliberate calculation. You know, Europe and France have their hands tied. This is a good time to strike. In addition, the U.S. and France had a very tricky relationship at this time because this came immediately after this period called the Quasi-War, which was when some arguments over repayments over revolutionary war loans led to U.S. and French sailors attacking each other on the high seas. And so there's this previous conflict in the Atlantic, which had sort of resolved itself, but there's still a lot of lingering bad feeling. And that meant that the Neapolitans, they were able to advise and even provide aid to the Americans due to goodwill thanks to their shared animosity toward France. So King Ferdinand of Naples helps outfit the U.S. to essentially lead a war against Tripoli, against the Tripolitanians. [1:54:54] And they begin their blockade, and to their surprise, they actually see that in 1801, there were already a few other ships blockading the harbor of Tripoli, but they actually were Swedish ships because, you know, we mentioned that Denmark and Sweden had been plagued by piracy a lot in these decades. So there was already an ongoing, totally coincidental Swedish blockade of Tripoli, which is, I think, a very funny, very fortunate coincidence for the Americans, because this meant that they had a lot of these sudden, unexpected allies that they could join toward their flotilla. [1:55:27] So these two small navies they recognized that they weren't powerful enough to attack the city of Tripoli directly, but that they would be able to starve out the local corsairs by maintaining this blockade until the locals became weak or desperate enough to accept a settlement. So, from 1801 to 1803, you had a small flotilla of both Swedish and American ships blockading Tripoli's multiple harbors and destroying or commandeering all local Tripolitanian ships that were within their sight. So, Jefferson immediately ordered the construction of new American ships to be sent to North Africa to continue this war immediately after they were commissioned. [1:56:09] Right, and then in 1803, one of these new ships called the USS Philadelphia had a very unfortunate maiden voyage because very shortly after getting to Tripoli, you know, and joining this blockade, it runs aground on an uncharted coral reef a couple miles off the coast of Tripoli. And so the crew spends all day trying to get off the reef, but then they realize there's no way. Their ship is stuck. They're going to have to call for help and evacuate. The ship is lost. That alone is a huge economic disaster. But as they, as day turns to night, as it starts to get dark out, they see something even worse on the horizon. They see a small squad of local Tripolitanian boats coming out to capture them and to capture their boat. This would be a potentially huge strategic blow because if the Tripolitanians could get this ship, they would suddenly have a navy of their own, if only a small one. [1:57:07] So the captain of this ship ordered it to be destroyed before the Tripolitanians could get there. They dumped as many of the cannons overboard as they could, and then they set the ship on fire. They tried to get off the ship on rowboats, but the Tripolitanians beat them there. Before they get off the ship, they were captured. And so the entire crew of the USS Philadelphia was taken prisoner. And potentially worse, from the perspective of the American government, the Philadelphia was captured. The Tripolitanians managed to put out the fire, they brought it back to Tripoli, and they repaired it, turning it into their own flagship of their own navy. [1:57:47] So the blockade that the Americans and Swedes were up to, it continued for several more months, and Americans became increasingly restless about the captured man of the Philadelphia. So in 1804, there was an attempt to attack the city of Tripoli directly. That was a total disaster. An American vessel packed with explosives and intended to be used as a fire ship was sent out, but the Tripolitanians shot it with coastal defenses before it could reach them, and the ship just exploded while the crew was still on board, which resulted in dozens of casualties. [1:58:22] Yeah, yeah. So that was a pretty awful blunder by the part of the Americans. [1:58:27] But, you know, one other thing would happen around that time that would end up being a huge victory, especially in a moral sense, because they would launch another bold attack, a little bit less of a foolhardy attack, to get the USS Philadelphia back. And this was done by a young officer that some other listeners might have heard of. They'll certainly know his last name, especially if they're from the Midwest, because this new mission to recover the Philadelphia, or at least to destroy the Philadelphia, was led by the 25-year-old Stephen Decatur, the youngest captain, I believe, ever in the U.S. Navy. So Decatur thought they could essentially fight fire with fire by capturing a Tripolitanian ship and, you know, doing away with the crew and manning it with American sailors disguised as local North Africans. They sailed this ship up into the harbor of Tripoli, and they weren't strong enough to take the city by force, but they were able to identify the Philadelphia. [1:59:27] So without getting off the boat, this delegation of U.S. sailors sidled up to the side of the Philadelphia, got in. There was a very brief naval battle in which I believe all of the Tripolitanian crew were killed. And then Stephen Decatur managed to light the ship on fire. This all happened at night. And so by the time the Pasha of Tripoli woke the next morning, he saw that the great ship, the Philadelphia, that they had captured, was burning and exploding in their harbor. And this immediately turned Stephen Decatur into basically the first war hero of the post-Revolutionary War period and launched a really important political career for this guy. [2:00:08] Yeah, and in addition to Decatur, there was a fellow by the name of William Eaton. [2:00:14] Right. A very different kind of figure. [2:00:16] Yeah, he was of the newly formed United States Marines, and he traveled to the front to organize an assault at the start of 1805. [2:00:25] Right, right. Because by 1805, so the war has gone on for four years now, and not very successfully, you know, because they've already lost one major ship. Another ship, you know, blew up in that failed firebomb attack. And the American prisoners, including the crew of the Philadelphia, are still held captive. And like we mentioned, the American public is getting restless. So Eaton, just like Decatur, had his own bold idea. While Decatur led this naval attack on the port, William Eaton decided they had to attack by land. Problem is, it's really hard to, you know, launch a land invasion of such a far-off place. There wasn't really enough of an American military at this time. So Eaton realized if they wanted to do any kind of land attack on Tripoli, the soldiers they were using were not going to be Americans. So something I never learned, never realized until I was doing research for this episode earlier this week is that the army that was used in the Barbary Wars was not actually Americans at all. [2:01:25] Most of the leadership was Americans, and some of the troops, a few of the troops were Americans, but overwhelmingly, these were Egyptians, including, interestingly, a lot of ethnic Greek Egyptians who were recruited from Egypt, which had very recently also been at war with France, to join this mercenary army against the Tripolitanians. So William Eaton goes to Alexandria and gets together an army of a few hundred mercenaries and tells them, okay, I don't have any money, but if you join this war, if you help me plunder across Tripolitania, you can take whatever plunder you want, and that will be your prize. And these guys say, okay, I'll take it. Let's go to war against Tripoli. [2:02:06] Yeah, and there was also another element that you failed to mention here, Liam. Ultimately, they decided that they wanted to get rid of the leader of Tripoli. And as it turned out, he had overthrown his brother to get to power a couple of years before that. So they tracked down this brother who had been living in Egypt and they offered to put him back on the throne. [2:02:28] Right, yeah. Because yeah, the the American ally was Hamet Karamanli, this you know Turkish governor essentially of of Tripolitania, who had been deposed by his brother Yusuf Karamanli. And so yeah, now you have this guy, they the just like just like how the French were able to take advantage of this pre-existing social division within Morocco, the Americans took advantage of this political fight between these two brothers, the two Karamanli brothers. And so they had they they told, yeah, they told Hamet that they would be able to restore him back to the throne if you know he joined them. [2:03:01] Yeah, so at the start of 1805, they they gathered an army which was overwhelmingly made up of Egyptian mercenaries and marched from Alexandria all over all the way to Tripoli. This journey would take 50 days, lasting from February to April. And although the local Egyptian forces were unpaid, they had been promised to receive their fair share of plunder once they reached Tripoli. So as the march continued onwards and rations grew thin, many of these local soldiers suddenly found that they were restless and decided that a better use of their time would be to mutiny against the Americans. So just as this unstable army seemed to be at its breaking point, Eaton and his soldiers came upon the city of Derna, which is today in eastern Libya, which had a small garrison of Tripolitanian soldiers. [2:03:51] Yeah, and so he realized this city, Derna, this might be his army's salvation, right? Because they say an army marches on its stomach. These guys were getting out of running out of food. But this town, presumably, would be full of food. So Eaton takes his mercenary army up to the gates of the city and says, Hey, we're the Americans. Give us some food. And what do the defenders of Derna say? My head or yours. Great response, yeah. [2:04:18] And so that this leads to the first shooting conflict on land of the Barbary Wars. And I believe this is going to be the first land engagement of the American military ever. You know, the first one after the Revolution, at least on foreign soil. So they prepare for battle. They managed to contact a nearby American ship who floated over a cannon that these mercenary soldiers could use to blast apart the walls of Derna. They managed to get a couple shots out, but then just a few hours after they began using this cannon, some idiot in the mercenary army left the ramrod in the cannon. And so when they tried to fire it, it ended up somehow destroying this expensive cannon, probably, you know, cracking in half or whatever, which is kind of funny. So they realized that the only way they'd be able to defeat the city, the garrison of Derna, would be an old-fashioned cavalry charge. [2:05:13] And that's what Eaton does. So Eaton leads his army directly into the city, attacking the defenses. During the attack, he's shot in the hand and pretty badly injured, I believe. I think that he might have very nearly lost his hand due to this. But, you know, they managed to get inside the city, and before they know it, you know, the troops, who I believe are partially led by Hamet himself, you know, the evicted pasha, they managed to seize all the major buildings in Derna and they hoist the American flag over the governor's mansion, which is this famous event. You know, you hear about the shores of Tripoli and the Marines hymn. They're talking about the Battle of Derna right here. [2:05:56] So how many Americans were actually involved in this military operation, period, just out of curiosity? [2:06:03] It was eight. Eight Americans and 500 Egyptians. [2:06:07] Yeah, sounds like an Egyptian victory then. [2:06:10] Yeah, no, right? Yeah. And what's kind of funny is that of the eight Americans, two of them were killed, and three of them, including the commander, William Eaton, were wounded, which is, you know, not a great batting average, I don't think. And then, yeah, but Eaton, he was a pretty bold guy, probably too bold for his own good, because he wasn't daunted by these terrible casualties because they managed to capture the city. So that's a dub, you're right. That's a win. But then very soon after the battle, an actual Tripolitanian army rides toward Derna, you know, and it's not great odds, but there's one little difference here. They had one cannon before, which they immediately had shattered. But now, as they've gotten into the city, they've found the armory. They have a whole barricade. They have a whole battery of cannons that the people of Derna had previously been pointing at American ships. [2:07:03] Now they realize they can point these cannons toward Tripoli. So any approaching Tripolitanian army would be blasted apart by their own artillery before they could do anything. You know, it's kind of like how in World War II, the Maginot line was totally subverted by, you know, the Germans getting around it. So next thing they know, all the guns of the Maginot line are pointing toward Paris. All the guns of the Derna battery are pointing toward Tripoli. [2:07:28] So at this point, the Tripolitanians see what's up, and they're afraid that the capital might become the next target. So by May, they began to talk with the Americans. They had peace negotiations to end the blockade and defuse any chances of a full-on invasion. The captured soldiers of the Philadelphia were ransomed, and consequently, no invasion of Tripoli ever happened. Yeah, interestingly, actually, you know, despite the whole idea of like that tribute was bad, they ended up making a new set of annual payments, which was a big issue of contention. Jefferson wasn't super happy about that because he was against any supposed tribute before, but the person who was especially upset about this was William Eaton. William Eaton had been one of the main proponents for the invasion. He was totally convinced that the city had to be controlled by the United States to clamp down on piracy. [2:08:26] Right, and the city again being Tripoli, which is a much bigger city to capture than Derna. You know, it's a real city. You know, Derna is just like a large town. [2:08:33] And when Eaton learned that Thomas Jefferson was planning to continue the tribute payments, he just lost it totally. Because to him, like, this is what the whole war was about, right? Like, this is just more tribute again. And so even though he had been pretty close with Jefferson before, Eaton suddenly totally turned on this guy and he was, you know, with full of spite and feeling presumably pretty impotent and not being able to get what he wanted, he goes back to America just furious at the government that he was working for. And not only was he mad at Jefferson, but he really resented the fact that the much younger and more handsome Stephen Decatur gobbled up all of the glory that he thought should have been his. [2:09:15] Wow, he sounds like a real hater. [2:09:17] Eaton would come back to America and complain that he never got a sword, a medal, a tract of land, or simply a resolution of thanks, which actually wasn't true at all. Because as soon as he got back to America, he was given 10,000 acres of land in Maine. But, you know, to William Eaton, that wasn't enough because he wanted all the attention that Decatur was getting. You know, it's a classic, you know, classic political resentment. You see this in Nixon. You see this in Andrew Johnson. It's, you know, it's resentment and spite motivating politics more than anything else. [2:09:47] Yeah, and we were talking earlier and you compared this guy to MacArthur. [2:09:52] Yeah, yeah, yeah, I think that's a good comparison. Yeah, like yeah, Douglas MacArthur or yeah, Curtis LeMay, just these like these military men who don't get everything they want and they try to meddle in domestic politics out of spite because that's what Eaton does. Even though he had been very close to Jefferson, he starts getting involved with the Federalists, the opponents of Jefferson's party. But really, he had no political motivation here. He just wanted to hurt Jefferson and Decatur, who he saw as his enemies. So as a result, William Eaton was very eager to make friends with anybody on bad terms with Decatur and Jefferson, the men who had wronged him. [2:10:28] One of the men who he quickly became friends with, who was probably the most notorious hater of Jefferson of all, was a former vice president named Aaron Burr. [2:10:38] Yeah, so notice we said former vice president. Burr was the former vice president because in 1804, he famously killed his rival, Alexander Hamilton, in a duel and was forced to vacate his post to escape murder charges. [2:10:54] Right. So yeah, he just goes as a fugitive between the houses of various potential allies. Anyone he knows also hates Jefferson or Hamilton, you know. And so he spends a lot of time in the West at the time, which would have been like the Appalachians, in the South and places like Alabama, just moving between these remote country estates of people who he thinks might be potentially sympathetic, who might want to hear him out. Eventually, he comes to the Maine territories of William Eaton, who is presumably, you know, living out in the woods in this large, but probably pretty wild tract of land, the far northern frontier of the country. And so Eaton, he thought, was a great potential ally because of his military experience. And so Burr tells Eaton that he's going to recruit them for a plan that'll be the comeback of the century. You know what Aaron Burr's plan was, right, Sam? [2:11:46] I'm sure it wasn't to make up with Jefferson. [2:11:48] His plan was to invade Mexico, install himself as the new Mexican emperor, and then, once he's successfully taken control of Mexico, invade the U.S. and join the two countries together under his dictatorship in what he was convinced would be this new guided democracy of the entire American continent. [2:12:09] Did this guy have Nathan Fielder as an advisor? [2:12:13] He might as well have. So yeah, so Eaton would claim later on that Burr actually wanted him to lead the new Marines that he was going to build, right? Because he led the Marines in Tripoli. Now he could lead the Marines in America. And that Burr specifically said to him, Eaton, with your Marines, we can capture Stephen Decatur, turn Congress neck and heels out of door, assassinate the president, seize on the Treasury Navy, and establish a new energetic government. [2:12:40] Well, you can certainly say that he was ahead of his time. He had some bold ideas. But unfortunately, Eaton was a little too spooked by this, although he was trying to be a Jefferson hater. On that date, he discovered that his hate was but minuscule compared to some other people. [2:13:02] Well, it's funny. Yeah, so he reported the plan, but so he goes to Jefferson, you know, who he probably, and he probably had some reservations about this, right? Like he didn't want to, I bet he didn't want to report Burr to Jefferson, but even though he was this, you know, spiteful asshole, at the end of the day, he didn't want Aaron Burr trying to invade the United States. So he goes to his enemy Jefferson and says, Listen, man, I know you don't like me, but you got to hear me out. I just heard something crazy. And he tells Jefferson Aaron Burr's apparent plan. What's also kind of funny is that even though this is like a pretty huge plan, Eaton's solution was very tainted by his own Jefferson hatred because what he told Jefferson to do was actually instead of trying to track down Aaron Burr and bring him to justice, Eaton's plan was, you should drop all charges against Aaron Burr, so then he'll stop being so angry and then he won't try to invade us. [2:13:54] And then Jefferson said, yeah, I think I'll, I think, thanks, but no, thanks. So instead, Jefferson gets some bounty hunters and on with Eaton's information, they're able to track Aaron Burr down to someone's farm in Alabama, which was the very edge of American society this time. And as a reward for his tip, Eaton was given $10,000. And in 2022, money, that is a quarter million. So a really big reward. [2:14:20] You think that he'd be happy with this, right? But no, he wasn't happy with 10,000 acres and he wasn't happy with this huge monetary award. He's still a hater. And ultimately, this huge reward would sort of be his undoing, or not really, not his undoing so much. It would be a big mistake on everyone's part. Because during the trial that would ensue, the treason trial, which was going to come before the murder trial. It was, Burr's defense argued that Eaton had been paid by Jefferson to bring false charges of treason against Burr. And they used this huge cash payment, this reward, as evidence of that. I don't think this is true. I think that Eaton was most likely telling the truth because there was corroborating evidence that Burr had tried to foment this revolt. But in any case, this was a really shocking revelation. in the middle of the trial. [2:15:14] It was like the Perry Mason moment for Burr's defense lawyers. And pretty amazingly, in no small part due to this supposed bribe, all charges ended up being dropped against Aaron Burr, including the murder charge of Alexander Hamilton. Burr would end up fleeing the country, but Eaton, he would stay in the US, but he really would never be in the public eye for any good reasons again. Because, you know, he was seen as kind of a venal asshole for the money he'd taken. And to make matters worse, after he came into the public eye, they opened the books on Eaton, and they discovered that a decade before this, he had been court-martialed for some kind of abuse against another soldier. So he was a guy, you know, with a violent temperament and who was a well-known hater. And both of these becoming public totally destroyed Eaton's reputation. [2:16:08] And so he had an unhappy final retirement up in the woodlands of Maine and Massachusetts. [2:16:14] Yeah, that's quite a life story, but let's make our way back to North Africa for a bit. [2:16:20] Right, that's enough about Eaton and Burr. Yeah, yeah, because this is really, yeah, this is a Morocco series, not an America series. So what really matters here is that the Barbary War was this huge defeat, obviously, of North African piracy, but in a broader sense, of North African politics as a whole. It was an embarrassment of these older North African governments by this upstart American Western government. And it also, for Morocco, showed that no North African government would be as capable of containing piracy as this faraway new American power. And so, really, more than anything, this invasion in 1801 to 1805 would be the first death knell, I would say, of Islamic piracy in the Mediterranean, because the very last pirate fleet would be just 20 years later in that embarrassing attempt by the Moroccans in 1825. There would be a second invasion of North Africa by the valiant Stephen Decatur in 1815, which would pretty much end piracy for good, in that it would invade Algeria, which was the last remaining Corsair port, completely end any payments of tribute, and basically destroy any political influence of the Barbary states. [2:17:32] Yeah, and as you dug up, Liam, the King of Naples ordered a celebration of the U.S. Navy and Marines for their conduct in North Africa quite a bit. And Decatur's conduct was so renowned in Europe that Horatio Nelson, the British admiral, called Decatur's capture of the Philadelphia, quote, the most bold and daring act of the age, supposedly. [2:17:58] Right, but yeah, yeah. We say supposedly, because we should mention that, I believe historians now think that Decatur might have actually made up that praise by Nelson, which is kind of funny, which makes me think that maybe, yeah, maybe Eaton was not so wrong that Decatur was also a venal glory hound, just like him. [2:18:17] Yeah, and another interesting reaction to American conduct in the region, the Pope at the time, Pius VII, said, quote, the United States, though in its infancy, has done more to humble and humiliate the anti-Christian barbarians on the African coast in one night than all the European states had done in a long period of time. [2:18:40] Right, although very unfortunately for the people of the African coast themselves, the Europeans would be back in North Africa very soon. And that's kind of where we're going to end this week's show pointing towards next week. You know, because last week we talked all about the first period of European arrival with the conquistadors. Next week, we're going to see what happens when the Europeans come back after this brief intervention by the Americans. The Barbary War might not have been a super important war in its time, but its ramifications were really big for both the U.S. and North Africa. [2:19:15] Yeah, and although Morocco wouldn't be a direct target for American invasion at this point, they had quite close relations with the Barbary states and were intimidated by this show of force by this new power. So during all of this, you also had the Napoleonic Wars raging, and both France and Spain used economic threats to keep Morocco from intervening again on behalf of the British. [2:19:41] Right. And again, this is not so long after one terrible famine. I believe it's concurrent with a really bad plague. And then 20 years later, it's going to be a famine again. So this is crisis after crisis for Morocco, happening at a time when the Europeans, who are much more urbanized and are becoming industrialized and are developing much more powerful militaries, are becoming increasingly interested in Morocco and the African continent as a whole. I think that one specific issue here that was one of these, we're talking about these compounding crises, you know, going back to the trade and the taxation we talked about in this episode, the Napoleonic Wars and the blockade of Tripoli and later Algiers would lead to this really severe reduction of trade and eventually of tax revenue, making it much harder for the North African governments, in particular Morocco, to stay competitive with the Europeans. [2:20:30] Eventually, we'd see by the middle or really by the 1830s, I guess, by the end, yeah, by a few decades after the Napoleonic Wars, you'd start to see the first permanent European presence in North Africa since the time of the conquistadors, which would end up having really serious ramifications for the rest of Moroccan history. [2:20:50] Yeah, so next time we're going to talk all about the wars that Morocco finds itself involved in in the 19th century. Usually forced upon it by the outside powers who saw that this was really the low point for Morocco and they could get away with pretty much anything that they wanted. Although these wars wouldn't be particularly impactful for the European powers that waged them, they would have a massive impact on the people of Morocco. And for the Moroccans, these first decades of the 19th century marked the arrival of European colonialism in a way that hadn't threatened the country before. And so a huge shift was forced upon Morocco in its relations with the outside world. To find out what happened, you'll have to tune in next time. But we were done for this week. Thank you very much for listening. Thank you, Liam, for all the great research you've done to contribute to this episode. [2:21:51] Oh, of course. Wait, no, this is your project. This is your baby. [2:21:54] Thank you. You know, we should mention, you know, a huge project that Sam has been working on, incredibly tirelessly is that we are about to publish a new up-to-date version of a novel heavily involving Morocco. Do you want to say a few words about that pointing towards the future, Sam? [2:22:11] Oh, yeah, yeah. So, and as you're hopefully aware, we're working on Ramón Sender's novel Imán, which we are publishing as The Magnet, which tells the story of the Rif War of 1921 through 1926, when the Spanish, in an attempt to make their protectorate real by getting troops on the ground, they very carelessly try to occupy the entirety of their protectorate in a way that is very easily exploitable by Moroccan forces. And consequently, 10,000 Spanish conscripts mostly would die as a result of these brutal attacks. [2:22:55] Yeah, yeah. And I think that what's so important about the Rif War is that it would have obviously enormous and terrible implications on the course of Moroccan society. It would also have global implications because the activities and tactics of Spanish colonial troops in the Rif War would pretty clearly go on to influence the practice of fascism in Spain itself. And so I think that when we're talking about these kinds of counterinsurgency movements, whether it's in Vietnam, whether it's in modern-day Afghanistan, or even in potentially, even in parts of Ukraine today, I think, in a lot of ways, these kinds of tactics that we talk about, which often have really terrible implications on the people involved, a lot of them can be drawn to these early 20th century colonial endeavors. And the Rif War is a great example of this, and one that most Americans, including myself, know very little about. [2:23:51] So, I think that we're hoping to bring to light this really interesting work by a pretty celebrated novelist and also look at this really interesting historical moment that people like myself know really nothing about. [2:24:04] Yeah, so as regards to the novel itself, I'm going through one last round of proofreading before I release it. So, it's literally going to be out in a couple of weeks, I would hope. [2:24:17] Yeah, so yeah, so Gladio fans, stay tuned. And I think that wraps it up for this week.