Gladio Free Europe, E101: American Centennials https://www.gladiofreeeurope.com/episodes/american-centennials [0:00:20] Welcome back to Gladio Free Europe. I am your host, Liam, joined as always by Russian Sam. [0:00:25] Hello, hello. [0:00:26] You are now listening to episode 101. We never thought this podcast would get that far, and so we figured the best way to pat ourselves in the back is by taking a look at an even more self-congratulatory celebration. That being America's Centennial in 1876 and the subsequent Bicentennial in 1976. When we had the idea for this episode, Russian Sam and I only had a vague sense about these two major festivals, both of which were mostly celebrated in the city of Philadelphia. But as we dove in, we realized that American society in the 1970s, while initially seeming unrecognizable to the nation a century prior, has so many of the same problems beneath the surface that were festering in 1876. In both of these eras, the joyous celebration of our nation's independence coincided with attempts to hide these kinds of problems, not solve them, particularly in the realms of racial and economic inequality. [0:01:25] Meanwhile, new feelings of paranoia and suspicion were bubbling to the surface, destroying ideas of good feeling and political harmony that existed in the prior generation, leading to new permanent senses of unease and disunity. America's two centennials allowed the country to return to an imagined past of unity and virtue, when a plucky bunch of colonists with nothing to their name except their great love of liberty challenged the most powerful empire since the Mongols or ancient Rome. And against all odds, these colonists emerged victorious, the world turned upside down. A new republic is built on the proposition that all men are created equal and endowed with the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. But both in 1876 and a century later, this proposition was challenged in ways the generations prior could not have been able to comprehend. The first centennial in 1876 happened in a nation a decade out from a bloody war that had nearly destroyed the entire American project. [0:02:25] The victory of 1865 of the North over the South saw the sudden extension of voting rights to millions of black men, to the shock and horror of southern whites as well as many northern sympathizers, who had never seriously considered the implications that all men truly were created equal. While some in the South fought valiantly to preserve this newfound freedom, forces immediately gathered to restore the old Dixie order. Politicians in the North were preoccupied with hammering out deals in smoke-filled rooms for the benefit of the few. Just as voting rights were extended to millions more people, the increasing influence of industrial interests meant that the average voter felt more alienated from politics than ever before. And then in 1976, the social revolution of the 60s had already run out of steam. Transformations around race, class, and sexuality were basically left unresolved, leaving an uncomfortable situation in which half the country believed women's rights and racial justice still had a long ways to go, while the other half thought that things had gone much too far and sought to return us to the rigidity of the 1950s. [0:03:25] American troops had finally left Vietnam, but the war, the draft, and its clumsy conclusion increased political division amongst Americans. Thus, by 1976, American society was divided into ideological camps clearly analogous and ancestral to the liberals and conservatives of our own moment. But just a couple decades before this, this was not the case at all. American society was not recognizably polarized. Government revelations about the Vietnam War, secret CIA dealings, and especially Watergate destroyed trust in politics for good, battering the image of the American politician and convincing voters in the value of the charismatic outsider. In 1876, the South continued to be gripped by a plague of racial terror, and just months after the centennial celebrations, a dirty backroom deal was struck to end what little federal enforcement remained to ensure the rights of freedmen. In 1976, the federal government was once again a decade into ensuring the rights of its black citizens in the face of ongoing racial demagoguery and violence in spite of the law. [0:04:27] Both years also saw ongoing economic crises involving deflation in the former and stagflation in the latter. The question of what labor was owed was up for contestation as well. Tenuous economic conditions and pressures on the lives of ordinary citizens in both years also precipitated a surge in labor militancy, which would be put down either by force of arms or by the muffled blows of neoliberalism. And so, in both the 1870s and the 1970s, paranoia and interpersonal suspicion were rapidly on the rise. Everyone, whether freedmen or Klansmen, weathermen or Reaganites, knew that the government was out to get you and your neighbor was your enemy. And in both eras, the powers that were believed that only one thing could return America to its imagined past of harmony and good feeling: a birthday party. [0:05:11] But before we continue, we would just like to remind you that we do have a Patreon for this show, and we would greatly appreciate it if you could throw us a couple of bucks. Because Liam and I, we just heard about this great investment opportunity with Credit Mobilier, a company that seems really solid. And, you know, railroads are the big thing right now. So be sure to throw us a few bucks and we'll be sure to invest it safely and soundly. [0:05:36] I'm sure nothing bad will happen there. [0:05:37] All right, so let's get into the centennial and the bicentennial, which first and foremost were really just a reskinned World's Fair. People today are vaguely familiar with the concept of the World's Fair, and you might know that they were especially prominent in the 19th century. These events were, and actually still are, shout out Osaka Expo 2025, a chance for the world's governments and business interests to highlight the newest achievements in science and technology, seeking investment and fostering goodwill along the way. The internet and television have basically rendered the novelty of these fairs obsolete, but their importance to 19th century people can't be overstated. The 1876 Centennial, which is one of the primary focuses of this episode, was visited by a fifth of the entire U.S. population. And that wasn't even the biggest exposition staged upon American soil. So it's clearly a huge preoccupation of 19th century society. [0:06:31] But where does the World's Fair come from? Officially, the first World's Fair dates back to 1851, when Great Britain hosted the Great Exhibition in London. But there were antecedents going back centuries. Back in medieval times, large-scale trade fairs bringing together wares from far and wide became a regular occurrence. These can be considered the earliest example of something roughly in the same ballpark. During the reign of Louis XIV of France, that is, in the 17th century, arts and trade fairs became a going concern for the French state. In Ephemeral Vistas, Paul Greenhalgh traces the genealogy of these fairs to 1754, when William Shipley founded the Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce, which would in the 1840s become the Royal Society of Arts. Shipley was interested in cultivating an organ to, quote, embolden enterprise, enlarge science, refine art, improve our manufacturers, and extend our commerce, and to reward discoveries which would have a positive effect thereon. [0:07:25] To that end, from 1760, the society would hold exhibitions for the display of arts, crafts, and technological innovations. Similar trade and industrial and crafts fairs would spring up across Europe through the remainder of the century. The most prominent of these for setting the tone of the world's fair would happen in Paris in 1797. 1797 was a tumultuous year for the history of France. The War of the First Coalition was in its sixth year, and the economy continued to strain under the British naval blockade. Merchandise remained in Glenbaux stash and warehouses, unable to be exported. The workshops were in ruin, and the workers were in penury. In these difficult times, the French people needed a sign of hope. To that end, the Marquis d'Avèze and François de Neufchâteau had the idea to put the goods to use. With the official support of the revolutionary government, these two men set up a fair for the stockpiled goods in front of the Louvre. [0:08:14] The aim of the fair was to move unsold merchandise and to reassure the French public that the economy remained intact. And this first fair was pretty successful. So the following year, these two guys planned a much grander exhibit on the Champ de Mars on the outskirts of Paris to celebrate recent military victories as well as the broader accomplishments of French society. A temporary structure called the Temple of Industry, you gotta love revolutionary language, was built to house the exhibition of products of French industry. This fair was meant to send a message to French capitalists that they should remain competitive against British goods and work for the glory of the revolutionary fatherland. Neufchâteau wrote that the French have surprised Europe with the rapidity of their military exploits and must advance with the same ardor on the paths of commerce and of peace. This is not merely an episode in the struggle against English industry, but also the first stone in a mighty edifice which time alone can complete and which will be adorned each year by the joint efforts of industry and commerce. [0:09:11] So although the French Revolution is inseparable from the context of these early expositions, they would, like so much of the revolutionary society, would survive first the rule of Napoleon and then the restoration of the monarchy. Eleven national exhibitions were held from 1798 to 1849, growing in size and scope every year. The 1849 fair was actually six months long, featuring 4,500 exhibitors. But as the name implies, these still weren't world's fairs. They were squarely national and nationalist exhibitions for the representation of French commercial interests. [0:09:47] This all changed in 1851 when the British, who had spent decades imitating the French with their own national exhibitions, invited other nations to display their industrial or artistic accomplishments in the hopes of fostering international trade and investment. They had actually gotten this idea from the French, who hoped to make their own 1830 exhibition an international affair. But these ideas were quashed by domestic manufacturers who were suspicious of foreign interests. By contrast, the British welcomed the competition. Historian Peter Greenhalgh explains that, quote, to invite all nations to take part in an international exhibition was to create the potential for market expansion abroad. One of the main motives behind the international character of the Great Exhibition of 1851 was economic. Britain wanted more market and was confident when the foreigner came he would buy British goods. So the stage was set. 44 foreign states, as well as British colonies and dependencies, sought to display their wares in London. [0:10:38] In 1850, the famous Crystal Palace began construction in Hyde Park, a glass-and-iron behemoth, 1848 feet long, 456 feet wide, and 108 feet tall. Basically, a giant greenhouse, it was unlike anything built before and would quickly be rapidly imitated. Across the 19th century, similar structures will be built across the US, Europe, and even Australia. But because Victorian-era glass is exceptionally brittle, almost none of these structures still survive today. The 1851 exhibition welcomed 6 million visitors, a full third of the population of England. Some 100,000 exhibits were displayed, over half of them being from Britain and its colonies. This was a raving success, to such an extent that the rest of the world raced to host their own. New York had its own exhibition just two years later in its own Crystal Palace that was destroyed by fire shortly thereafter. But while this event was well attended, the New York Expo failed to attract international attention or really much investment, and it left those few American investors deeply in the red. [0:11:39] In the 1860s, the violent outbreak of the Civil War deeply harmed the international reputation of the US, causing European trade partners to begin looking elsewhere to source raw materials. But across the 1860s and 1870s, the U.S. continued to build and industrialize. American leaders had never been more confident in their nation's prospects, but recognized that many everyday citizens were less optimistic. Therefore, it was determined that the best way to forge the American future was to remind Americans of their victories in the past and flex their modern industrial muscles in front of the gawking eyes of Europe. [0:12:15] Right, so we're going to get into just what was happening in this era because this period is unfortunately not given justice in schools at all. [0:12:24] No, I really want. Once you get past the Civil War, it's kind of like, you know, a sort of sleepy slide to World War II, I feel like. [0:12:30] You might hear about Credit Mobilier, you might hear about Teapot Dome, you probably hear the word reconstruction, but you probably don't know much about its demise. [0:12:39] Mm-hmm. Yeah, not at all. [0:12:41] So we'll start from the part that everyone remembers. In 1865, Lincoln was murdered by John Wilkes Booth, and the drunkard Andrew Johnson takes the wheel. Until the end of 1865, when Congress was back in session, Johnson leads the process, which is now known as presidential reconstruction. If Johnson had gotten his way, the control of the southern states would have immediately fallen back into the hands of the southern aristocracy who had declared the Confederacy. The rights of the freedmen would not be a going concern for the federal government, and pro-Confederate representation would have immediately gone back to Congress. Johnson's policies were so abhorrent that Republicans in Congress closed ranks to stand against him. This would seem unlikely at first, as the Republicans were split amongst themselves. Remember, the two American parties welded very different people across the country in ways that made ideology a secondary concern. So in one corner of the Republican Party stood the business wing, for whom existing property relations were sacrosanct and who were largely indifferent to the future of black people now that formal slavery had been outlawed. [0:13:40] Opposite them sat the radical Republicans, like Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner, who were staunchly in the camp of racial equality. Now, these guys envisioned abolition as a wide-spanning transformation of American economic and political life, fearing that otherwise the old hierarchies of the Confederacy would impose themselves on the southern population. And between these two extremes, you had the vast majority of people, I'd say, who were sympathetic to Reconstruction to one degree or another, but weren't nearly as committed to it or as indifferent to it as either of the extremes. [0:14:12] No, I think that's kind of just the tricky thing with this era: the Confederacy and what it stood for was incredibly unpopular, but not enough Northern whites had the stomach for the kind of drastic changes that would be needed to truly banish that kind of southern racial hierarchy. And, you know, we all were going to find out what happened due to that contradiction, but it's just such a great example of how revolutionary change is always so much more difficult than anybody expects. And I think that's why, you know, both the 1870s and the 1970s are somewhat unsatisfying periods to read about. There's just so many missed opportunities. [0:14:51] So initially, these radicals had a lot of support among northern white voters due to practical considerations about keeping the planter class out of power and moral offense at the idea that the rebels, whose war had left half a million dead, would go unpunished. And thanks to the spirit of egalitarianism and maybe a dash of vengeance, the Republicans in Congress passed a series of transformative laws that we now call Reconstruction. The Civil Rights Act, the Reconstruction Act, and the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendment were promptly passed, with the Republican supermajority smashing through Johnson's attempt at veto. For the moment, it really seemed like the power of the slavers had been broken forever. [0:15:27] But despite the good intentions of many who had conceived Reconstruction, this strategy was flawed in many respects. For instance, what did it really mean to be free? From the start, the Republican Party was built around the idea of free labor. While this always meant that the labor of freemen as opposed to slaves, the 19th century understanding of freedom was a little more specific than we imagine today. Lincoln saw free labor as rooted in earlier conceptions of America as an artisan republic, and free labor being someone who was neither hirer nor hired. This meant to make one's own living by running a farm or building a small business which would furnish both independence and economic efficiency through one's own hard work. [0:16:05] Right. As guys say, you know, the idea of the artisan republic and artisans in general, this is something that we've been interested in for many months now and we're hoping to go into more detail about in the future. Kind of the pre-capitalist economic identities. But this is all to say: there was a place for wage labor in this model, but it wasn't really something to be maintained permanently. It was seen as this aberration from this idea of the self-made artisan. [0:16:29] Or not really an aberration, but rather an early stage in life before you become a artisan. [0:16:34] Yes, it was a temporary stage, not a career, because it was understood that a young man, unfortunately for the ladies, only a young man, could expect to work for some years earning a wage while he masters a craft, after which point he will become his own artisan, a self-employed businessman. He would gather up his savings in his youth to build a foundation for this independent livelihood, upon which point he would inevitably, you know, get married and maintain his own independent household. The ideal producer would work hard to provide for his family, but he would also maintain a good work-life balance that allowed him to cultivate his Republican virtues as well as his Christian virtue and remain politically engaged as a U.S. citizen. This was the building block of the American identity, particularly in the first half of the 19th century, especially outside the South, where slavery was a very different set of values. [0:17:21] Yeah, this is what of the people, by the people, for the people means. [0:17:25] Exactly. Like it's sort of every family is sort of a node in this structure. Like, it's very interesting, and I have to say that it is kind of alluring in its own ways. At least, like, the ideal sounds very beautiful, I'd have to say, but unfortunately, the practice did not live up to the ideal. [0:17:43] Right. And I think also that, you know, this, this ideal is essentially a utopian system based on virtue and values, not necessarily rooted in any economic realities. There was no way to uphold this kind of economic mode of production. And as early as the first decades of American history, you know, with the struggles between Jefferson and Hamilton and Adams, there were already lots of dissenting voices who thought that a more industrial future was the way to go. But in any case, this system, this kind of pre-capitalist artisan system, made a good living for many people, even if it did lead to the kind of precarity a modern person would not really be able to stomach. [0:18:20] Yeah, like it was really normal to just go bust like five times before you actually get a stable business, and at which point you can go on living happily ever after. But it was, you know, a very hard slog. [0:18:32] Yeah. And, you know, cracks in this ideal progressively began to show across the 19th century. And there was a marked acceleration after the Civil War. With the development of capital-intensive industries, the yeoman small producer was out-competed in the market, and more people were pushed away from artisan work into wage labor as a permanent way of life. It wasn't just a thing that you do when you're young, you know, before you get married. In her book, The Labor Question in America: Economic Democracy in the Gilded Age, Rosanne Currarino calls this ideal proprietary producerism and its capitalistic replacement, industrial producerism. We're going to return to this struggle in a minute, but note that with the falling away of these conditions, soon many Republicans had whittled down the notion of free labor simply for the freedom to go from one employer to another. That's often, we should say, what freedom does mean in a capitalistic context today. [0:19:26] So, this goes all the way back to the 1860s and 70s. So, keep in mind, this is the economic context, this unfortunate transformation away from the free labor artisan republic. This is the world into which millions of freedmen, free African-American former slaves, found themselves stepping into. Many of these freedmen actually had escaped during the war itself, migrating to northern cities only to find themselves competing with a very hostile and perhaps increasingly hostile white workforce. Additionally, many people who risked their lives to escape slavery found this system lacking because, in addition to competition with white workers, they had to deal with terrible wartime living conditions. And they were dependent on northern white officials who were apathetic, sometimes even outright hostile toward their conditions. In his book, The Republic for Which It Stands, Richard White wrote that the federal government had enlisted able-bodied black men as laborers and soldiers that often consigned their families to contraband camps or neglected them entirely. [0:20:27] They died by the tens of thousands. Freedom that amounted no more than the ability to sell one's labor at what a buyer was willing to pay was a more constrained freedom than slaves had imagined. [0:20:38] Right. And that reminds me, you often come across the term wage slavery, which does have sort of this, you know, very dismissive tone almost, just because we have a very different idea of what life should look like. But again, because these people's conceptions were based on this yeoman idea, to be stuck in a wage job permanently without any prospect of moving beyond that, it would have been seen as a permanent servitude of sorts, a sort of wage slavery. So, in that context, the terminology makes a lot more sense. [0:21:11] But continuing our story, the million-strong Union Army of April 1865 would be rapidly discharged until only 28,000 remained by July 1866. By September of that year, there would only be 101 outposts at their disposal. The U.S. South, a territory the size of Western Europe, was to have its socio-economic basis overturned by an army of men around the size of the Union casualties at Gettysburg. This meant that so long as the white southern population wasn't willing to participate in Reconstruction and was prepared to fight against it by force of arms, Reconstruction was going to be severely undermanned and struggling just to maintain its existence. This wasn't an accident, in fact. The ranks of politicians who ran the government were packed with people who were hostile to the notion of transformative change, even if they were unhappy with Johnson's antics for other reasons. Outside of the Radical Republicans, most congressmen and senators were preoccupied with creating an environment for free market capitalist social relations to prosper. [0:22:05] They supported the formal political equality of freedmen, but they had no interest in creating actual conditions that would allow former slaves to thrive. This meant that the redistribution of property would be brought to a halt, and in some cases, even reversed. The famous 40 acres and a mule maxim, which General Sherman had begun to implement in his occupation zone at the start of 1865, would be struck down as unconstitutional, and the lands would be restored to the former planters, leaving the predominantly rural and agricultural African-American population without a means of pursuing the American proprietary producer ideal. They, along with many poor white southerners, would be pushed into sharecropping, a condition that would persist for almost a century. The rights which they had at first, it secured would be whittled away in the years to come, largely as a result of a series of Supreme Court decisions, which either proclaimed that protections were unconstitutional or that the federal government had no business interfering in the affairs of the states. [0:22:58] States' rights may have lost the war, but they still had many battles to win, up until the country's 100th birthday and beyond. [0:23:04] You know, I think it's amazing that it took us this long to realize there might be a problem with giving complete veto power over our laws to a council of immortal wizards. [0:23:12] But yeah, all right, well, let's go into the second big question of the post-Civil War early Gilded Age era, that being cash money. Because during the Civil War, the Union had stumbled upon an unthinkable discovery that the federal government doesn't actually need specie to pay for things. Paper money had been used in America in the past, states had briefly issued paper money in the colonial period, and then during the War of Independence, Congress used paper money to supplement fiat currency. But an inability to coordinate the monetary policy of the 13 colonies, then states, resulted in runaway inflation. With the rise of the Constitution, the federal government wiped its hands clean of currency altogether, and the task of issuing currency was left to individual banks. Pretty chaotic situation all around. So, by the time of the Civil War, the government got back into the currency game, issuing greenbacks, the predecessor to modern dollar bills, to preserve specie for international trade, which was increasingly shifting to the gold standard as a result of British policy. [0:24:15] The move allowed the economy to continue functioning throughout the war, but it also created problems like inflation and an environment that allowed private interests to run rampant in its corrupt dealings with the federal government, something that would be really a hallmark of this period. [0:24:30] And so, as we mentioned, this period is most often called the Gilded Age, a somewhat ironic term coined by Mark Twain to denote the character of the era. A luxurious golden exterior thinly covering up a mass of base corroded metal. But while Twain's variant makes a great metaphor, it has much more of a moral valence, as if the phenomenon described was primarily the result of fallen standards or tacky aesthetic tastes. So 50 years after Mark Twain, the progressive historian George Parrington coined a term that we think cuts much closer to the heart of what was at stake, the Great Barbecue. Congress had rich gifts to bestow, in land, tariffs, subsidies, favors of all sorts. And when influential citizens made their wishes known to the reigning statesmen, the sympathetic politicians were quick to turn the government into the fairy godmother the voters wanted it to be. A huge barbecue was spread, to which all, presumably, were invited. [0:25:20] Not quite all, to be sure. Inconspicuous persons, those who were at home on the farm or at work in the mills and offices, were overlooked. A good many indeed out of a total number of the American people. But all the important persons, leading bankers and promoters and businessmen, received invitations. That's from Parrington. And nothing really exemplifies the Great Barbecue better than the new railroad tracks that were spiderwebbing their way across the continent. Through acts of Congress, the rail companies were able to secure massive swaths of government land, which they would be able to sell at whatever rates they desired. You might have heard of the Homestead Act, which gave 160 acres of practically free land to anyone stout and sturdy enough to go out west. But these were really just the drippings off the barbecue table. The railroads got even more land, they made a killing off of it, and would keep developing the unsold, undeveloped bits for many decades. [0:26:09] Because so much of the good land was already taken by the railroad companies, the Homestead Act allotments for farmers were often acres of arid desert, unsuitable for either cultivation or cattle grazing. And if you were lucky enough to secure good land in the first place, then you had to be on your guard lest it be stolen from under your feet through various legal shenanigans. And even if you managed to get this far and establish a farm in your name, there's a good chance that you wouldn't be able to stay on it for long, as farmers were often forced out of business by the ever-encroaching tentacles of the market, which connected everyone internationally. [0:26:42] Yeah, now there's a reason why, you know, poor farmers being forced off their land is kind of like the big, you know, thematic subject of so much literature from the late 19th, early 20th century. But to return to the greenbacks, many people ended up heavily in debt due to all of what we described above. For this reason, these people benefited from a looser monetary environment in which inflation could be expected. Because, you know, remember, if you owe a certain amount of money and your dollar becomes worth more money every year, in a sense, your debt shrinks. So these people were very excited in the potential for paper money to be inflationary. A very funny contrast to feelings about inflation today. Because remember that gold is essentially a finite resource. And so unless you have, unless you're very unlucky, like the Spanish Empire in the 18th century, you are unlikely to have significant inflation simply due to hard gold or silver. [0:27:34] But paper money can be printed indefinitely, leading to a constant expansion and thus constant inflation. So many Americans after the Civil War were in debt that there was a genuine support base for the idea of inflation. And many legislators responded to this, particularly within the Democratic Party. We should mention that even before the war, the Democratic Party was somewhat known as the Party of Northern Labor. It was, strangely, linked to the very different interests of southern slaveholders, this very weird alliance that would shockingly survive for about a century after the Civil War. But due to the associations with Northern Labor and the Democratic Party, and especially because they were sort of hoping for a rebrand after the Civil War, a lot of the Democrats were pretty eager to embrace this new greenback business. There was one idea in particular involving the greenbacks. The Civil War, like so many other wars in history, was funded primarily through war bonds, which had largely been purchased with greenbacks. [0:28:37] Supporters of the Greenbacks argued that these war bonds should be redeemed in greenbacks as well. This was known as the Ohio idea and was strongly associated with the politician George Pendleton, an unsuccessful candidate in the Democratic primaries of 1868. Business interests, of course, recoiled at this idea because they had hoped that the war bonds that they had paid for with worthless greenbacks, at one point they were selling for like a third of their nominal value. It meant that they were hoping that it would be repaid in hard gold. Richard White explains that in the 19th century, quote, liberals often framed the decision between gold and greenbacks as a choice between sin and salvation. Carl Schurz consistently described the redemption of U.S. bonds with greenbacks, even though they had been bought with greenbacks, as immoral. The liberal publicist Edward Atkinson, funded by Isaac Sherman, equated the adoption of greenbacks with theft. [0:29:27] He declared circulation of greenbacks a crime, and he demanded that crimes be suppressed no matter what the cost. Nature demanded gold. It, along with silver, had intrinsic value. So yeah, I would just recommend that these guys read Marx's chapter on commodity fetishism to get to the bottom of this. [0:29:44] But as such, because of business interests arrayed against him, Pendleton was outmaneuvered at the convention, and the Democratic nominee in 1868 was the business-friendly former governor of New York, Horatio Seymour. Although the Ohio idea was acknowledged in the Democratic platform that year, they primarily ran on a platform of racial resentment. Speaking of Ohio, Seymour's vice presidential nominee, Francis Blair Jr., was notorious for his incendiary racism in ways that might remind us of a modern VP pick. According to historian Charles W. Calhoun, speaking in Omaha, Blair declared that the Reconstruction measures had subjugated all the people of our race in 10 of the southern states to a hideous black barbarism. At Indianapolis, he attacked blacks as addicted to indiscriminate concubinage and in politics, content to be the tools of those who gratify their brutal lusts. So, while those comments were criticized by some fellow Democrats who hoped to cleanse themselves of the legacy of the Confederacy, this kind of racial animus really spoke to the id of white Southern Democrats after the war. [0:30:49] It seemed unlikely in 1868 as Reconstruction was still going strong, but this twisted vision of Francis Blair would quickly begin to drive politics across the entire South. [0:31:00] Yeah, and an interesting side note about Francis Blair. So this was Francis Blair Jr. And Francis Blair Sr. was very famous in his own right because he had been one of the founders of the Republican Party back in the 1840s. [0:31:13] How did you know that? [0:31:14] Yeah, and so the pair, father and son, they were Republicans until the end of the Civil War, at which point the racism really started to show itself. And so they ended up jumping ship from the party, which they saw as, you know, handing power over to black people in the South, which was the unnatural order. Which just goes to show that the Republican Party, again, was not a monolith. People like Thaddeus Stevens were the exception, not the rule. And in the same vein, it should be noted that George Pendleton, although he was primarily interested in economic vision, also had a very strong history of racial remarks, let's put it. He was a doughface in the antebellum period. He was from Ohio as well. But despite that, he was sort of bending over backwards for slave interests. And then in 1864, he was the VP candidate on the Democratic ticket to end the war. [0:32:08] And we should clarify: basically, to end the war in 1864 basically meant a draw where the South would remain as an independent slaveholder republic. [0:32:17] Right, of course. [0:32:18] But Pendleton himself, he would become famous towards the end of his life because in 1883, by that point, he was back in Congress and he was able to introduce the bill which would finally introduce civil service reform, bringing an end to the spoils system that we're going to cover here in a bit. But that was one of the really big issues of the anti-corruption people in that day. Getting rid of the spoils system, which meant that the elected person would be able to hand over jobs to friends and associates. [0:32:46] Well, you know, on the subject of corruption and graft, I think that this is the perfect time to talk about the Republicans after the Civil War, and in particular, the Grant administration. The Republicans were also under the sway of business interests and they had a far less contentious process to go through for the nomination. Although there were some murmurs of competition, they came to naught because in the first round of the vote, the nomination went unanimously to celebrated Union General Ulysses S. Grant. We'll have to return to the Grant presidency at another point because he was basically a failed leader and, in many ways, an exceedingly modern and incredibly poignant one. Some of the more online of our listeners might recognize what I mean when I say that he was a Brandon. So Grant's failure was really tragic because to so many voters, he was just the perfect candidate. [0:33:35] He was the hero. He was the man who saved the Union and who had stood against Johnson's shameful attempts to entirely sidestep Reconstruction. But as important as this red meat was to the masses, Grant was also a popular pick among business interests. He had few strong convictions of his own, he had a very weak handle on politics, and he proved himself willing to be bought. Immediately after the war, wealthy businessmen bought him several homes in Washington and New York, and he would reward them as president most blatantly by naming several of them to important positions such as his cabinet. But unlike the Democrats, who had some openness to greenbacks, Grant was a staunch, hard-money man, and he positioned himself as the adult in the room. Uncomfortable with public speaking and familiar with what public speaking meant under the Johnson presidency, Grant had sequestered himself away to Galena, Ohio, to present himself as a dignified, laconic alternative to Francis Blair's lurid racial fantasies. [0:34:31] And then he won. Grant swept the Electoral College by 214 to 80 and would remain president until 1877. Grant's presidency was like a 19th-century rickety wooden roller coaster. Incessant corruption scandals were interrupted only by the highs of his genuine commitment to Reconstruction, as demonstrated by the Enforcement Acts, which included the famous Anti-Klan Act and the 15th Amendment, which protected the right to vote irrespective of color. But despite his interest in social equality, Grant always managed to fumble the execution. In the lead-up to the election of 1870, laws were passed to ensure that Republican men, who were disproportionately black, could exercise their right to vote in the South by force of the Union Army if necessary. This was far from a given, as vigilante mobs often resorted to brute violence against black men who dared to venture into Republican polling stations. This kind of violence, often committed by the newly formed Ku Klux Klan, resulted in thousands dead across the late 1860s and early 1870s. [0:35:28] The Justice Department Enforcement Commission sought to stop this, but they were slow, poorly staffed, and often had completely backward priorities. The historian Calhoun explains that rather than focus on the South, quote, the administration gave much greater attention to the election in New York, which being the largest state, Grant regarded as, quote, certainly the most important state to secure a fair election. Three weeks before the election, Grant ordered the U.S. Marshal in New York to appoint 5,000 special deputies, and he placed at the Marshal's disposal 1,200 regular troops and 250 Marines. In the end, the administration's efforts yielded only modest gains for the Republicans. On the eve of the election, the federal attorney and marshal reached an agreement with city officials about keeping the peace at the polls. On election day, the city was quiet and saw only a handful of arrests. Republican performance improved over previous elections. [0:36:17] Support for the Democrats declined somewhat, but not enough to defeat their municipal ticket. If the administration's robust enforcement program achieved little in New York, benign neglect produced malignant results in the South. Violence and intimidation had a telling impact in several states, especially Georgia, Alabama, and North Carolina. In congressional elections alone, at least 15 House seats shifted from Republican to Democratic control. That's from the presidency of Ulysses S. [0:36:41] Grant. To Republicans and to the corruption-minded, boss Tweed was the primary villain of this era. The man was a giant, as literal as figurative. He stood six feet tall and weighed 300 pounds. Tweed thus embodied the stereotypical fat cat of the era. Under his direction, and by means of heavy-duty fraud, the Tammany Hall machine consistently delivered New York to the Democratic Party, creating an environment that allowed for the enrichment of Boss Tweed, all of his associates, and a steady stream of jobs for his voters. Tweed faced a series of lawsuits for embezzlement from 1871 onward after a sleighing accident led to the death of one of his associates and the publication of a whole tranche of documents by the liberal press. Tweed would go on the lam in the centennial year, fleeing first to Cuba and then mainland Spain. The U.S. government caught wind of this and sent word to Spanish authorities to have him extradited upon his arrival. [0:37:34] And in an era when photography was still quite sparse, these guys had to rely on cartoons by the famous Thomas Nast to identify their target. We should mention that because one of these cartoons was an allegory depicting Boss Tweed as a policeman arresting some young street urchins, Spanish authorities apparently believed that Boss Tweed was being sought for kidnapping, as depicted in the cartoon. Tweed was successfully apprehended and brought back to New York, upon which he died in jail shortly thereafter. But his legacy of corruption would long outlive him. [0:38:05] Yeah, and like I said, corruption was everywhere you could possibly look in this era. As far as I know, there has not been any direct evidence of Grant enriching himself during his presidency, but those around him certainly were. Congressman Oakes Ames, upon the revelation that he was involved in the Credit Mobilier scandal, remarked that, quote, gifts of stock were not bribes because bribes were quid pro quo, while the offers of a chance to pay to buy into Credit Mobilier were exchanges between friends already willing to do each other favors. The stock could not possibly be a bribe, he argued, because its value was beneath the going price of a congressional vote. That's the paraphrase from Richard White. So, there's really too much on this topic to really do justice to in this one episode. But one particular example exemplifies the era, I think. Robert Fisk and Jay Gould, who ironically had close ties with the disgraced boss Tweed, were some of the biggest financiers of the era. [0:38:58] And their connections in Washington allowed them to corner the gold market for international transactions. Because, once again, the gold standard was the standard set by the British Empire. And if you wanted to do international trade increasingly, that meant that you needed gold. And so, Fisk and Gould were able to drive up the price of gold and to charge exorbitant exchange rates because the government was not selling any gold at this point. [0:39:22] Yeah, it was really a great gig. And because Gould and Fisk had extensive ties with people around Grant, they were able to keep their finger on the pulse from the very beginning. Orville Babcock, Grant's private secretary, Grant's sister, his brother-in-law, an assistant treasury secretary, and maybe even Grant's wife, were given insider information to allow them to profit from the gold cornering scheme. Grant, at a certain point, ordered the Treasury Department to begin selling gold, which would have broken the pair's corner. But he warned his sister to get out of the scheme before the Treasury sold the gold. Gould and Fisk immediately received word and they began selling gold like hotcakes, which they had been previously hoarding, in order to beat the Treasury. They were thus able to net huge profits and caused the Black Friday of 1869, the first sign of financial trouble in the Grant administration. [0:40:09] The economy was growing at a massive rate on paper as a result of railroad expansion, but in truth, the field was rife with fraud, and the beneficiaries were those select few who had come to the great barbecue first. For a while, the market seemed healthy, but there was rot underneath the surface, just waiting to blossom. [0:40:26] In 1871, Germany's shocking invasion and subsequent victory over France in the Franco-Prussian War allowed them to demand a massive indemnity from the French government. This huge inflow of cash from the Atlantic seaboard into Central Europe caused the Vienna stock market to overheat and explode. In a rapidly globalizing world, this crash in Austria sent tremors to the world economy, landing on American shores by September 1873. Jay Cooke, another railroad financier and close associate of Jay Gould, was now flat broke. His bank, Jay Cooke and Company, could no longer make payments. This triggered a run of the banks, which resulted in the Panic of 1873, the original Great Depression. This was the most serious financial meltdown until the 1929 crash and the longest to batter the economy. Samuel Rezneck estimated that between 1873 and 1879, there was an overall economic decline of 32%. Indices of railroad stock prices plummeted by almost 60%. [0:41:26] Wholesale commodity production fell about 30% and net capital imports declined sharply. The more general financial downturn lasted until 1897. The period between 1879 and 1881, which appeared to be one of economic recovery, merely represented a temporary lull. In more practical terms, there were 5,183 bankruptcies in 1873, and the panic did not really take hold until October. But in 1878, the last full year of depression by the usual measures, there were 10,478. The Society for Improving the Condition of the Poor estimated that 25% of New York's workers were unemployed during the winter following the panic. The next winter, their estimate was 30%. And that's again from Richard White in The Republic for Which It Stands. So this was a miserable time. Labor was getting squeezed, deflation made life hell for debtors, and real wages continued to decline across a lot of time. When it came time to celebrate the country's centennial, the situation was heavy indeed. [0:42:26] The Grant administration handled this crisis poorly to the detriment of the average American and increasing the diminishing prospects of the artisan republic and the Lincoln ideal of free labor. Grant was entirely unsuited for the moment, even before we considered the judiciary, which he filled with people who were continually undermining the legal foundations of Reconstruction. But this was in fact Grant's own doing. In Richard White's assessment, quote, without any clear method or intent, he created a court which would help eviscerate the legislative base of Reconstruction. Grant was an institution's a norm sort of guy, and even if he didn't support the injustice that was happening down south, he wasn't able to choose people to affect that change, and he was unprepared to swim against the current. So, his appointees would decide a whole slew of Supreme Court cases, which destroyed the federal government's ability to enforce the rights of citizens in the United States. [0:43:20] And this would begin the backslide into Jim Crow, which took several decades. But you probably went over the most notorious of these cases. There were the slaughterhouse cases, there was the Cruikshank case, but really the capstone to the whole affair was U.S. versus Reese in 1876, the year of the centennial. This finally made the ultimate leap by saying that the federal government was unable to prosecute people who stopped potential voters from exercising their franchise because the rights that were enumerated in the Bill of Rights only applied to the federal government, while the states were free to decide which rights would be given to its residents. And so, all the efforts of the Klan Acts were moot. The government was left powerless to prevent the slaver class from reinforcing control over the South and their domination over their former human property. [0:44:10] And now, we're finally getting to what you're all waiting for: the Philadelphia Centennial Exhibition. As 1876 approached, the country was of two minds. Some were looking forward to a fair of such momentous proportions. They were proud to be an American and looked forward to the distraction from all the difficulties of mundane life. Others were unhappy with the thought of the country hosting such a spectacle, precisely because it would be a distraction from everything wrong with it. James Russell Lowell, a former abolitionist poet whose poem The Present Crisis is still read in our day, penned these verses in the lead-up to the exhibition. Columbia, puzzled what she should display of true home-make on her centennial day. Asked Brother Jonathan, he scratched his head, whittled a while reflectively, and said, Show your new bleaching process, cheap and brief, to wit, a jury chosen by the thief. Show your state legislatures, show your rings, and challenge Europe to produce such things. [0:45:04] As high officials sitting half in sight, to share the plunder and fix things right. If that don't fetch her, why you only need to show your latest style in martyrs, Tweed. She'll find it hard to hide her spiteful tears at such advance on one poor 100 years. [0:45:20] Yeah, I gotta say, not his best work, not by a mile. [0:45:24] Right, but this centennial had been a hundred years in the making, and the event itself, of course, was about, you know, 10 years of hardcore planning and fundraising. Across the nation, people were feeling centennial fever to the point of exasperation. On the eve of the opening night, one Wisconsinite named George Washington Americus Vespucci Snodgrass announced his intention to push a wheelbarrow from Wisconsin all the way to Philadelphia. Jack Noe, in Contesting Commemoration, dug up the Chicago Tribune's coverage of this plan. Snodgrass was about to set out for the centennial with his patriotic contribution to the horrors of that exhibition. He will, he says, be attired in a continental suit of clothes made of the Stars and Stripes pattern. His wheelbarrow is simply painted and decorated with the Star-Spangled Banner, and its contents are 37 enameled bricks, each bearing the name and coat of arms of one of the 37 states. Mr. [0:46:20] Snodgrass will carry the 38th brick in his hat until he hears that Colorado has been admitted to the union as well, upon which it will be added to his load. A hand organ attached by a crank to the wheels of the barrow will grind out patriotic airs as he progresses on his wheeling way. Mr. Snodgrass sends the Chicago Tribune an elaborate timetable giving the day and hour at which he will be at due at various given points. This timetable will be of great convenience to the vigilantes, who will thus be enabled to make the arrangements for the lynching or tarring or feathering of him, as humanity may dictate, with the smallest possible waste of time. [0:46:57] This guy sounds so fucking annoying. [0:47:01] No, that's amazing because this is like, this is totally a guy you'd see it today, you know, either at a Trump rally or at any kind of like, you know, weird, like, you know, civil event. It's hilarious. [0:47:10] Yeah, so certain things of, you know, American history, as we're hoping to explain in this episode, are truly trans-historical. But we just don't get guys named George Washington Americus Vespucci Snodgrass anymore. [0:47:22] They just don't make him anymore. [0:47:22] No, no. Very sad. [0:47:24] Yeah, we might have to return to that one. [0:47:25] No, I know, I agree. [0:47:26] All right, but so on May 10th, 1876, Philadelphia opened the fairgrounds of the Centennial Exhibition to the public. 200,000 visitors would come on the first day, and nearly 10 million more would make the pilgrimage before the event concluded in November. Again, this was around one-fifth of the entire American population. This number of people going to such an event is hard to believe even today, and this proportion of the population is completely unthinkable. I think it just goes to show, you know, that before TV and TikTok, there was a lot less to do. So, you know, a lot easier to get people to go to your event. As we saw, this was an incredibly difficult moment for the country as a whole. But in the words of one historian, it was an opportunity to challenge doubts and restore confidence in the vitality of America's system of government, as well as in the social and economic structure of the country. [0:48:17] From the moment the gate swung open at nine o'clock in the morning of May 10th, the fair operated as a school for the nation, a working model of an American mecca. And that's from Rydell in All the World's a Fair. [0:48:29] So as we said, the centennial had been many years in the making. In 1871, Congress passed a bill saying that Philadelphia would host the World Fair to mark the country's centennial. A national centennial commission was formed answerable to Congress, and they were able to raise funds to hold the fair on their own accord. Almost immediately, the affair took a very partisan and sectional tinge. Joseph Hawley, who was also the president of the RNC in 1868, 1872, and 1876, was selected as the leader of this commission. Hawley viewed his role as the organizing of an exhibition which would unite the country, which had only a decade before been embroiled in a fierce civil war. The South was none too happy about this. But for now, the main task of the commission was to secure funding for the affair. This was done by issuing quotas for each state to fulfill and appointing individuals to sell the bonds to raise the money, showcasing Southern reticence. [0:49:20] Alabama was supposed to raise $258,000, but raised only $220,000. Many other Southern states would act along the same lines. In the end, only two Southern states, Arkansas and Mississippi, would fund exhibition space in Philadelphia. Despite the South having received almost everything it wanted through the Grant presidency, many Democrats remained unhappy. One Southern newspaper opined, quote, Now is the time to say to our Republican friends, No amnesty, no centennial. This will bring them to terms and remove the ban which rests upon two or three hundred of the old Southern leaders. [0:49:52] And just to pause here for a little bit, again, by 1876, the old ban which had prevented former Confederates from taking power were now applying to only a few hundred people. Like, again, these were the people who unraveled the war, which resulted in half a million dead. And suddenly they were just back at it. They were totally welcomed back into the government. And everyone was just very eager to say that they had been reconstructed and let them get back to their business of passing anti-black laws and organizing race riots. [0:50:27] No, and that's why I, you know, think like their reticence to fund this centennial, like that's so childish of them because they got like 90% of what they wanted. You know, like they basically got to restore, but by the centennial, they had essentially already restored the antebellum system of white supremacy. But they were so mad that it wasn't enough. They still had this lingering resentment over being defeated. And I'm sure a lot of them really would prefer it if they could go back to formal slavery. But I just think that, you know, like they didn't realize how good they had it. Like, you know, they got everything they wanted, and they were still turning their nose to the centennial. [0:51:00] Yeah, yeah, it's just really unfathomable what, just how entitled these people were. But in addition to these kinds of gripes, the Southerners also took aim at the hypocrisy of the North and chafed under the idea that their dollars were going to provide stimulus to Philadelphia in a time of financial downturn. And like everything else in the era, it was full of corruption and money-making opportunities, which again, they were quick to point out and which they had a point in. But for precisely these reasons, other Southerners had hoped that their states would be fully represented at the fair. In response to the reactionaries exemplified by the Bourbon Democrats, many Southerners pointed to a pragmatic rationale for participating in the exhibition. Even if the exhibition would be biased against the South, and even if there was an opportunity for the North to make money, why shouldn't we be present to present our side of the story and to hawk our wares? [0:51:48] As one newspaper opined, quote, Men of capital and genius and activity and force will come and dwell among us from all parts of the earth and share our great advantages to develop our material wealth and make us rich and powerful and great. So in the end, their appeals would be for naught. As I said, only two southern states would be represented at the fair, and the south would send very few visitors as well. But they would write home with a whole litany of complaints. White Southerners were deeply unhappy with some of the art on display at the fair. One painting titled Emancipation showed Abraham Lincoln with the sledgehammer breaking the shackles of a black man as smiling angels looked on. One bronze statues showed the black man struggling against the bloodhound. Another showed a muscular black man being set free. All of these offended southern sensibilities, and several journalists published accounts talking about how upsetting it was to witness all this. [0:52:39] To which I have to say, triggered. [0:52:42] Right, but we should mention that beyond Southerners, the Centennial really did prove to be a tremendous success, genuinely captivating the American public in ways not seen since maybe the second Great Awakening 40 years before. One particularly evocative reaction is cited by Rydell. Dear mother, wrote a young woman after seeing the grounds. Oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh. [0:53:05] Yeah, wow, she sure was excited about this. [0:53:08] Yes, I think that this young woman would have very much loved the kind of, you know, Tumblr writing style a century and a half later. This reaction was certainly warranted. 37 countries were represented at the exhibition, and even if the South didn't make much of a showing, the remainder of the nation, as gripped by centennial fever as our friend George Washington Americus Vespucci Snodgrass, represented their culture and wares more than handily. International guests were welcomed with open arms. The opening ceremony was also the occasion of the first visit by any foreign head of state to the U.S. It was in fact the flamboyant Emperor Pedro II of Brazil. And as we're going to see actually, there were several prominent international guests in attendance, including the composer Richard Wagner. [0:53:52] Right, and thanks to the marvels of modern technology, you can both listen to us as well as the music of Wagner from anywhere in the world. But they did not quite have this level of technology back in 1876, and the exposition was the occasion, nevertheless, to showcase the latest and greatest developments, including the telephone. Alexander Graham Bell, who had patented the telephone in February of 1876, demonstrated the awesome power of the device at the exposition. His prototype got smashed up during shipping pretty badly, but he was able to put it back together well enough to give it a demonstration, which seriously impressed the guests and panelists of the exposition. He would gin up enough interest that the Bell Telephone Company would be founded a year later in 1877. Other recent inventions on display included refrigeration, the latest developments in telegraphy, the typewriter, the Singer sewing machine, a monorail, and even Heinz ketchup. [0:54:47] Really, you know, the greatest inventions of American history, I have to say. [0:54:52] Absolutely. And so these electrical devices needed a source of power, and this would be one of the most impressive aspects of the expo. Because at the center of Machinery Hall stood the Corliss Engine, a massive steam engine which powered the entire fair. President Grant and the Brazilian Emperor Pedro powered it up themselves by cranking it during the opening ceremony. It was 45 feet tall and had been engineered to run silently because the boiler was kept far away. This machine, therefore, embodied the entire spirit of the age and certainly of American society in this period, inspiring the hopes of anybody present. Walt Whitman was particularly taken by this contraption, and according to Robert Rydell, when Whitman visited Machinery Hall several weeks later, he ordered his chair to be stopped before the great, great engine. And there he sat looking at this colossal and mighty piece of machinery for half an hour in silence, contemplating the ponderous motions of the greatest machinery man has built. [0:55:51] And this was not even the only miraculous machine on display. [0:55:56] Right, so the Corliss engine that was more of a natural feat of engineering, but there was a lot of room for whimsy as well. So, for example, one of the things that was displayed at the exposition was a tomb of George Washington, which featured an automaton of the dead president himself, who would periodically rise from the grave and give a little speech to those present, which, you know, a little unsettling, but certainly gives you a sense of, you know, what was going on in that age. There was other great stuff going on at the exposition as well. They were also, the Statue of Liberty hadn't been built yet entirely, but they did send over the hand of the Statue of Liberty with the torch to be prominently displayed at the exposition. And also in the Whimsy department, they also featured the world's largest knife and fork combination. [0:56:51] There is a picture of that on Wikipedia if you'd like to have a look. It's just a guy leaning against this, like, you know, eight-foot-tall knife and fork. Like, it's really great. They had a great sense of humor back in the day, I gotta say. [0:57:02] Yeah, but you know, tragically, for all the beauty of this industrial might, there was also a dark counterpart because the technologies showcased at the fair would completely reshape people's lives across the American continent, including many who were not U.S. citizens and whose lives would not be reshaped for the better. Because we have to remember that in 1876, American expansion was not yet complete. For decades, settlers moving out west had been encroaching on the lands of Native peoples, who, whether they pursued war, peace, or attempted separation, would ultimately find themselves dispossessed. The plains wars were still very much ongoing in the 1870s, and the era would contain some of the greatest crimes by the American state against indigenous peoples. In the eyes of the fair's planners and goers, they were the bearers of civilization against the savagery of the natives, and technologies on display showcased their worth, as well as the means by which those ways of life deemed less worthy would eventually be extinguished. [0:58:04] And a particularly important piece of context here is that General Armstrong Custer's infamous last stand would occur in June of 1876, a month before the 4th of July, in which 250 U.S. soldiers were killed in one of the last great Native American victories in the entire history of U.S. colonization. This means that from June onwards, attendees to one particular piece of the Centennial exhibition would have had a very different response. And that's because a major part of the American Centennial was in fact dedicated to Native American life and Native American history, though not often depicted on the most flattering of terms and with clear political overtones. [0:58:47] Right, because at this point in American history, the question of what to do with Native Americans was really central. And of course, this rubbed off on the Centennial Exhibition as well. The Native Americans were taken to be a moribund race. In the parlance of the times, they had lost the game of natural selection, and now was their time to wither away. Although the government had signed treaties with natives for many years, these weren't often worth the paper that they were printed on. Countless tribes would be shoved into reservations, which continued to shrink with each passing year as land-hungry settlers streamed in, aided by the expansion of the railroads and increasingly powerful firearms. Natives were herded into reservations under the purview of Indian agents, who more often than not proved corrupt and venal, and given the sparsest of vittles while they were expected to die. If not as individuals, then certainly as cultures. [0:59:40] The Smithsonian Institute was given some 21,000 square feet of exhibition space, which would include a large section on Native Americans. The goal was to, quote, present savage life and condition in all grades and places. They wanted to present these moribund peoples as part of the narrative of the fair, a demonstration of humanity's lowly beginnings, a sharp contrast with the advances of Euro-American civilization like the Corliss engine. If the purpose of the exhibition was to depict indigenous life as part of the American past and not of its future, then the Smithsonian greatly succeeded. [1:00:14] Right. And in the words of one white observer, the reporter William Dean Howells of the Atlantic Monthly, the red man, as he appears in effigy and in photographs in this collection, is a hideous demon, whose malign traits can hardly inspire any emotion softer than abhorrence. We do not sufficiently account for the demoralizing influence of merely beholding these false and pitiless savage faces. Moldy flour and corrupt beef must seem altogether too good for them. In Howell's mind, there was a simple solution to the so-called Indian question: extinction. Yet, even this kind of depiction of Native American life was, in fact, too sympathetic for some observers in 1876. Take, for instance, James L. Dale, who thought this exhibit was much too soft on the Indians and tried to use facts and logic to own the woke libs in Philadelphia who sympathized with the natives. He wrote, They are wax figurines of celebrated Indian braves, with names indicating their bloodthirsty disposition and terrible fighting qualities. [1:01:15] Novelists with unsubdued fancies may sit in their cozy parlors and write pretty little stories of the noble red man bounding over his native wilds in the untrammeled freedom of irrepressible nature. But let one of these red gentlemen, with his small, cruel eyes, his coarse, unkempt locks, and the chains of his wide cheekbones and large animal mouth, heightened by a skillful application of red paint, I say, should this attractive creature meet our charming story writer on those same native wilds, I fancy the next novel, if by some miraculous interposition of Providence it should be permitted to be written at all, would indicate a very sudden change of base on the Indian question. [1:01:56] Yeah, but these weren't the only marginalized peoples that were represented at the fair. As we mentioned previously, there was a fair amount of representation of black Americans at the fair, which the Southerners took particular issue with. But nevertheless, black representation at the fair was very sparse, and there was a lot of criticism of that in particular. These problems with black visitors as well as exhibitioners began from the very beginning of the fair when Frederick Douglass, who was supposed to be one of the guests of honor who was to be sitting at the Grand Pavilion with Grant and Emperor Pedro and all those other people, one of the Philly cops who was present there, he wasn't allowing him to enter there until one of the white participants said, Dude, what are you doing? That's Frederick Douglass. Of course you have to let him in. And Grant, he had wanted to speak at the fair about racial questions because this was pertinent, especially in 1876. [1:03:03] But the fair organizers who they felt that this would be much too divisive, even though, you know, like Hawley, he was already the chair of the RNC, so he was already being attacked. And nevertheless, he felt like he had to bend over backwards to meet the tastes of the white southerners who were present to, you know, not give credence to the fact that black Americans were people. So, because of that, the participation of black people within the fair was extremely limited. They would not really be granted any exhibition space. There were some attempts to get some black sculptures put up, as in sculptures by actual black people representing the black experience in America. But this sculpture would only go up a couple of weeks before the conclusion of the fair, and there was no success in getting it to become a permanent fixture of Philadelphia. So, there was a lot of cynicism going around about, you know, what exactly black Americans had experienced in this country. [1:04:16] Because, I mean, the fair, it had been an opportunity for black Americans to really stress their Americanness, they felt. They thought that, you know, they had a decade of freedom at this point, and they would be able to use this fair to showcase everything that they had accomplished in this period. But just because... [1:04:38] Right, right. And you have to mention, given the political context of 1876, given the Supreme Court rulings that basically legalized Jim Crow essentially that year, this was the last chance for many people in the black community to reassert their citizenship. [1:04:52] Right. And we should mention that, of course, like several black attendees had really mixed feelings about celebrating America's independence in the first place. One anonymous letter writer going by the name of Civis wrote to a New Orleans newspaper that, quote, I regard the Battle of Bunker Hill and the signing of the Declaration of Independence as constituting the birth of our national life, but that, quote, we are not yet a nation in the proper sense of the term. The founders in our government, in making the black man an exception in what he has deemed a self-evident truth, not only falsified the principles upon their theory of government, upon which their theory of government wholly rests, but they poisoned the very foundation of national life. Persistent indulgence in the vices which slavery generates has demented the whole white population of the South and rendered it morally irresponsible. And so there is this really interesting dynamic that I picked up upon, or rather that Jack Noe in Contesting Commemoration picked up on, which was that black representation at the fair was largely limited to minstrel adjacent roles as menial laborers and as waiters and entertainers in the so-called southern restaurant. [1:06:09] But there was a lot of black critique of this relegation, and there was a certain symmetry between the critiques of white southerners and as well as those of the black people living within this country, where the black people of this country were essentially saying that we are equal citizens, so why are we not given equal space within the exhibition? To which the white southerners answered, if the northerner believes these black men to be equal citizens, then why are they not given equal representation? This just goes to show that they don't actually believe any of this, and all this holdrum about the equality of black men is just a way of humiliating us. [1:06:54] Yeah, no, right. And I think that that argument is very cynical, but I think that the northern whites absolutely embarrassingly left themselves open to attack this way by not embracing the principles for which the Civil War was fought. [1:07:07] Yeah, of course. I mean, like, I was just shocked in the course of researching this episode just how many states in the North didn't have black suffrage even after the Civil War. Like, in the case of Ohio, the laws on the books said and basically said that voters had to be white men until 1923. Now, I'm not, like, I haven't been able to find out whether or not black men were able to vote in Ohio before that date. But, nevertheless, like, it still speaks to this very racist environment in the first place. [1:07:44] No, of course. And then, a related factor, we talked about how there was like a labor tension between black and white workers during the Civil War when so many black people became free and moved to the North. There were basically race riots, or at the very least, racial panics across the 1860s and 70s in northern states, like Kansas, for instance, because there were suddenly, you know, groups of black people moving in who had not existed in these states previously. And the longtime white residents reacted really badly to the arrival of these people who were at this point now U.S. citizens who had every right to live wherever they wanted. [1:08:20] Yeah, yeah, it's a very bleak chapter in American history, as I hope this episode has cleared up. But before we move on to the next period of American history, we're going to be covering just a fun fact: Major League Baseball was founded in 1876. I know that several listeners of the podcast are really big baseball heads. So, shout out to all of you guys. Hopefully, you find this fact illuminating. [1:08:44] Yeah, no. And I think that that is such a great bridge to the popular culture of and the kind of vibes of the 19th century to the vibes of the 20th century. Because think about the ways that American sports would dominate public life, including as we would see, the eventual celebration of the Bicentennial in 1976, of which sports were a big part. [1:09:07] So, let's, all right, so let's move ahead now. We are going forward 100 years to a very different, but in some ways, very similar period in American history. Before we can truly understand 1976, though, I think we should start a little bit earlier when the Bicentennial was first announced. That being in 1966. All right, so just setting the stage here: the Beatles are on the radio, the Eisenhower highways stretch across the continent, the world is changing, the civil rights movement is really gathering speed, and the president is Lyndon Johnson, who had been inaugurated three years prior in circumstances that genuinely traumatized the American public. Newspapers across the country had printed photos of Johnson in the cramped and sweaty hole of Air Force One, just two hours after the murder in broad daylight of his predecessor, John F. Kennedy, whose blood now stained the skirt of the former first lady standing centimeters away from Johnson. [1:10:16] The shock of the Kennedy assassination led to a brief cooling of tensions in American politics, which contributed to the monumental passage of the Civil Rights Act. Because really, it seemed that for the first time now in 1965, the promise made to black Americans 99 years prior and then betrayed in 1875 and 1876 may now actually be kept. And we should mention that in the early stages, the most successful stages of the civil rights movement, while whites in the South fought back brutally and lethally against civil rights protesters, white people outside the South were more shocked, were really mostly shocked by the violence meted out against black people. This means that respectable upper-class opinion in the Kennedy and early Johnson era was basically on the side of the civil rights movement against local white reactionary interests. [1:11:12] Yeah, and we should just stress that this wasn't just an internal dynamic. This was very much a product of the fact that the Soviet Union at this point was waging the Cold War against the United States. And a reaction to every single American move was, oh, but you lynch Negroes, which I mean, you can't really answer in good faith as a good American liberal. Because I mean, it's like, you know, it's fundamentally true that there are a lot of people who are resorting to vigilante justice to murder black men in the South and who are committing this regime of racial apartheid against right, no, no, right, right. And so, you know, and that means, you know, any critique of, you know, the Soviet Union or its satellites not being democratic enough, for instance, that was nullified by the fact that about 10% of the U.S. black people in the South couldn't really vote at all as late as 1964 and 1965. [1:12:08] So in the first of these big legal changes was Johnson's Civil Rights Act, which formally outlawed racial discrimination. This bill had enormous support from both the Democratic and Republican parties, even though the Republican nominee that year, Barry Goldwater, opposed civil rights legislation on the grounds that state governments should basically reserve the right to brutalize their own black citizens. The good feelings around the early civil rights era contributed to Johnson's triumph over Goldwater in 64, as Goldwater was able to sweep the deep South, but nowhere else except his home state of Arizona. And so, the New York Times thought that this was the final vindication of civil equality against racial oppression, and they declared the day after the election that, quote, white backlash doesn't develop. [1:12:58] Yeah, famous last words. So, Johnson was inaugurated once again in January 1965, which was not held in a tight metal tube, but instead in the White House lawn with over a million attendees. That August, the Voting Rights Act would pass with an even greater majority than the Civil Rights Act had. There was no legislative opposition from any party outside of the South. [1:13:21] But unfortunately for LBJ, this harmony would be very short-lived because just five days after the Voting Rights Act was signed, the brutal beating of a young black motorist by the LAPD led to a deadly riot in Los Angeles, the Watts neighborhood in particular. Similar race riots had occurred in the summer of that year in Harlem, in Rochester, and in Philadelphia. But Watts was unique. Thanks to the proximity to Tinseltown, which was Southern California's news station's home base, like KTLA, this gave these media outlets, you know, a prime time seat for all of these events, including unheard of, to this point, helicopter cameras. These broadcast burnings and beatings directly into the living rooms of the average white suburbanite. And the editorial board of Life magazine, whose cover was a black man standing in the wreckage of his home, condescendingly remarked that historians will be unlikely to compare the residents of Watts to Crispus Attucks, and that the people of Watts have, quote, died to history for lack of a clear cause or purpose. [1:14:31] Right, but of course, the people of Watts saw things differently, because while many black community leaders condemned the riots, many young activists saw this event as a righteous revolt against a century of broken promises and three centuries of violent white supremacy. For instance, while in prison, the Black Panther Eldridge Cleaver, who we've discussed before, remembered thinking that, my black ass is here in Folsom, but my black heart is in Watts. And we need to mention that during all of this, during this emergence of civil strife in 1965, there was just as much turbulence abroad. [1:15:06] Some people today, especially on the left, see John F. Kennedy as this dove, which really is not correct, as he sent about 16,000 American troops, the so-called millie advised the so-called military advisors, to Vietnam. But it must be said that the new Johnson administration escalated the Vietnam War in ways far exceeding Kennedy's known plans. And a major part of this escalation was the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which the Kennedy-appointed Defense Secretary Robert McNamara exaggerated and falsified details of a naval skirmish as a cynical ploy to authorize the use of full-scale military force to overthrow communist governments, not only in Vietnam, but across the Southeast Asian region. Because within months of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, a brutal pogrom erupted in Indonesia with the backing and support of the CIA. Here, up to a million suspected communists and everyday ethnic Chinese were murdered. That same year, CIA Director Richard Helms oversaw secret anti-communist massacres in neighboring Thailand and Laos. [1:16:14] This violence was funded by the activities of the CIA front corporation Air America, a phony airline that was probably involved in the trafficking of heroin from Southeast Asia into the United States. [1:16:28] Right, and we should note: although the 1870s was really, you know, the first heyday of these kinds of narcotics, the usage of heroin and other illegal drugs really exploded in the second Johnson term in particular, which contributed not only to massive overdoses, but also to a rapid rise in street crime. This crime was felt most painfully by the poor black residents of increasingly desperate U.S. cities, particularly New York and Detroit. Yet, racialized fears of crimes abounded, particularly after the Watts riots. [1:17:03] Even though the 1966 midterm election was the first election since Reconstruction in which all black Americans could vote, anti-civil rights forces saw significant gains. And now, these forces were no longer limited to the South. In the years following Goldwater's humiliation, Republican leaders such as Richard Nixon reoriented the Republican coalition using explicitly racist appeals to win the support of whites in both the South and the North. Working-class whites in the Midwest and the Northeast began slowly drifting towards the Republican camp, part of the process which would continue for the next 50 years. [1:17:39] But what's really interesting about the Nixon appeal is that he was speaking out of both sides of his mouth at the same time. He was also the first president to run on black power. Like for him, of course, black power was about empowering black men to become small business leaders in the model of the white ideal. But nevertheless, like this was very much a slogan that the Nixon president, that the Nixon candidacy would use. And as a result of this, he would reap a third of the black vote in his 1968 election. [1:18:08] Yeah, although we should mention that, you know, prior to this, black people were voting for Republicans by significantly higher margins than they voted for Nixon. And in the 50s, because so few black people in the South could vote, those that could in the South tended to vote Republican, because the party of Jim Crow was the Democrats, whereas most black people in the North were Democrats. [1:18:30] Yeah. [1:18:31] So that means that there was a brief moment actually where African Americans were basically the biggest swing electorate in the U.S. during the 50s and early 60s. But we're kind of getting off the track here. What is important to know is that by the second Johnson term, his administration was genuinely on the ropes. American society felt more fractious than ever before, at least in the minds of middle-class suburbanites. These were divisions not seen since the labor wars of the 1930s, or perhaps not even since the violence of the 1870s, coinciding with the first centennial. Johnson believed that Americans were adrift, floating toward terrifying prospects of civil violence and social collapse. If he wanted to stop this and preserve his own legacy as a president, he needed to give Americans a light to guide them, something to keep alive memories of the past and hopes for the future. [1:19:26] And so, in July 1966, Johnson declared that the bicentennial celebration should be held 10 years hence to, quote, recall to Americans and the world the majestic significance of the revolution. In this speech, he drew parallels between the American Revolution and the ongoing war in Vietnam. Ironically, the communist North Vietnamese were eager to draw on these parallels as well, but with themselves as the valiant freedom fighters and the Americans as the avaricious colonial empires. Ho Chi Minh had, in fact, personally written articles to that effect. And so, following the Johnson Declaration, local governments nationwide began planning for the 1976 celebration. Philadelphia was the most eager because, first of all, of the shadow of the 1876 celebration, which still loomed large, but there was also this lingering unease around the memories of the 1926 sesquicentennial, which was rained out and didn't sell anywhere near enough tickets to pay for its own expenses. [1:20:26] And we here at Gladio, we think that the biggest problem might have been that the sesquicentennial is too hard of a word for Americans to really say freely, which is why it's now in the dustbin of history. [1:20:40] You know, speaking of the dustbin of history, Johnson's final months as president were some of his most unsuccessful and most controversial, because riots dwarfing Watts broke out across America in 1967, then again in spring of 1968 after the murder of Dr. Martin Luther King. The North Vietnamese Tet Offensive of 1968 resulted in enormous casualties, sounding alarms for the toll of the war on the Vietnamese population and casting doubts on the ability of the American faction to actually win. So in August, anti-war protesters swamped the Democratic Convention in Chicago, resulting in an infamous show of force by police. Looking at the carnage meted out by Chicago cops, young anti-war press representative Don Rose quoted Bob Dylan, saying, The whole world is watching. And the whole world was watching indeed. But what the protesters didn't realize is that the public opinion of 1968 was nothing like that of 1964. [1:21:38] Just four years prior, images of cops beating protesters had turned Americans' hearts towards the protesters. But now this kind of moral consensus was no longer possible. According to the Harris poll immediately after the protest, 66% of Americans approved of the Chicago cops' violent response to the protest. [1:21:59] And speaking of Dardan, Dr. Martin Luther King, he had in fact spent the final year of his life being basically the most hated man in America because he had taken a very active stance against the Vietnam War, at which point respectable liberal opinion turned decisively against him because it's like, we just gave you literally everything that you wanted. Why are you, you know, acting up in this way? [1:22:23] No, no, right. And that's what we've mentioned that, you know, like we like the white backlash against civil rights was very much not limited to uneducated or working class white people. You know, the whites writing for the Atlantic were also to blame. [1:22:36] Yeah, yeah, absolutely. [1:22:37] And so city government leaders outside of Chicago swore that they would do whatever it takes to contain protests on their own streets going forward. In 1968, Philadelphia's new police commissioner, Frank Rizzo, swore that if any protesters took to the streets in Philadelphia, he would quote, make Attila the Hun look like a faggot. [1:22:56] Yeah. Unlike Attila the Hun, who drew his power from a heterogeneous constellation of barbarian peoples, Frank Rizzo's tenure as police commissioner really saw a reassertion of power by his own specific tribe, that being Catholic white ethnics, especially Italians and also Poles and the Irish. So black people were a full third of the Philadelphia population and in 1968 were about 20% of the police force. But under Rizzo, only 7% of new hires were black and the overall percent of black police declined. And so, you know, despite being a Democrat, Rizzo was in fact a close ally of Richard Nixon, having met him way back in 1952 when he was a young cop leading then VP Nixon's motorcade through the city. 20 years later, after Nixon had won his second term as president and Nixon and Rizzo jumped from commissioner to mayor, the two men reconnected. Rizzo salivated over Nixon's law and order politics and his race-baiting strategy, recognizing that, despite their differences in party, these two men were closely aligned in their goals. [1:24:07] And so, in the early 1970s, as the bicentennial approached, Rizzo asked Nixon for an official presidential sanction, making Philadelphia the official site of America's 200th birthday party. Rizzo intended the celebration to be a political spectacle to his own glory, because as other cities in America languished in poverty and lawlessness, Philadelphia would stand strong and safe and proud. Rather than just celebrate the founding of the Republic, the Bicentennial would thus stand for the defense of Rizzo's vision of society against the coalition of protesters and rabble-rousers who sought to upend it. [1:24:43] Yes, and Rizzo's leadership led to this immediate suspicion of the bicentennial from civil rights enactor and anti-war activists. There were accusations that this whole thing was being done to cover up the poverty and poor housing that did exist within the city, or that this was a waste of money that could have been spent improving the lives of city residents. [1:25:03] But then, in 1973, with less than three years to go until the bicentennial, America was gripped by the shocking revelations of the Watergate hearings. At first, the idea that the president had conspired with burglars to spy on the Democratic Party had been considered a crackpot conspiracy theory, but weeks of sworn testimony revealed metastatic criminality within the Nixon administration. Ironically, this was only revealed thanks to Nixon's habit of bugging everybody who ever spoke in the Oval Office, including himself. Watergate really broke the brains of a lot of Americans who previously believed in the honor and dignity of the presidency despite the party of the officeholder. The president was not only revealed to be a criminal, but a victim of the same kind of paranoia that gripped everybody in the 1970s. [1:25:53] Yeah, no, it's like the curtains are thrown off, and not only is he a criminal, he's just like us. He's a regular guy. He's as fallible as the rest of us. He's not the automaton of George Washington rising from his tomb. Well, I think he did everything right, and they indicted him. [1:26:09] Right. But and so, but again, like, so we should want to underscore here that before Watergate and before Johnson, it was really commonplace for everyday Americans to just love the president, regardless of party. By 1973, for better and for worse, that genuinely naive, I would say, state of affairs had been washed away. Now, opinions on the president will be determined first and foremost by partisanship. Therefore, despite the general public really freaking out over Watergate, Republican leaders circled ranks and defended the disgraced President Nixon. A small handful of prominent Democrats supported Nixon throughout Watergate as well, including, as you might expect, Frank Rizzo. Rizzo was very tainted by his racism and his defense of Nixon, but more than anything else, he was tainted by his reversal of the promise that he would never raise taxes. [1:27:04] To make matters worse, when Nixon resigned in 1974, the promise of presidential funds for the Centennial dried up. Philadelphians were left holding the bag, and in 1975, they would revolt, staging a mass attempted recall of Frank Rizzo. All polling indicated that if a vote was held, Rizzo would lose. Hundreds of thousands of citizens signed the recall petition in the months leading up to the centennial. This meant that the celebrations, which were slated to be held in July, would have huge implications on Rizzo's political survival. Left-wing groups across the city decided that if Rizzo attempted to politicize the bicentennial, then they would politicize it as well. [1:27:43] Right. Yeah, and so there was some genuine tension leading up to this, you know, because, like, you know, the 70s was a genuinely unstable time. There was a lot more civil violence than I think we are used to today. There were multiple assassination attempts against Johnson around this period. I'm sorry, against Ford. And so there were genuine fears basically of some kind of terror attack or mass violent protest or riot that would happen. [1:28:10] Right. And so during all of this. [1:28:12] Despite all of these fears, the officially sanctioned bicentennial events mostly went on without a hitch. And there was a lot of sports and games and concerts across the historic part of downtown Philadelphia, which included a 50,000-pound birthday cake served to the attendees. And tragically, as far as we can tell, the giant knife and fork were not dug up to serve the cake. [1:28:35] Now, Liam, from what I can tell, your parents were present at the celebrations. Did they have a chance to try this cake? [1:28:41] Yeah, yeah, yeah. I think a lot of like, you know, kids, teenagers, you know, young people in Philadelphia at the time showed up. And I think from their point of view, it was just a whole bunch of sports games. There was, because there was like a, there were, they had big baseball, basketball, football, and even hockey events happening during the Centennial in Philadelphia, the big international events. And there were a whole bunch of concerts, which we'll get into in a minute. I think that, you know, the first Centennial was really this kind of world's fair event. The bicentennial was basically just more like a giant block party that happened to have several hundred thousand attendees in this massive park, Independence Park, in the center of Philadelphia. The keystone for the whole thing was the night of July 4th itself. And this was hosted by longtime Nixon and Ford ally Charlton Heston, the actor, you know, Mr. Ten Commandments. [1:29:34] And it featured appearances by President Gerald Ford, as well as even Queen Elizabeth. The Queen presented a replica of the Liberty Bell as kind of a colonial apology. [1:29:45] Although, so things were going very much according to plan within the chained fences of Independence Park, but outside, there was discontent stirring. And so that summer, activist groups led by remaining civil rights and anti-war elements organized a pretty serious counter-demonstration, which marked, which marched across the poorer and less white parts of Philadelphia. This unsanctioned people's bicentennial really brought left-wing politics to the forefront of the bicentennial, involving political causes that would have been basically unthinkable several years prior, when Johnson had proclaimed the celebration. There were black power groups, radical labor organizations, some outright communist groups, and even Native American and Latino activists who had come over from Western states to assemble, to provide their own perspective on America's founding. The Philadelphia Inquirer wrote that the group was accompanied by about 150 members of Vietnam veterans against the war. Dressed in army fatigues and marching in approximate formation, they counted cadence: one, two, three, four, we won't fight a rich man's war, as they walked by. [1:30:56] Then the July 4th coalition chanted slogans including: The people united will never be defeated, no more broken treaties, no more wounded knees, and even ho-ho homosexual, the sodomy laws are ineffectual. [1:31:13] I've heard the other ones before, I guess, but the last one, it's great. We should, you know, maybe we should even recriminalize homosexuality so we can start chanting that again. Just so I'm sure Frank Rizzo would have loved that. [1:31:28] And Frank Rizzo, in fact, demanded 15,000 National Guards be on site to counter this substantial coalition of radicals. However, the Ford administration, not seeing a serious threat, did not indulge him. Despite all of this, there were genuine fears of rioting or terrorism. And this is probably the main reason why crowds at the 1976 celebration were much smaller than in 1876. [1:31:55] I think there really is a fundamental difference in vibes between the two celebrations and really between the two years, because the first Centennial successfully wove a cloak of optimism and harmony which they were able to throw over the violence and corruption of the era. But in 1976, this wasn't possible. I would argue that the bicentennial, in fact, reinforced feelings of instability and division. And I think this is because by the 70s, people had become fundamentally polarized, had become fundamentally paranoid, probably exceeding the division and paranoia of the 1870s, which meant that it was really never possible to repair or at least cover up these divisions the way the Gilded Age had so successfully done. Because in the 70s and the 80s and the 90s, there might have been some, you know, drizzled optimistic wax onto the fractures of American society, but there wouldn't be the gilt. [1:32:57] And I think that's somewhat interesting to consider. And that's why we are going to move on now from discussion of the centennial events, moving towards just the years 1876 and 1976, years that are so different, but also really so alike. [1:33:14] And I think that a fun way to start is to talk about music. [1:33:20] Right, so returning back to 1876, in that year, Wagner composed his American Centennial March in honor of America's century. This, of course, would be the very same year that his famous state-funded theater would open in Bayreuth, which premiered both his opera Siegfried and the massive ring cycle, which he had been writing for the past 28 years. Wagner, he really loved America, especially its geography. He claimed that just as the ancient Greeks were the first among peoples, the United States was the first among geographies. Wagner was famously an obsessive German nationalist, and his political ideologies influenced his life in music from top to bottom. Historians and musicologists have spent the past century and a half combing his works to see the ways his political beliefs and especially his notorious anti-Semitism may have been expressed through music. And his American March was written just five years after his Kaiser March, which was written to celebrate the aggressive invasion of France in 1871 and the proclamation of the German Empire. [1:34:26] Nietzsche, who knew Wagner, scoffed at Wagner's vulgar politics as well as the poor attempt to write a march anyone could actually march to. But even for Wagner, nationalistic fervor could sometimes be secondary to mammon, because after being dissatisfied at the amount of money given by the new German Empire to produce his operas, Wagner wondered that if, like so many other Germans of the 1870s, he should leave his homeland and move to America. He consulted with some American supporters about the possibility of raising funds to move him and his family to New York. This fell apart when Wagner insisted he needed at minimum $1 million to make the move, which in 1876 money is about $30 million. [1:35:10] Right. And continuing on the theme of music, Thomas Edison would invent the first phonograph in 1877, just barely missing the centennial. Now, the feasibility of recorded music completely transformed the field, but let's get a sense of what popular music would have been like in this period. Because aside from the high music of Wagner, of course, there was also a very, like a very lively popular tradition. The popular professional form of music par excellence of the era was the minstrel show, unfortunately. From the 1830s onwards, crowds, especially urban northern crowds, flocked to see white performers donning blackface, singing, dancing, and telling jokes while inhabiting the character of a black man, who was usually portrayed as dumb, happy, and carefree. Such performances helped to set the tone for how northerners would perceive black Americans, as well as southerners large to some extent. [1:36:07] Yeah. But if you can believe it, after the Civil War, the minstrel show actually went woke, as it became common, shockingly, for black performers to participate in minstrelry. And across the 19th century, it even became not uncommon for black performers to perform minstrel shows wearing blackface. And so the content of what white audiences expected to see and hear in these shows remained very similar. But now there would be an added element of authenticity in some of these shows, where they previously claimed to represent the voice of black Americans. And now black Americans who had drunk from the font of these tropes would deliver the messages themselves. As mentioned previously, black Americans were barely represented at the centennial celebrations except as waiters and performers at the Southern themed restaurant. And although these black performers would enter into a decades-old field with their own language, tropes, and characters, some of them were able to find a good living. [1:37:11] And so in 1876, you saw the debut of the song Carry Me Back to Old Virginny, which was written by the composer James Bland. Bland was one of the first black men to make it in this white-dominated field, and he would be the author of many celebrated songs of this era. I believe I read he wrote something like 700 different songs. And so many of these songs would engage in the themes of minstrelsy, because that's just what audiences expected to hear from black men. Here's some quotes here from the song. So note that it begins with Carry Me Back to Old Virginny, not Virginia. It mentions corn, cotton, and taters. The singer describes himself as an old darkie, and he says how that, Old Virginny, is where I labored so hard for old Massa, day after day in the field of yellow corn. No place on earth do I love more sincerely than Old Virginia, the state where I was born. [1:38:09] And sort of, this is written by an African American. This is a black guy who realizes that his best way of advancing in a deeply, deeply racist society is by conforming to the image that whites expected a black person to conform to. And it's pretty grim, but it certainly worked for him. This song was a real runaway hit and would be the state song of Virginia until, wait for it, 1997, when the lyrics were eventually deemed too inappropriate for a state song. [1:38:41] We should mention that thankfully, in many cases of these minstrel songs, there were sanitized versions with less explicitly racist lyrics. For instance, there's a really nice Ray Charles version that thankfully does not force the listener to hear the singer reminisce about his old Massa. [1:38:56] Yeah, and speaking of minstrel shows, the 1870s was really the first decade when this ubiquitous form of entertainment had a consistent form of competition among the popular audiences. So instead of watching the minstrel show, the audiences of 1876 could venture over to Broadway to watch the precursors of the modern musical. Edward Harrigan made a name for himself with his Mulligan Guard acts and songs. By 1878, these would be turned into proper musical plays. One of them was called The Mulligan Guard Ball. The play was a satire on inter-ethnic relations between Irish, German, and African Americans in the contemporary Lower East Side. I believe that the framing device is that the son of the Irish lead wants to marry a German woman, which sparks off the controversy. But really, the main thrust of the play is that all of these different ethnic groups found on the Lower East Side, they have a great love for their own ethnic militias. [1:39:59] And so, yeah, and that's what the title, the Mulligan Guards, mean. It's a reference to this, you know, fictitious Irish militia in the Lower East Side. But, you know, if you were politically minded during this era, you might even memorize and sing the official campaign song of the Rutherford Hayes campaign. Oh, comrades here, and did you hear the news that's going round? They say the Rebs shall rule again on Free Columbia's ground. Shall the rebel grey be put on guard to rule the boys in blue? No, never for the cry goes up for Hayes and Wheeler too. For Hayes and Wheeler too, for Hayes and Wheeler too. We'll cast our votes, the boys in blue, for Hayes and Wheeler too. [1:40:48] Yeah, that's fun, I guess, if that's your sort of thing. But I gotta say, there's been better songwriting before. [1:40:56] Yeah, that's a nice kind of, you know, look at the state of music in 1876. If we jump ahead a century forward, music was an even bigger part, possibly from the perspective of attendees, maybe the biggest part of the bicentennial. Because in Philadelphia, a joint bicentennial concert between Yes and Peter Frampton saw 130 attendees, saw 130,000 attendees, the largest concert seen in the city ever before or since. Interestingly, those are both British artists. Elvis, who was very much not British, and Elton John, who is, also had official bicentennial performances in Philadelphia. On a more buttoned-up note, the New England Conservatory used the bicentennial to introduce contemporary classical music, especially by American composers, to wider audiences. There was some really good music in 1976, I gotta say. You got The Boys Are Back in Town by Thin Lizzy, Bob Dylan's album Desire, Bowie's album Station to Station, I Want You by Marvin Gaye. [1:42:00] My personal favorite from this era is probably from this year, The Royal Scam by Steely Dan. But we have to consider that by the mid-70s, rock music, which was very much hegemonic, had become essentially overripe, certainly compared to what it was in the 60s. Rock was so big that any countercultural pretensions were now farcical. The most popular rock bands for the mid-70s played it exceptionally safe, because the biggest acts were all doing radio-friendly anthems devoid of any kind of political messaging, musical experimentation, or really any meaningful lyricism. So you had on two different directions, prog rock and punk rock tackling dissatisfaction with mainstream music. The former seeking to turn rock into a more sophisticated medium for real music theory connoisseurs along the lines of jazz, and the second an attempt to strip rock back down to its earliest, angriest basics. But what fans could not anticipate was that the radio would eventually, pretty quickly, turn away from rock music basically altogether, instead moving toward dance music and disco, forms with a completely different sound, completely different considerations of what makes a song good, and I would argue a different ethos. [1:43:18] Dance music and disco were explicitly, deliberately apolitical, whereas rock music fans as late as 1976 still saw rock as a fundamentally political, anti-establishment medium, even if that was no longer true. There is one song that's not from 1976 that was pretty important that year, and that is Elton John's Philadelphia Freedom, actually recorded in 1975 as a tribute to a short-lived tennis team of that name. But when the Bicentennial, but when the Bicentennial rolls around, it was the natural theme song. Something that for a lot of Americans who have memories of 1976, they might associate that year with Philadelphia Freedom, in fact, recorded the year before. All right, so that's it for music. [1:44:06] Let's maybe move on to the other forms of media that were present in both these eras. [1:44:12] Yeah, so looking at literature, in 1876, we realized that was the year that the Harvard Lampoon first started, which of course is the celebrated humor magazine that would have a huge impact on American humor, especially with the launch of its spin-off 100 years later, or almost 100 years, the National Lampoon in 1970. We looked through the first couple issues of the Harvard Lampoon. Gotta say, not much there that's that interesting. Lots of in-jokes about life on campus in 1876. A lot of jokes about how Yalies are dumb, that kind of thing. There's one sort of funny article we saw that's about how so many students were sailing off to Greece and Italy in hope of digging up antiquities. But yeah, it's just kind of a nice little fun fact that this was the same year that this important element in the development of American humor started. [1:45:02] Right, but much more important than the Harvard Lampoon, arguably, is Mark Twain's The Adventures of Tom Sawyer, which was also published in 1876. And of course, this one is a classic. I'm sure most of you guys have read that one at some point, but it's really a terrific retrospective on life in the antebellum South in general. [1:45:21] Yeah. And I think that we should mention that, you know, this was in 1876, a decade past the Civil War. I gotta wonder if during the 1860s there might have been more hesitation about this kind of a book. I don't know. Like Uncle Tom's Cabin was the 1850s, basically. And although it covers some of the same ground, it's also, you know, much more melodramatic and much more dour because this wasn't a time and a place that you could really joke about that much because, again, this was the site of some of the most horrific forms of human bondage that ever existed. [1:45:56] Right. But when it's said and done, Mark Twain was, even though Mark Twain was an enormous critic of the South and of slavery in particular, I do think that there also is kind of this nostalgic element of Tom Sawyer that, you know, again, also might have been a little bit offensive to northern readers in particular in like 1867. I don't know. [1:46:16] I mean, yeah, of course, but I mean, that's just, you know, the generic sort of stuff about how, like, you know, stuff was funner in my youth, the colors were brighter and the food tasted better. Things like that. [1:46:28] Yeah, right, right. [1:46:29] But you know what actually was better a few decades ago? You know what's not just nostalgia? [1:46:34] Film, maybe? [1:46:35] Yes. 1976, possibly the best year of American cinema ever. There's so many great movies we can talk about from this period. Two really stand out, particularly because they are genuinely oppositional views of America. These are Taxi Driver and Rocky. So, Taxi Driver, which I'm probably am guessing most of you have seen listening to this, it is, of course, directed by Martin Scorsese from a script by Paul Schrader, who at this point was a recently divorced Midwestern Protestant living in Manhattan, addicted to 24-hour porn theaters and passing by scenes of vice and violence on a nightly basis. If you have not seen the movie, it's an expose of the grime and slime of American society told from the POV of the worst person to try to fix this: Travis Bickle, the maladjusted young cabby played by Robert De Niro. After failing to woo an untouchable young woman who works for a local political campaign, Bickle slips into psychosis. [1:47:35] He plans to assassinate the candidate she works for, but fumbles and barely avoids capture by police. After getting away, Bickle, who had just recently returned from Vietnam, makes the split-second decision to gun down a gang of pimps and johns in a backroom brothel, saving an underage prostitute. And for this, a deranged gunman is hailed as a hero. [1:47:58] Yeah, there's just been a whole flood of writing about Taxi Driver, but we should note that it's really a nuanced look at both urban blight and the reactionary attitudes and methods of the Travis Bickles and Frank Rizzos of the world, whose desire for purity isn't based on any kind of compassion, but instead a desire to mete out violence upon those they view as deserving. Now, Rocky is very much the mirror image of this sort of urban story. Rocky follows the simple and gentle Italian-American fighter who leaves the life of organized crime to become a professional boxer, challenging the haughty black champion Apollo Creed. And this movie is clearly very much inspired by the real racial anxieties of white Americans towards the unbeatable Muhammad Ali. By the 1970s, the legacy of civil rights and, in particular, the urban housing integration had convinced many whites that African Americans had taken something from them. [1:48:55] Nobody felt this more strongly than the white ethnic city dwellers, who felt that they never really got their due as white Americans in the first place. And here was Muhammad Ali, the black Muslim Viet Cong sympathizer who was rubbing all their faces in it while calling himself the greatest. [1:49:11] Right. And so Rocky had a budget of just a million dollars, but would make $225 million at the box office. This makes it one of the most profitable feature films of all time. And it was written by and starring the completely unknown Sylvester Stallone. As soon as it came out, he was one of the biggest movie stars in the world. I think also, you know, a big part of Rocky's success is that even though there are these unfortunate racial overtones, it is not an explicitly racist movie at all. I think that one really interesting creative choice along those lines is that Rocky ultimately loses the fight. He is in fact a worse fighter than Apollo Creed, but he is regardless celebrated for just trying his best. And I gotta say, that means that Rocky is very much part of that everybody gets a trophy ethos that today's conservatives tend to despise. [1:50:00] Like, actually, the interesting thing about Rocky, I just recently watched it, so it's fresh on my mind and I have thoughts. But like, it's just very funny the way that Rocky himself is coded in that movie, where it's like, you know, the backdrop of that movie is the bicentennial celebrations. And it's like, and we're going to be holding this fight to commemorate the 200th birthday of America. And so, when the fight actually happens, you have this contrast between Creed, who is dressed up like Uncle Sam, he's got, you know, the top hat, he's wearing an America suit, he has the beard, versus Rocky, who's decked out in all red attire, which I took to mean like, you know, like an implicit way of coding Rocky as like the Soviet, whereas Creed is like the ultimate American. He's Uncle Sam embodied, and again, this is a black man. [1:50:54] So, you know, that's another interesting angle to this. [1:50:57] Yeah, yeah. We gotta mention that, you know, audiences loved Rocky, but critics loved it almost as much as well. They actually, in fact, lauded its emotional simplicity in such a cynical time for American film. But a few brave voices did dissent. Slamming it with the headline, Pure 30s make-believe, the New York Times' Vincent Canby described the movie as an absurdly oversold vanity production without any believable emotion, in contrast to the technique of more acclaimed filmmakers. He writes, It's as if Mr. Stallone had studied the careers of Martin Scorsese and Francis Ford Coppola and then set out to copy the wrong things. But what I find so interesting about Rocky is that none of what we've described was an accident. Rocky is not simple and childish because that's all Stallone could dream up, but instead, because Stallone had watched Scorsese and Coppola and was sickened. The cinema of the 1970s, typically understood as a time of brilliant experimentation and thematic exploration, was to Stallone everything wrong with America. [1:52:05] Films in the 70s were too sneering, too sarcastic, and above all, too cynical. America needed a simple, straightforward savior to bring us back to the innocence of the pre-Watergate, pre-Johnson, pre-black power era. Maybe that man could be Stallone. But let's not paraphrase him. Let's hear him in his own words. [1:52:28] You've written several scripts before, but was there any special reason for you to write this one, to write Rocky? Well, I felt at the time that cinema, at least the movies I had been seeing, were at an all-time low. Everything was anti-society, anti-Christ, anti-government, anti-everything, and there was no one to root for. And I also feel that films are very cyclic, so I wanted to get back into the cycle of the films of the 40s and the 50s, where people say, hey, gee, I missed the good old films, yet Hollywood hasn't taken heed and hasn't made any good old-fashioned type films where morality was at the forefront. [1:53:08] But yeah, yeah, like, I mean, it should be noted, like, this period, it's been called by Mark Ames, American glasnost. It was, you know, the time when Americans were able to look at the dark face behind the curtain and to finally recognize it through all these great Hollywood works, which were part of the new Hollywood movement. And then came along Rocky, and suddenly, you know, instead of continuing in the same trend of All the President's Men and Taxi Driver and all that kind of fare, you get, you know, Rocky and Jaws and Star Wars, just, you know, pablum for right, right. [1:53:54] And this is kind of getting off topic, but it really feels like at the end of the day, New Hollywood was a victim of its own success because a small handful of New Hollywood directors were so successful that films like Rocky and Jaws and Star Wars completely redefined what a movie should be. They made so much money that producers had very little interest in making really anything else. And so I don't think this was, you know, necessarily expected in 1976, but basically, films along the lines of Taxi Driver would basically be consigned to the dustbin of history. They would be always very critically acclaimed, but they wouldn't ever have the same kind of box office appeal or influence within the industry as something like Rocky. And, you know, I do think this kind of connects to the idea of 1976 and the late 70s more broadly as this reactionary turn in American society, as the struggles of the 60s came to an unexpected resolution, with the reactionaries basically winning, much along the same lines as they had won in 1876. [1:55:04] So let's go back now and look at the political side of the 1876 era, especially what happened after that summer, after the first centennial. As I hope we've made abundantly clear in this episode, by 1876, Grant had endured many years of hounding in the press for reasons both deserved and undeserved. For example, in the undeserved category, he was lambasted for his regular travels on the railroads, which were not only dangerous in the era, but also meant that he was spending a lot of time away from Washington, much more than any previous president. The Grant administration justified his travels by citing his access to technology of the era. With the help of the telegraph, one could govern far away from Washington, and the railroads furnished means of returning to the city in the event of an emergency. So said Grant's supporters. But aside from the he-plays-too-much-golf type complaints, there were very serious controversies all through the Grant administration. [1:56:09] His rule was much more pay-for-play than it had been in earlier generations, and the figures around him were constantly mired in controversy. Just to give another example, as a result of the Credit Mobilier controversy, which had broken on the eve of the 1872 election, Grant's vice president, Schuyler Colfax, resigned in disgrace. The Credit Mobilier Construction Company and the Union Pacific Railroad Company worked together to defraud the government of tens of millions of dollars in the 1860s. This was graft on a scale which was entirely new to the era. And to that end, Credit Mobilier had bought congressmen left and right, including Colfax, who was at that point the Speaker of the House for the Republican Party. But Credit Mobilier was only one of the corruption scandals of the Grant term. Others, such as the aforementioned Black Friday of 1869, the whiskey ring when it turned out that Republican Party officials were faking taxes on whiskey to allow the profits from them to go into Republican coffers, and the Belknap scandal, which revealed that powerful figures within the government were selling positions as Indian agents to the highest bidder. [1:57:25] All of this and more had seriously damaged Grant's personal image, even as he himself was never directly implicated in anything. Grant had toyed with the idea of running for an unprecedented third term, an idea which ultimately came to naught as a result of his name having been dragged through the mud for so many years. Grant would step aside and make way for another Republican to take the reins of power. [1:57:50] Initially, going into 1876, the favorite had been the Senator James G. Blaine, who came from Maine. [1:57:57] Blaine from Maine. [1:57:58] Yes. He had been the Speaker of the House, like Colfax before him. Blaine had a very fiery personality, and he supported the best of Grant's reconstruction efforts. But he was also firmly in the hard money camp, and he was known as a prolific waver of the bloody shirt, as they called it. He also had the benefit of being untouched by many of the corruption scandals of the era. That is until the run-up to the 1876 convention, when he was fingered as a participant in many railroad shenanigans of the era. Nevertheless, Blaine proved very popular at the Republican convention, and in the initial rounds, he actually was in the lead. The writer Robert Ingersoll gave a famous speech at the convention where he defended Blaine against charges of impropriety in a style that feels more at home in the halls of King's Landing in Westeros than at a Republican political convention. [1:58:50] Like an armed warrior, like a plumed knight, James G. Blaine marched down the halls of the American Congress and threw his shining lances full and fair against the brazen foreheads of every defamer of his country and maligner of his honor. For the Republican Party to desert this gallant man now is worse than if an army should desert their general upon the field of battle. However, despite these wonderful orations in favor of Blaine, several ballots and the balance began to shift against him as the anti-Blaine contingent began to consolidate their votes. Ultimately, the anti-Blaine compromise became Rutherford B. Hayes, the governor of Ohio. [1:59:32] You can remember, it's Blaine from Maine and Hayes from Hades. [1:59:37] Right. So Hayes had the necessary bona fides of the era. He was a Civil War general, an anti-Catholic, a hard-money man, and a vocal supporter of civil service reform, something which both parties heavily emphasized in the election. Civil service reform was positioned as a way to do away with the great barbecue of the Grant years. Instead of political cronyism, a backbone of Jacksonian politics, the government should be staffed through a meritocratic process, as if nerds with good grades are immune to bribery. [2:00:08] Right, so on the Republican bench in 1876, you've got Rutherford B. Hayes. On the right, you have Democrat Samuel Tilden, who, like many 1860s, 1870s Democratic candidates, was a governor of New York. And while Tilden had made some noise in support of the soft money positions popular with his base, as we discussed, his heart wasn't really in it. At the end of the day, both of these men were pretty boring and differed little in substance. Hayes made some half-hearted attempts at waving the bloody shirt and painting a Democratic victory as these resurgence of the old South, but ultimately he emphasized peace with the South, which really means reconciliation with the Confederates, and a significant degree of toleration for the Confederate vision of society. However, Hayes' appeals would not win him the presidency. Instead, it was good old politics. 1876 marked a shift in the Southern Democrat demeanor, where previously they sat at home sulking and posting death to America Kaka. [2:01:16] By 1876, the South had all but shed the last vestiges of Reconstruction. There continued to be some half-hearted federal intervention on the rights of freedmen, such as the pursuit of the redshirts of North Carolina from July 1876 when they perpetrated the infamous Hamburg Massacre. All through this period, they were making increasingly bold provocations and massacres of the black population of North Carolina. But the writing on the wall was clear for all to see. Reconstruction was all but dead, even as formally the government continued to pursue formal lawsuits against these men. So, because of the optimism powering the Southern Democrats, far more of them turned out to the polls than had in previous years. Additionally, many northern voters who were exasperated with Reconstruction and tired of the endless corruption scandals which had been exposed under Grant's tenure either stayed at home or switched over to the Democrats. [2:02:14] On Election Day, 1876, Samuel Tilden would emerge the winner of the popular vote by making great gains in the northern states. But, you know, like many elections in the 19th century, it was certainly not clean, because aside from the intimidation factor in the Jim Crow South, which had been there since early 1866, both sides were actively stuffing ballots for their preferred candidate. As Richard White puts it, even the Democrats agreed Hayes had carried South Carolina in a corrupt and violent election where there were more votes cast than adult male residents. Florida and Louisiana were much harder to determine. In Florida, first the courts and then the new Democratic legislature had intervened, resulting in three different counts: one for Hayes and two for Tilden. In Louisiana, the head of the Electoral Commission, with his eye on the main chance, tried to sell the results to the highest bidder. [2:03:06] But although there was some evidence that both sides nibbled, they did not bite. This attempt failed. Both states gave their electoral votes to Hayes. [2:03:14] Yeah, this election really was one for the ages, and it makes recent contested elections in American history look like child's play. Both candidates remained stuck with 184 electoral votes apiece. There were genuine fears that political violence could reach hitherto unseen scales. George McClellan, the first commander of the Army of the Potomac during the Civil War, threatened to raise an army to march on Washington unless a solution was found. And so, negotiations between the parties continued until a compromise was finally hammered out only a few days before the inauguration was to take place. This entered history as the compromise of 1877. The Democrats would concede Hayes' victory in exchange for a guarantee by the Hayes administration that they would abrogate civil rights laws by not sending federal troops into the South. The Democrats, in turn, would make a pinky promise to respect the political and civil rights of the freedmen. [2:04:09] And as we saw above, Reconstruction was already dead in the water by the end of the Grant administration. So this compromise basically signaled the end of Reconstruction only insofar as it was a guarantee against future Republican candidates attempting to reclaim the issue of the freedmen as their own. And so before Hayes' inauguration, Grant gave his final address to Congress. Reflecting on his own presidency, Grant said, it is but reasonable to suppose that errors of judgment must have occurred. Mistakes have been made, as all can see and I admit. History shows that no administration from the time of Washington to the present has been free from these mistakes. But I leave comparisons to history, claiming only that I have acted in every instance from a conscientious desire to do what was right, constitutional within the law, and for the very best interests of the whole people. Failures must have been errors of judgment, not of intent. [2:05:07] Thus, the nation bid farewell to its first Brandon-in-Chief. [2:05:11] And, you know, just to really briefly touch on what would come after Grant, everything we've discussed so far about the 1870s, the, you know, increasing division, the paranoia, the increasing civil violence in pursuit of further social inequality, is going to continue. And I think that if there's one thing we should mention about the years after Grant, we should mention the 1877 railroad strike. [2:05:42] Right. This was one of the major flashpoints of American labor history. The labor unions had existed for some years up until this point, but this railroad strike, it really was the thing that terrified many Americans. People saw this as basically the Paris Commune springing up in their own backyard. Basically, the railway workers of several lines, I believe, they basically went on strike simultaneously because remember, this was still during the panic of 1873 and their wages kept going down. And these were just totally intolerable conditions. So, because of that, there was a widespread success in getting all these workers in this sector to rise up simultaneously and to impede railroad traffic. Now, what ultimately was their big mistake was that by impeding railroad traffic, this meant that you're also impeding the flow of mail, which is a federal crime. So, this gave the federal government a way of sending actual troops in to put this strike down by force of arms in coordination with. [2:06:55] Yeah, no, you never fuck with the mail. I think it's a very important, very important piece of advice in the United States. [2:07:01] Yeah, yeah. So, ultimately, hundreds of people would be killed, and this unrest would be put down in the meanest ways possible. Of course, this was the era of strike breaking in its finest. This was when the Pinkertons really came to a head with their prosecution of the Molly Maguires, who may or may not have been linked to organized labor. Verdict is still out on that. But, nevertheless, like, you know, very, very turbulent period in American history. And although this would be the first instance of these kinds of events, they certainly wouldn't be the last. [2:07:40] Right, and I think that while we're on the subject of breaking the back of labor, let's talk about the politics of 1976 and the consequences from there up until the present. I think that the basis for understanding this period should be Watergate and its reaction, including the Watergate babies, who were a whole bunch of first-term congressmen and women elected in 1974 due to mass national outcry about Nixonian corruption. These were about 50 young Democratic representatives and senators who were initially identified with the social movements of the 60s, basically simply because they were young. They were assumed to be in some sense countercultural. For this reason, when they were sworn in, the Washington Post compared these guys to the Maoist Red Guard in contemporary China. But unlike any Maoist, the Watergate babies prided themselves on not adhering to any party line. They saw themselves as standing for results, not ideology. [2:08:47] So I guess in this sense, they're really dangerous. And, you know, on that note, the new Democratic lawmakers of the 70s were much more amenable to using market solutions to tackle issues like poverty and healthcare. This was basically a right-wing attitude, certainly in the minds of earlier generations of Democrats. So the general mood of American liberalism in 1976 was that decency trumps everything. Policy concerns were basically secondary, and the continuing struggle for racial justice was basically set aside. [2:09:22] The Watergate babies would find their greatest champion in the Democratic nominee that year, the plain-speaking peanut farmer Jimmy Carter, who just turned 100, if you're listening, you know, in October of this year. So elected in 1976, Carter positioned himself as a unifying figure, much like Lyndon Johnson was after the Kennedy assassination. He was genuinely popular across racial and class lines, but not unlike Nixon, took controversial steps to win the support of working-class whites who had opposed civil rights. In his most notorious campaign episode, Carter took a stand against housing integration by telling the crowd of white Midwesterners that while he opposed discrimination on the basis of race, he had, quote, nothing against people who are trying to maintain the ethnic purity of their neighborhoods. And so this comment led to mass outcry from his own black supporters. And he was similarly rousted for constantly waxing poetic about his own childhood in Jim Crow, Georgia. [2:10:28] He liked to tell one story in particular about how his father never let black sharecroppers enter the home, but would sometimes, in his great beneficence, leave the window open so their destitute black tenants could listen to the radio. [2:10:41] That's bleak, man. Jesus Christ. [2:10:44] Right. And the New York Times remarked in April 1976 that one of the most striking aspects of Mr. Carter's success has been his ability in both North and South to win votes from blacks and simultaneously for many whites who feel that the government has done more than it should for racial minorities. Just like the Watergate babies who preceded him, Carter stood for decency and honesty, but not a whole lot more. Committed New Deal liberals were terrified of Carter in ways that might seem laughable today, but they weren't wrong by any stretch of the imagination. Noted CIA critic Frank Church led a valiant but doomed late primary campaign against him, and Carter cruised onto the nomination after winning a somewhat close election against the incumbent president Gerald Ford. [2:11:28] Carter's election saw a generally unprecedented turn towards economic austerity. Carter did not run on the kinds of inflammatory politics that Nixon did, but he didn't, and he didn't dirty his hands with the same kinds of blatant corruption. But Carter generally went beyond Nixon in his economic conservatism, most famously with the radical monetary policy of the Fed chairman Paul Volcker, a Nixon ally who had criticized the New Deal consensus from the very beginning, due to his reasoning that curbing inflation would take precedence over social programs that assuaged poverty but may contribute to inflation. And so. [2:12:06] Right. And so this means that when inflation reached fever levels in the 1970s, Paul Volcker rose to the occasion by spiking interest rates in an effort to reduce borrowing and investment and thus engineer an artificial recession. Just years after Democrats in Congress had seriously proposed a federal jobs guarantee to bring employment down to 0%, a Democratic White House was now steering America to 10% unemployment. The Volcker shock thus represents a sea change within the Democratic Party and in the history of American governance more broadly. And as you might expect, this kind of unemployment and immiseration caused by this sudden Carter-era austerity provided fodder for Ronald Reagan's campaign four years later, even though Reagan completely agreed with the calculus behind this decision. That being the idea that the American working class ought to burn to save the dollar, which by now was clearly understood as the global reserve currency. [2:13:11] For all of these reasons, if we're looking at politics in 1976 and of course what would come after during the Carter administration and beyond moving into Nixon, I do think we need to understand 1976 as a great retreat away from the ambitious social democratic post-war governance of the 20th century and toward a new, more unequal vision of our economy and society. You can even argue Carter's victory was one of many blows against the egalitarian ethos of the 60s. And remember that his victory against Ford was built on the cleanliness of his image, not on the strength of any of his policies. It's this turn away from politics toward personality, which would be this great gift to reactionaries later down the line, more than anyone to Ronald Reagan. And I would basically say, if we're looking at the Reagan era, this is an era that would follow in which there would be this conservative backlash against really all of the social progress of the 60s, including women, gay people. [2:14:27] And I would say it's a backlash that makes Frank Rizzo look like you get the picture. [2:14:32] Yeah, it's a very bleak era. [2:14:34] I know. I don't think even Attila the Hun would have approved. [2:14:39] Yeah, and I mean, like, the really painful thing about this all is that, like, the damage done to the American working class is really just the tip of the iceberg. In reality, like, the Volcker shock itself, it would, you know, result in the debt crisis of the Third world because with the massive rise in interest rates that this saw, on the one hand, this was devastating for many regular Americans, but on the other hand, it was a massive boon for American finance because all this capital was packing up in the third world, which was forecasted to be on the road towards industrialization and catching up with the West in terms of development. And suddenly, because interest rates are so high, first of all, the interest payments on their debts are spiking, which means that much more money has to go towards that, which leads many of them to be broke. [2:15:36] But also, capital is leaving those countries because, as it turns out, it's more profitable to hold your money in a savings account with 10% profit with no risk than keeping it invested in a dam in Cameroon or whatever. [2:15:55] Yes, and I think while we're discussing kind of the political aspect of these changes, we need to keep in mind that this was a bipartisan effort to steer American society toward a, you know, in a more austere direction, which would have horrific consequences that we've been dealing with for these past 40 years. And I think that, you know, it's like you don't want to exaggerate the similarities between 1876 and 1976, but both eras saw this retrenchment of social inequalities through deliberately engineered government actions, again, by both parties, the Democrats and the Republicans, both were implicated here. [2:16:34] And I think that, you know, we've been going quite long. I think that, you know, this is, we're basically wrapping up this whole episode. I think, Sam, I kind of want to ask you, so we've looked at the ways that 1876 and 1976 are similar, but it does feel like there's one big difference, which was that in 1876, following the bicentennial, following the Hayes inauguration, following the violent suppression of the railroad strike, there was a cooling down of American politics. And it seems like American society was basically depoliticized up until maybe World War I. Whereas in 1976, this did not happen. The Bicentennial was probably intended to reunite the country. And both Reagan and Carter ran on their personalities as unifying figures. But in 1976, American society continued to fracture as it continues to fracture today. And right now, in 2024, we are living in this period of unprecedented polarization, I'd argue, in which the very notion of consensus reality breaks down. [2:17:48] Nothing can happen in global news that is not immediately politicized, where you will not have one side often denying it outright because they think it's libcoded or whatever. So what do you think is the difference, Sam, which led to 1876 successfully, you know, pouring this molten gilt over society when that was not possible in 1976? What's the difference? [2:18:12] Well, I mean, we also wouldn't want to, you know, I'm exaggerating to the extent to which this was able to be pushed under the rug because, in reality, like there was a lot of insurgent political activity, activism from, you know, the populists, for example. This was the period of the growth of the American labor movement. So, there was a fair bit of contestation, even if the party duopoly remained largely very similar looking to the outside observer. But I would say that the big difference is that I think that 1876 was ultimately an environment when there was a lot more expansion in practice awaiting the American people. Where even if there was this depression that was, you know, depressing wages and causing deflation, which was making the debt go, which was making it more difficult for debtors to repay their loans, like there was still the feeling that this country had a lot to offer its people in a way that wouldn't be as true in later eras, just because there wasn't as much growth, there wasn't as much dynamism. [2:19:43] Yeah. You know, like, I mean, yeah, no, that's true. Industrialization also was still so early in 1876 that, you know, there was very much, I think there was significantly much more reason to be optimistic about the American economy if you were an investor than in 1976. [2:19:59] Yeah, and I mean, I guess the other point we have to stress is that, again, there was increasingly less difference between the parties and what they were actually offering, aside from, you know, like the Republicans became increasingly anti-Catholic because the Catholics tended to be Democrats. But aside from like these relatively small factors, like there just wasn't much of a difference. Like everyone was speaking the language of civil service reform. Everyone was speaking the language of the gold standard. Everyone was speaking the language of non-intervention, intervention of the federal government into state affairs, etc. [2:20:43] It's just, you know, like I wonder if how much that's just because, you know, the reassertion of Confederate power meant that with black people essentially out of the political equation, politics had become somewhat less contentious. One major question was now completely swept under the rug. [2:21:03] Well, I mean, that process also took decades. Like, it wasn't until 1897, I believe it was, that, like, Jim Crow, as we know it, finally received like the federal stamp of approval. [2:21:18] Right, right, no, you're right. It wasn't all in the 1870s, yeah. But it does seem like there was this kind of like truce or consensus in the late 1870s that toned down the temperature of electoral politics, which didn't happen in the 1970s. Instead, things got, I would say, clearly increasingly divisive. [2:21:44] Yeah, thinking about it, I think that another difference was that in this era, there was much more room to retreat into local politics of the era. So, like, you know, if you can't really make that much of a difference on the federal level or even on the state level, at least on the municipal level, you can, you know, like vote for your guy for dog catcher, and that's going to, you know, lead to these marginal changes that lead to beneficial outcomes for you. Whereas in like in the 1970s, there was also this retreat into localism, but I feel it just wasn't nearly as successful because so much more power had been centralized into federal hands that this strategy just didn't really provide the all-encompassing solution it could have in the 19th century. [2:22:39] I think that might be onto something there. If there is just one big lesson of both these eras, it's that no fight is over until it's over. And you can never assume that just because you feel like momentum and fate and the moral arc of justice is on your side, that you're going to win. And I think that, you know, I think the changes of both 1870s, 1876, and 1976 were clearly quite regrettable, but people fighting against them at the time had no idea how far things would go in the wrong direction. And so I think that we should basically never assume things can ever get worse and never assume you've won until you know you've won. [2:23:19] Well, on that note, we have the bisesquicentennial coming up in two years. So, you know, maybe there's something to look forward to there. Who knows? [2:23:27] I know, I know, yeah. I wonder if bisesquicentennial is an easier word for Americans to say. We have not heard much about it. There are certain events planned in various U.S. cities, but yeah, I'm curious where we are in a couple of years, if things are much different from what they are now. You know, it's certainly going to be an interesting time, an interesting celebration. So, yeah, so how about this? If you have any ideas for the bisesquicentennial, am I saying that right? [2:23:56] I believe so. [2:23:58] Then, yeah, then if you have any ideas, let us know and maybe we can have the Gladio Free Europe 250th birthday. I don't know. We'll figure something out. All right. Well, this has been a great one. Thank you guys all for tuning in. I am Liam, joined here by Russian Sam, and we are saying good night. And let's celebrate some Philadelphia freedom. [2:24:18] Yep, yep. Bye-bye.